

















# ITAREYOPANIṢAD

WITH

ŚAMKARĀCĀRYA'S BHĀṢYA

ENGLISH VERSION

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BY

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## PREFACE

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THE Sanskrit text and the Bhāṣya are both printed here to facilitate reference in following the English version. The division adopted in the existing editions of the Aitareya so far as the Upaniṣadic text is concerned, seems arbitrary and the lack of punctuation in the Bhāṣya adds considerably to the difficulty of comprehending the sense. My paragraphing of the Bhāṣya closely follows the arguments set forth by the commentator.

The reader cannot fail to perceive a certain charm of diction even in this prose-Upaniṣad and this is what inclined me to give it a poetic garb but I trust the English rendering will be found to be strictly faithful to the original. My English translation of Kathakopaniṣad published by Messrs. Macmillan & Co. in 1928, secured a fair degree of appreciation from the reviewers which I thought was justification enough to undertake the present work.

I feel it my duty to express my obligations to Pandit Venkateśa Sāstri of Śaṅkara Mutt, Bangalore, and to Professor Hiriyanna of Mysore whom I have consulted with great profit on some of the knotty passages in the commentary.

BANGALORE, }  
June 1934. }

D. V.



## INTRODUCTION

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The Aitareya Upaniṣad is but a section of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka* of the Ṛig Veda Brāhmaṇa. There are five *Āraṇyakas* of which the present Upaniṣad forms the fourth, fifth and sixth adhyāyas of the second *Āraṇyaka*. The seventh adhyāya which contains only the peace-chant is also included in the Upaniṣad making a total of six adhyāyas as shown below:—

### II Āraṇyaka.—

Adhyāya IV, Chap. i begins with ‘Ātmā vā idam’					
”	”	”	ii	”	‘Tā ētā dēvatāḥ’
”	”	”	iii	”	‘Sa ikṣatēmē nu’
”	V,	”	iv	”	‘Om Puruṣe ha vā’
”	VI,	”	v	”	‘Ko’yam ātmā iti’
”	VII,	”	vi	”	‘Vāṇme manasi’

These six chapters are known as ātmaṣatka since in them we find the nature of Ātman expounded as contrasted with the rest of the *Aitarēyāraṇyaka* dealing with ritual and meditation (upāsana) known as Prāṇavidyā.

With a view to showing that the central teaching of this Upaniṣad is the unity of the Ātman which is to be realized through right knowledge and not by ritual, Śaṅkara prefaces his commentary with a discussion of



the relative values of Karma and Jñāna. Karma as is well known is either secular or ritualistic. The former has reference to one's conduct in life and must conform to the generally accepted ethical standards. It is the latter, however, that requires special consideration since certain Indian schools of thought hold the view that it is the only way to liberation or at any rate that its association with jñāna is indispensable for the attainment of the spiritual goal.

Śaṅkara is positive that with the rise of knowledge Karma automatically ceases and that the two are as opposed to each other as light and darkness. Karma of whatever kind is a hindrance to liberation as its fruit has to be enjoyed in one birth or another and consequently its performance involves one in the cycle of *samsāra*. It is only Ātmajñāna that cuts asunder the knots of *samsāra* eventuating in Mokṣa.

The point for consideration is whether one who is in quest of reality should renounce Karma and embrace Samnyāsa. Samnyāsa, however, may be either Vividīṣa-Samnyāsa or Vidvat-Samnyāsa. The first is voluntary renunciation which one embraces while yet a neophyte, to qualify oneself for Vedantic study. There appear to be different views as regards the necessity of entering on the order of Samnyāsa at the stage when one is undergoing the necessary discipline for the attainment of the higher knowledge. Some hold that it is no disqualification to remain a householder (गृहस्थ), for purposes of Vedantic study and that the duties

enjoined on one in the second Āśrama can be pursued along with Vedantic disciplineship under a guru. Others are of the view that even in this preliminary stage one should join the ascetic order, as without absolute renunciation one finds it difficult to pursue Brahma-vidyā.

The qualifications insisted upon in a student of the Vedānta are:—

- (i) Discriminations of things of eternal and of ephemeral values—निव्याप्त्यवस्तुविवेकः,
- (ii) Distaste for the rewards of this and other worlds—इहामुन्नफलभोगविरागः,
- (iii) Attainment of the six virtues—समदमादिषट्क-संपत्तिः,
- (iv) Desire for freedom—मुमुक्षुत्वम्.

The six virtues under (iii) are:—Mental equipoise—समः; withdrawing the senses from their objects—दमः; abstention from works—उपरतिः; endurance of opposites like cold and heat, pleasure and pain, etc.—नितिश्चा; cultivation of the powers of concentration—समाधिः; faith in the Vedantic verities as inculcated by the preceptor—श्रद्धा. Here ‘abstention from works’ (उपरति) is taken by some to mean Samnyāsa and Śaṅkara appears to be in agreement with that view. A few among his adherents maintain that *uparati* means only the absence of distractions (Vikṣepābhāva) and that a householder is fit for Vedantic study since such peace is possible for him also. Examples of

Janaka and others are cited in support of the view that the assumption of Samnyāsa is not indispensable for the pursuit of Brahma-vidyā.<sup>1</sup>

Śaṅkara while conceding that a householder is not disqualified for such study declares that a seeker will find adequate leisure and freedom from distractions only in Samnyāsa. Hence he would recommend renunciation even for those who have not attained jñāna—अविदुषापि मुमुक्षुणा पारिव्राज्यं कर्तव्यमेव. He takes his stand on the following text:—

“शान्तोदान्त उपरतिस्तिष्ठुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्येवात्मानं पश्यति”;  
“अत्याश्रमिभ्यः परमं पवित्रं प्रोवाच सम्यग्गृषिसंघजुष्टम्” ; “न कर्मणा न प्रजया घनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः”.

What Śaṅkara would impress is that without the abandonment of the concerns of life, knowledge cannot be pursued with unabated vigour and devotion.

As regards Vidvat-Samnyāsa which is the second variety mentioned above, no injunction is necessary since renunciation inevitably follows the rise of knowledge and it is for this reason that Śaṅkara points out the incongruity of a knower (jñānin) remaining at home discharging the duties of a householder. Those who

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Advaita Vedānta Paribhāṣā*, Prayojanaparichcheda, where *uparati* is explained both ways, by Dharmarājādhvarindra. The commentator, his son Rāmakriṣṇa Dikṣita, however, is somewhat harsh on those who advocate asceticism as essential for the study of Vedānta. He thinks that it is only the pseudo-Samnyāsins elate with the honours done to them by householders who insist upon asceticism as a necessary preliminary for entering upon Vedāntic inquiry.

advocate that even after the dawn of knowledge a man may continue to fulfil the obligations of the second Āśrama, are endeavouring to support the *Samuchchaya* doctrine which Śaṅkara assails in no uncertain terms. Since the injunction is absolute even secular Karma seems prohibited so far as the jñānin is concerned but an important exception is made even in his case. Work undertaken with the object of helping humanity is not regarded as holding the worker in bondage to *samsāra*. This is the *lokasaṃgraha* type of duty as enjoined in the *Bhagavadgīta*. Śrī Kṛṣṇa and Janaka though they were liberated souls continued to work lest mankind should go astray by thinking that a life of inaction is to be preferred to that of endeavour and service.<sup>1</sup>

Still the weight of Śaṅkara's opinion being on the side of Samnyāsa, it may be urged that this life of isolation recommended as the goal of a seeker after knowledge is likely to make him too self-centred to think of the general interests of society. In his quest for his own freedom he is neglecting thousands who are held in bondage. There is an over-estimate, it is

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<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Bhagavadgīta*, III, 22-24 :—

न मे पार्थास्ति कर्तव्यं त्रिषु लोकेषु किञ्चन ।

नानवाप्तमवाप्तव्यं वर्त एव च कर्मणि ॥

यदि ब्रह्म न वर्तेयं जातु कर्मण्यतन्द्रितः ।

मम वर्तमानवर्तन्ते मनुष्याः पार्थ सर्वशः ॥

उत्सादियुरिमे लोका न कुर्वी कर्म चेदहम् ।

संकरस्य च कर्ता स्यामुपहन्यामिमाः प्रजाः ॥

said, of 'subjective worth' and the demands of humanity receive little or no response. Exception is also taken to Samnyāsa on grounds of personal morality. One often comes across critics who argue that freed as he is from all ethical obligations a Samnyāsin might violate the accepted code of morality without the least compunction. One need not tarry long in refuting these superficial observations. It has been noted above that a neophyte has to pass through a state of preliminary discipline which strengthens his character and enables him to rise above selfishness of every kind. When he voluntarily embraces the life of a Samnyāsin, it is not that he undervalues the needs of the particular society to which he belongs or of the larger world. All that this new life means is a new attitude. His aim now is to reach the Highest Reality. He has passed through the lower stages of spiritual evolution and while he appears to be not toiling with the rest of his brethren it should not be forgotten that he exercises a silent but none the less an irresistible influence for good upon them. That itself is the service he is rendering to the society around him and that is the highest and the most beneficent service that man could render to man. He may seem to be hiding from the public vision but his is 'the sightless song of the lark'. Baseless too is the charge levelled against Samnyāsa that it is liable to lead one astray. The very fact that the aspirant has renounced the world argues an amount of self-restraint which will stand four-square to all the temptations of the flesh. Liberty and not libertinism (*yathākāmitva*) is his rule of life.

When the purblind eye has shed the scales how could the vision continue to be blurred ?<sup>1</sup>

The Upaniṣad proper begins with an elaborate account of the world-creation, the whole of the fourth adhyāya being devoted to it. Śaṅkara after meticulously expounding the texts gives as his final opinion that no serious consideration need be attached to this account since the world-phenomena are but the fabrication of the primal ignorance. The creation Śrutis are to be understood only in a secondary sense and they are, as Śaṅkara puts it, but *arthavāda*. It is a well-recognized Advaitic doctrine that the creation is a mere superimposition on the Absolute—*adhyāropa* which is followed by the negation of all that is attributed to the Brahman by pointing out that the multiplex universe is but an appearance having no independent existence apart from its ground, *viz.*, the Brahman. Such an exposition of the nature of Reality is known as *adhyāropāpavāda*—superimposition followed by negation. It is only when the uninstructed mind is made aware of the nature of the vast concourse of things which constitute the world that it can clearly grasp the nature of the Supreme Reality which sustains the universe of names and forms. The Eternal remains in lone purity in describing which the words

“ Are like the babblings in a dream

Of nightmare, when the babblings break

the dream.”

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<sup>1</sup> For a fuller discussion of the topic of Samnyāsa the reader is referred to Śaṅkara's commentary on *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, II. 23-1 and on *Vedānta Sūtra*, III, 4-19.

It is the Nameless that assumes countless names, and predication of any kind—Is, Is not, etc., (cf. p. 93), is impossible of that which is Peace, Bliss and Secondless (शान्तम्, शिवम्, अद्वैतम्, *Mandukya Up.*)

The next topic of importance, which forms in fact the central teaching of the Aitareyopaniṣad is the unity of Ātman. The contention that there are three selves, Jīva, Īśvara and Parabrahma (p. 76) is met by the argument that the ordinary instruments of knowledge are inadequate to prove the existence of even Jīva—the individual soul. Neither perception nor inference is a fit instrument for the comprehension of the self. Though it is conceded that the self cannot be brought within the compass of sense-perception by practically all Indian philosophers, it is contended that the Ātman can be the object of inferential knowledge. Against this view it is urged that inference is a mental act and the self when engaged in it is incapable of cognizing anything else except what is being inferred. In other words, the Vṛttijñāna, i.e., consciousness as conditioned by antahkaraṇa, has reference to only one mental act and is discursive in character. It is only the Ātman that can, being the witness of all mental and sensory activities, be regarded as the common ground of such activities. While the pure secondless Ātman is a necessary presupposition for all modes of consciousness, the delimited Ātman functions only in time. It is in this way that the contradictory texts like 'the Ātman is hearer,' 'the Ātman is non-hearer,' etc., (p. 831) can be reconciled.

Now the Aitareya begins with the text—'Ātman alone there was at first' testifying to the secondless nature of Ātman. To the query, "Who is this Ātman whom we adore?" (Chap. V, 1), the answer is given that the Ātman is Hiranyagarbha himself, the Lord of the universe, known as Prajña which Prajña is finally equated with Brahma—'Prajñānam Brahma'. We have here the first of the six canons of interpretation accepted by the Indian philosophers of practically all schools, namely, the coherence between the beginning and the end or the first statement and the last (agreement between *Upakrama* and *Upasamhāra*); the second is the repetition—*abhyāsa* pointing to unity as indicated in the passage, 'And he perceived that very Being—the Brahman—overspreading all' (p. 69); the third is *apūrva* or newness since no human means of knowledge can prove the unity of Ātman; the fourth is the reward—*phala*—promised in land of bliss—*Svarga* (p. 108); the fifth is *arīhāvāda* or laudation as indicated in the texts describing the world-creation and Ātman's entry into the body: "He slit the suture of the skull and entered by that door" (p. 65); finally, we have the test known as *yukti* or reason as when it is pointed out that the three states of waking, dream and sleep are all illusory, in the text—"For him there are three states and all the three are but dreams" (p. 66).

Thus the finale of the teaching, namely, the unity of Ātman and Parabrahman is confirmed by these six well-recognized tests of interpretation.



Before closing this somewhat brief introduction reference may perhaps be made to Professor Keith's observations on this Upaniṣad which forms, as noted above, adhyāyas 4-6 of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*. In his introduction to the *Āraṇyaka* published by the Professor in the Clarendon Press, he says that he follows neither the Advaitic school of thought nor of the Vaiṣṇava. At the same time he admits that the interpretation of the Upaniṣads is far from easy or certain. Though disagreeing with Śaṅkara or for that matter with any of the great Indian thinkers, he concedes that these are "the first books of a new faith and were to be fated to be the source of a system of philosophy whose influence in India is still permanent".

We need not pause to examine Professor Keith's attitude towards the Vedānta. The philological method which consists, to use his own words, "in extracting what seems the most natural meaning from the actual words", can only lead to such jejune results. Our object is to present a faithful rendering of the Upaniṣad as expounded by one of the most prominent schools of Vedāntic thought and to enable the reader to discern in however small a degree the depth and beauty of its teaching. The approach to the Upaniṣads, we may add, should be made in a spirit of sympathy and reverence, for then only will they serve as the way of life.

॥ ॐ तत्सद्ब्रह्मणे नमः ॥

# ऐतरेयोपनिषत् ।

AITAREYOPANISAD

WITH

SRI ŚAMKARĀCHĀRYA'S BHĀṢYA

॥ संबन्ध भाष्यम् ॥

## INTRODUCTION

परिसमाप्तं कर्म सहापरब्रह्मविषयविज्ञानेन सैषा कर्मणो ज्ञान-  
सहितस्य परा गतिरुक्तविज्ञानद्वारेणोपसंहृता । “ एतत्सत्यं ब्रह्म  
प्राणारूपम् ”; “ एष एको देवः ”; “ एतस्यैव प्राणस्य सर्वे देवा विभूतयः ”;  
“ एतस्य प्राणस्याऽऽत्मभावं गच्छन्देवता अप्येति ” इत्युक्तम् ।

The description of karma embracing scriptural rites and observances and of the knowledge of the lower Brahman, has been concluded and what ultimate good the performance of works along with meditation (Jñāna) will yield has been indicated by means of laudatory passages (of the third chapter of the second Aitareya).<sup>1</sup> These passages are : “ This Brahman known as Prāṇa is truth ”; “ He is the one God ”; “ Of this God alone all the other gods are but manifestations ”;

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<sup>1</sup> Meditation on सगुण or qualified Brahman is insisted on as an integral part of the ritual. Uktha is praise-chant in prose as contrasted with Udgītha which is in verse.

“Realizing his oneness with this Prāṇa he becomes one with all the gods.”

सोऽयं देवताप्ययलक्षणः परः पुरुषार्थः । एष मोक्षः । स चायं ययोकेन ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयसाधनेन प्राप्तव्यो वातः परमस्तीत्येके प्रतिपन्नाः ; ताच्चिराच्चिकीर्षुर्हृत्तरं केवलात्मज्ञानविधानार्थमात्मा वा इदमित्याद्याह ।

Some philosophers hold that the *summum bonum*<sup>1</sup> of man consists in his attainment of the deity which he adores, that itself is salvation, that salvation is to be sought only in the path of knowledge unsevered from works,<sup>2</sup> and that there is nothing else higher than this. With the object of refuting the view of these (philosophers) and establishing the doctrine that the way of knowledge alone (leads to salvation) the following Upaniṣad has set out with the Text “Ātman alone there was in the beginning”, etc.<sup>3</sup>

कथं पुनरकर्मसंबन्धिकेवलात्मविज्ञानविधानार्थं उत्तरो ग्रन्थ इति गम्यते । अन्यार्धानवगमात् । तथा च पूर्वोक्तानां देवतानामग्न्यादीनां संसारित्वं दर्शयिष्यत्वज्ञनायादिदोषवत्त्वेन तमज्ञानापिपासाभ्यामन्ववार्ज-  
दित्वादिना । अज्ञानायादिमत्सर्वं संसार एव परस्य तु ब्रह्मणोऽ-  
ज्ञानावाप्तव्यश्रुतेः ।

<sup>1</sup> पुरुषार्थ is literally ‘human value’. The goal reached through समुच्चय is considered as the ultimate human value.

<sup>2</sup> ज्ञानकर्मसमुच्चयसाधनेन — by combining ritualistic practices with jñāna—meditation.

<sup>3</sup> The aim of this Upaniṣad is to bring home the doctrine that salvation is to be attained only by the knowledge of the Absolute and that ritual as well as meditation, however useful as a preliminary discipline, must be transcended finally.

What justification is there, one might question, for the supposition that this Upaniṣad which is the sequel (to the Upāsana section) enjoins for the attainment of salvation the knowledge of Ātman only unrelated in any manner to action?

The answer is that no other interpretation can possibly be put upon (the Upaniṣad).<sup>1</sup> To explain: gods like Agni, etc., mentioned before (as objects of meditation) will presently be shown as subject to *samsāra* because of their contamination with hunger, etc.: "He assailed him with hunger and thirst" (1. 2) and it cannot be doubted that hunger and thirst are the characteristics of *samsāra*. Of Parabrahma, however, the *śruti* declares that He is exempt from hunger, etc.<sup>2</sup>

मवत्वेवं केवलात्मज्ञानं मोक्षसाधनं न त्वत्राकर्म्मैवाधिक्रियते ।  
विशेषाश्रवणात् । अकर्म्मिण आश्रम्यन्तरत्येहाश्रवणात् । कर्म च  
ब्रह्मतीसहस्रकक्ष्यं प्रस्तुत्यानन्तरमेवाऽऽत्मज्ञानं प्रारभ्यते । तस्मा-  
त्कर्म्मैवाधिक्रियते । न च कर्मासंबन्ध्यात्मविज्ञानं, पूर्ववदन्त उप-  
संहारात् ; यथा कर्मसंबन्धिनः पुरुषस्य सुर्वात्मनः स्वावरजङ्गमादि-  
सर्वप्राण्यात्मत्वमुक्तं ब्राह्मणेन मन्त्रेण च सूर्य आत्मेत्यादिना ; तथैव  
“ एष ब्रह्मैव इन्द्रः ” इत्याद्युपक्रम्य सर्वप्राण्यात्मत्वम्, “ यच्च स्वावरं

<sup>1</sup> The beginning of this Upaniṣad—"आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्" would be purposeful if salvation is to be had from a knowledge of निर्गुणब्रह्म.

<sup>2</sup> Cp. "यो अक्षनायापिपासे ज्ञोकं मोहं जरां मृत्युमत्येति"—*Brh. Up.*, III, 5. 1, "आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्"—*Tait. Brh. up.* Thus it will be noticed that liberation means the knowledge of the nirguna—निर्विशेषात्मविषयत्वं.

सर्वं तत्प्रज्ञानेनमि”त्युपसंहरिष्यति । तथा च संहितोपनिषदि—“ एतं ब्रह्म बह्वृचा महत्युक्ते मीमांसन्ते ” इत्यादिना कर्मसंबन्धित्वमुक्त्वा “ सर्वेषु भूतेष्वेतमेव ब्रह्मेत्याचक्षते ” इत्युपसंहरति । तथा तस्यैव योऽयमशरीरः प्रज्ञात्मेत्युक्तस्य यश्चासावादित्य एकमेव तदिति विद्यादित्येकत्वमुक्तम् । इहापि कोऽयमात्मेत्युपक्रम्य प्रज्ञात्मत्वमेव प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति दर्शयिष्यति । तस्मान्नाकर्मसंबन्ध्यात्मज्ञानम् ।

Let us admit that the knowledge of Ātman only is the means to liberation; but there is no warrant for the supposition that this knowledge has to be pursued by none but an ascetic (*saṁnyāsin*) who has abandoned all works. No specific mention as regards the agent (*adhikārin*) is made, *i.e.*, it is not stated that *ātmaññāna* is meant only for one, who by forsaking works belongs to a different order (*saṁnyāsa*). As a matter of fact, the Āraṇyaka begins with the description of karma known as *Bṛhatīśahasra*<sup>1</sup> and then deals with *ātmaññāna*. Hence one performing the prescribed duties alone is declared fit for *ātmaññāna*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> प्रस्तुत्य-उपक्रम्य, having begun. *Bṛhatīśahasra* is the name of a śāstra or praise-chant recited in the form of prose as contrasted with stotra which is sung. The earlier portion of Āitareya lays down that a thousand ṛks (which are all in the bṛhatī metre) have to be recited. Śāstram is thus defined.—अप्रगीतमंत्रसाध्यगुणिनिष्ठगुणाभिधानं. Cp. II. iii. 5-6-7-8.

<sup>2</sup> न केवलं विशेषाश्रवणं किंतु सन्निधानात् कर्मणः प्रतीतिः कर्मसंबन्धित्वनियमश्रवणं चास्ति. It is not only that there is no specific injunction but because the Upaniṣad comes so close upon the karma section, evidently association with karma is enjoined on one who pursues *ātmaññāna* and not on the ascetic who has abandoned works.

Further, the knowledge of Brahman (*Ātmajñāna*) is not dissociated from karma because the conclusion is the same both of the earlier and later sections, *i.e.*, the Brāhmaṇa and the Mantra portions (of Ṛgveda) declare that one who follows the path of Karma will as the ātman of Sūrya (becoming identical with Sūrya) permeate all bodies—static and dynamic, in such texts as “Sūrya is Ātma”: even so, this Upaniṣad having begun with the statement “He is Brahman, He is Indra” (III. 1. 6), concludes with the text “All that is static is governed by Brahman (Prajña) thereby showing that Brahman (Prajña) is the inner self of all beings. Similarly, the *Samhitopaniṣad* begins with<sup>1</sup> “The Ṛgvedins contemplate this Brahman in the great praise-chant which is known as Brhatisahasra,” and thus having indicated the association of works (with *ātmajñāna*) concludes with the text “In all beings it is the same (Ātman) that is regarded as Brahman.” Again the one who is described (in *Samhitopaniṣad*) as bodiless and of the essence of pure sentience is here also referred to (in identical terms). Setting forth the query, “Who is Ātman”, the Upaniṣad ends by pointing out in the text “Prajñāna is Brahman” that Prajñāna itself is Brahman. Hence *Ātmajñāna* is not dissociated from works.

पुनरुक्त्यानर्थक्यमिति चेत्कथं “प्राणो वा अहमस्मृषे” इत्यादि-  
ब्राह्मणेन “सूर्य आत्मा” इति मन्त्रेण च निर्धारितस्याऽऽत्मन “आत्मा

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<sup>1</sup> बह्वृचः Those who recite the Ṛgveda which contains many ṛks. मीमांसन्ते-उपास्यन्ते, meditate upon. The *Samhitopaniṣad* is the section following the Ātmaṣaṭka in the *Aitareyāranyaka*.

वा इदम्" इत्यादिवाक्येन कोऽयमात्मेति प्रश्नपूर्वकं पुनर्निर्धारणं पुनरुक्तमनर्थकमिति चेत् ।

The question may well arise, how do you meet the charge of repetition? (For example), in the earlier section (*Ait. Up.*, II. 2. 3-11), it is stated, 'I am Prāṇa, O, Ṛṣi'; again, in the Mantra section (*Rigveda* I. 115. 1) 'Sūrya is the Ātman' (of both the moving and the stationary worlds). Of this Ātman so determined, a restatement in the present section of the Brāhmaṇa<sup>1</sup> (beginning with) 'This Ātman alone' there was in the beginning together with the query 'Who is Ātman?' referring to the same Prāṇa would be mere repetition and purposeless.

च । तस्यैव धर्मान्तरविशेषनिर्घाणार्थत्वाच्च पुनरुक्तादोषः । कथम्, तस्यैव कर्मसंज्ञनिबन्धो ज्ञानसहितविशेषादिविज्ञानविशेषनिर्घाणार्थत्वात् । केवलोपास्यत्वम् । अथवाऽऽत्मैसादिपरो ग्रन्थसंदर्भे व्यात्मनः कर्मजोऽयत्रोपास्यत्वम् । कर्मप्रस्तावैऽविहितत्वात्केवलोऽप्यात्मोपास्य इत्येवमर्थः । मेदामेदोपास्यत्वाद्वैक एवाऽऽत्मा कर्मविषये मेदद्यष्टिमाक् । स एवाकर्मकालेऽमेदेनाप्युपास्य इत्येवमपुनरुक्ता ।

'No' says the *Pārvaṇakṣin*, who rebuts the charge of tautology by pointing out that the sequel predicates certain other specific attributes to Him only (Prāṇa) not mentioned before. How? Prāṇa, whose knowledge

<sup>1</sup> It may be urged, says the *Samuchchaya-vādin* (one who considers that a combination of works and knowledge leads to salvation), that it would be a blemish to the teaching if the sequel merely repeats what has already been enjoined in the first part of the Scripture. He anticipates the objection and meets it.

pre-supposes karma, has the additional attributes of creating, sustaining and destroying the worlds;<sup>1</sup> or the objection may be met by assuming that the teaching of the subsequent section commencing with 'Ātman alone indeed, etc.', is for the mere purpose of meditation (Upāsana) since in dealing with the ritualistic portion even meditation becomes part of karma and cannot receive a separate treatment.<sup>2</sup> Or we may understand the teaching to refer to meditation of the Ātman viewed both as 'bhinna' and 'abhinna' i.e., when one is performing karma Ātman is to be viewed as distinct and separate but when not performing karma as identical with the person meditating.<sup>3</sup> Thus there is no room for the charge of repetition.

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<sup>1</sup> पूर्वोत्तरब्राह्मणयोरेकार्थत्वे वक्ष्यमाणमपि प्राणात्मविषयं स्यात् ।  
etc. If the previous and subsequent Brāhmaṇas convey the same teaching what follows (in the Upaniṣad) relating to Prāṇa considered as Ātman is tautological since the identity of Prāṇa and Ātman has already been established. The Brāhmaṇa here refers to the section containing the *Āitareya Upaniṣad*—Ānandagiri.

<sup>2</sup> Here, however, meditation on pure Ātman is prescribed without however abandoning the injunction that both karma and meditation are to be practised. The idea of the *Pūrvapakṣin* is that though the meditation described here is dissociated both from Karma and Uktha, which is subsidiary to it, the doctrine of Samuchchaya is not abandoned, since meditation refers to the qualified Brahman and as such is associated with works.

<sup>3</sup> भेदेति-इदं तथा उपास्यः ; अभेदेति-अहं तेत्यर्थः.

The sense of separateness is prominent when the meditation takes the form of 'this is Ātman' and identity is explicit in the form of 'I am Ātman'.



“विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह । अविद्याया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यायाऽऽमृतमश्नुते ” इति । “कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतः समाः ” इति च वाजिनाम् । न च वर्षशतात्परमायुर्मर्त्यानाम् येन कर्मपरित्यागेनाऽऽत्मानमुपासीत । दर्शितं च “तावन्ति पुरुषायुषोऽद्वां सहस्राणि भवन्ति ” इति । वर्षशतं चाऽऽयुः कर्मणैव व्याप्तम् । दर्शितश्च मन्त्रः “कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि ” इत्यादिः । तथा “यावज्जीवमग्निहोत्रं जुहोति ” ; “यावज्जीवं दर्शपूर्णमासाभ्यां यजेत ” इत्याद्याश्च । “तं यज्ञपात्रैर्दहन्ति ” इति च । ऋणत्रयश्चतुश्च ।

Further the Scripture of the Vājasaneyins explicitly enjoins a lifelong performance of works: “He who clearly grasps the significance of the conjoint performance of meditation and works will overcome death by works and gain divine bliss by meditation”; “If one is desirous of living a hundred years, one should go on doing works here unceasingly”-<sup>2</sup> A man's life does not extend beyond a hundred years and as he is enjoined to perform karma till the moment of death there is no chance for meditation on the Ātman after completing the prescribed duties. It has also been declared that “a man's days are to be counted by the number of letters in the thousand ṛks of *Bṛhatisahasra* (each ṛk in the *brhati* metre contains thirty-six letters),” and all the hundred years are filled with karma (as per text already quoted). Likewise (we have the text), “By performing here works only etc.”; “Till life lasts perform sacrifice”; “Till life lasts perform sacrifice on new moon and full moon days”; “They burn him

<sup>2</sup> *Īśāvāsyaopaniṣad* (belonging to Śuklayajurveda. Vājasaneyi śākhā, 11 and 2.)

with the sacrificial utensils he has maintained"; all indicating the obligation to perform karma till the moment of death. Also there is the śruti relating to the three debts<sup>1</sup> one has to discharge.

तत्र पारिव्राज्यादिशास्त्रं व्युत्थायाथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्तीत्यात्मज्ञानस्तुति-  
परोऽर्थवादोऽनधिकृतार्थो वा ।

If attention is drawn to the text enjoining renunciation, 'They forsake the world (i.e., having abandoned desire for wife, children, and wealth) and beg for food',<sup>2</sup> the answer is that such passages are meant only to extol the knowledge of self or they may be taken to apply to those who by some physical defect are unfit for the performance of karma.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> जायमानो वै ब्राह्मणस्त्रिभिर्ऋणवान् जायते—*Tait. Samhita*, 6. 3.

Indeed a Brahmin that is born is born with three debts. The three debts are: 1. Dēvarṇa which is discharged by sacrificing to gods, 2. Pitṛṇa discharged by begetting sons, 3. Ṛṣiṇa discharged by the study of the Vedas. The implication is that the discharging of the first two of these obligations is possible only to a householder and not to one who becomes an ascetic.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, III. 5. 1.

<sup>3</sup> सर्वं सन्यासेनापि आत्मा ज्ञातव्यः इति ज्ञानस्तुतिः ; विधित्वेऽपि कर्मानधिकृतान्ध पङ्गवादि विषयत्वमेव—*Ānandagiri*.

To the criticism that scriptural injunctions regarding *sannyāsa* would become inoperative the *Pūrvapakṣin* says that nothing more than mere praise of *ātmajñāna* (to be acquired even at the sacrifice of all one's possessions) is implied in these injunctions and that the mandatory character of the texts holds good in the case of those who are unfit for karma, such as the blind and the halt, to whom *jñāna* though not karma is possible.

न । परमार्थविज्ञाने फलादर्शने क्रियानुपपत्तेः । यदुक्तं “ कर्मिण एव चाऽऽत्मज्ञानं कर्मसंबन्धि च ” इत्यादि तत्र । परं ह्याप्तकामं सर्वसंसार-  
दोषवर्जितं ब्रह्माहमस्मीत्यात्मत्वेन विज्ञाने कृतेन कर्तव्येन वा प्रयोजन-  
मात्मनोऽपश्यतः फलादर्शने क्रिया नोपपद्यते ।

(Now follows Śaṅkara's refutation of the arguments thus far advanced in defence of the inseparable association of works with knowledge.) No, (says the *Siddhāntin*) when the knowledge of the ultimate reality is attained there is no idea of reward and in consequence karma (its means) has no place and the contention that the knowledge of self is enjoined on him only who adheres to the path of works and that such knowledge is related to karma, is untenable.<sup>1</sup> Because when one realizes one's identity with the supreme self in whom all the desires are fulfilled (*āptakāma*) and who is rid of all the impurities of *samsāra* there is nothing else for such a person to gain by works either accomplished in the past (*sañchita*) or to be accomplished in the future (*āgāmi*). When there is no consciousness of a result following from it, activity is inconceivable.

फलादर्शनेऽपि नियुक्तत्वात्करोतीति चेत् । न । नियोगाविषयात्म-  
दर्शनादिष्टयोगमनिष्टवियोगं चाऽऽत्मनः प्रयोजनं पश्यंस्तदुपायार्थी यो

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<sup>1</sup> If as is averred the enlightened man is also bound to perform karma, the question will be whether he has to do it in the expectation of some positive reward as in the case of *kāmyakarma*—permitted voluntary ritual, or do it merely on the strength of the mandatory character of the śruti enjoining it. The latter is the view of Prahākara in regard to the daily ritual नित्यकर्म—Ānandagiri.

भवति स नियोगस्य विषयो दृष्टो लोके न तु तद्विपरीतानियोगाविषय-  
ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शी । ब्रह्मात्मत्वदर्शयपि संश्लेषियुज्येत नियोगाविषयोऽपि  
सन्न कश्चिन्न नियुक्त इति सर्वं कर्म सर्वेण सर्वदा कर्तव्यं प्राप्नोति ।  
तच्चानिष्टम् । न च स नियोक्तुं शक्यते केनचित् ।

If it be said that even in the absence of such consciousness, a man does engage in action because of the scriptural injunction, the answer is that self-realization implies the conviction that the self is beyond the pale of any injunction (i.e., no injunction is operative as regards the one who has realized the truth of the identity of the individual self with the Supreme). It is a matter of common experience that an injunction is applicable only in the case of one who recognizing the benefit to be derived by the acquisition of that which pleases him and by the riddance of that which displeases him is in search of some means to attain his object. But no such injunction is of any value to him who has turned away from the world and set his heart on the Supreme of which no injunction can be predicated.<sup>1</sup> Nor is it valid to hold that a seer may be enjoined to perform works even though he is not a fit subject for any injunction. For in that case, the incidence of

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<sup>1</sup> In confuting the view of Prabhākara that the sense of duty is the only motive for action, Śaṅkara takes for granted that a consciousness of some beneficial result (*Iṣṭasādhana-tājñāna*) is essential to all activity. This view is as we know the one held by the Bhāttas but is accepted by Śaṅkara also. He makes an exception, however, in the case of a knower of the self from whose standpoint the distinction between end and means does not exist.

scriptural injunction being absent, it will become obligatory on all to perform all actions at all times—a result which is disastrous.<sup>1</sup> Further he is not to be commanded by any one whatsoever.<sup>2</sup>

आज्ञायस्यापि तत्प्रभवत्वान्न हि स्वविज्ञानोत्थेन वचसा स्वयं नियुज्यते नापि बहुविस्त्वाम्यविवेकिना मृत्येन । आज्ञायस्य नित्यत्वे सति स्वातन्त्र्यात्सर्वान्प्रति नियोकृत्वसामर्थ्यमिति चेत् । न । उक्तदोषात् । तथाऽपि सर्वेण सर्वदा सर्वं शिष्टं कर्म कर्तव्यमित्युक्तो दोषोऽप्यपरिहार्य एव । तदपि शास्त्रेणैव विधीयत इति चेत्, यथा कर्मकर्तव्यता शास्त्रेण कृता तथा तदप्यात्मज्ञानं तस्यैव कर्मिणः शास्त्रेण विधीयत इति चेन्न । विरुद्धार्थबोधकत्वानुपपत्तेः । न ह्येकस्मिन्कृताकृतासंबन्धित्वं तद्विपरीतत्वं च बोधयितुं शक्यम् । शीतोष्णतामिवाग्नेः ।

Even the Veda cannot be mandatory to him because it has sprung from him only. The Veda (God's word) which emanates from divine recollection (at each creation) cannot be binding on one who has attained *Īśvara*hood.<sup>3</sup> How can the all-knowing master be

<sup>1</sup> What the *Siddhāntin* means to say is that if the opponent's view is accepted unrestrained action which counts neither the competency of the doer nor the right occasion of its accomplishment will ensue.

<sup>2</sup> Having attained the divine estate the vidvān is himself become the source of all mandates ; hence neither any person nor the Veda can command him.

<sup>3</sup> If it be said that an enlightened person takes it as scriptural injunction, then how can a person who has become one with the Supreme Being lay down a law to himself ? It is incompatible for the same person to be both the subject and the object of an injunction—एकत्र कर्मकर्तृत्वविरोधात्.

guided by a servant of small wits ?<sup>1</sup> It may be urged that the scripture is eternal and its authority being underived from Īśvara is binding on all including the knower. But then the objection will remain unanswered,<sup>2</sup> namely, the necessity of recognizing, that all enjoined actions (siṣṭa) are obligatory and should be performed by all at all times. It may be asserted that the scripture itself enjoins on the same individual both

<sup>1</sup> Cp. स्वामीसन्नहि मृत्येन स्वामिनेव नियुज्यते ।

संबोधनीय एवाऽसौ सुप्तो राजेव वन्दिभिः ॥

*Sureśvar's Sambandha Vārtika*, St. 240.

The Veda commanding the self is like a servant waking his master from sleep but when once he is awake the servant withdraws from him.

There are two points to be noted here :—(i) The absurdity of Īśvara's laying down a law unto himself ; (ii) The incongruity of the Veda, which as the work of Īśvara obviously gives expression to very much less than what its author knows, presuming to instruct him.

<sup>2</sup> If Īśvara is the author of the Veda, which is the view of the Naiyāyikas then the objection pointed out above will arise ; for if it should command the knower who is identical with Īśvara it would mean a dependent authority commanding one who is the source of its authority. Though it may legitimately command everyone else it must make an exception in the case of its own author. On the other hand if it is assumed with the Mīmāṃsakas that the Veda is self-existent (svatasiddha) and has had no author, even the single exception noted above disappears rendering the knower also liable to be commanded. The answer is that if its injunctions are to be understood as of universal application nothing but social disintegration will follow as no reason exists to restrict and regulate their operation.

action and self-knowledge. Just as the performance of works is a scriptural mandate, so is the acquisition of *Ātmajñāna*. But it cannot be so, since it is impossible that the scripture can make two statements which are contradictory to each other. Of one and the same person it is not possible to speak of his entire dissociation from works—accomplished and to be accomplished—and again of his association with works (which is a contradictory statement). It will be like the assertion that fire is both hot and cold.

न चेष्टयोगचिकीर्षाऽऽत्मनोऽनिष्टवियोगचिकीर्षा च शास्त्रकृता सर्व-  
प्राणिनां तद्दर्शनाच्छास्त्रकृतं चेत्तदुभयं गोपालादीनां न दृश्येताशास्त्रज्ञत्वा-  
त्तेषाम् । यद्धि स्वतोऽप्राप्तं तच्छास्त्रेण बोधयितव्यम् । तच्चेत्कृतकर्तव्यता-  
विरोध्यात्मज्ञानं शास्त्रेण कृतं कथं तद्विरुद्धां कर्तव्यतां पुनरुत्पादयेच्छी-  
ततामिवाग्नौ तम इव च भानौ ।

It is not by scriptural ordinance that one holds fast to that which one likes and discards what one dislikes. For all creatures are alive to their own interests. If scriptural teaching were necessary it would follow that herdsmen and the rest, ignorant of scriptures, would be oblivious of both (what conduces to their interest and what not). It is only when something cannot be known (by human means and one's own experience) that scriptural enlightenment is necessary.<sup>1</sup> (In other words, scriptural injunction has a

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<sup>1</sup> The contention of the *Pūrvapakṣin* is that even in an enlightened person desire for action is generated by the Śāstra though likes and dislikes have been suppressed by him, as witness the injunction "One desirous of svarga should perform *Jyotiṣṭoma*". The *Siddhāntin's* reply is that it is only when

place only when a thing cannot be known by one's unaided intellect). Since that is so, the scripture has enjoined only self-knowledge which by its very nature is subversive of all action past and future: and how can it generate again its very opposite—a desire for action? Would it not be like predicating cold of fire and darkness of sun?

न बोधयत्येवेति चेत् । न । स म आत्मेति विद्यात्प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति चोपसंहारात् । तदात्मानमेवावेत्तत्त्वमसीत्येवमादिवाक्यानां तत्परत्वात् । उत्पन्नस्य च ब्रह्मात्मविज्ञानस्याबाध्यमानत्वाच्चानुत्पन्नं भ्रान्तं वेति शक्यं वक्तुम् ।

Then (the *Pūrvapakṣin*) may say that such knowledge (i.e., of the self) is not inculcated at all. "You are wrong," (says the *Siddhāntin*), because of the scriptural text, "Know, He is my Self,"<sup>1</sup> "Pure consciousness is Brahman"—thus ends the present Upaniṣad.<sup>2</sup> "He understood that (Brahman residing in the body as Jiva) as his self"<sup>3</sup>; "That thou art".<sup>4</sup> These and other passages all point to the identity (of Jiva with Brahman). When once the knowledge of the Brahman being one's own self is gained, it is impossible to regard it as not significant at all because

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there is desire that Śāstra teaches the means but does not generate the desire itself:—

स्वभावतः प्राप्तप्रयोजनार्थितानुवादेन तदुपायमात्रं शास्त्रेण बोध्यते,  
न तु साप्याधीयते—Ānandagiri.

<sup>1</sup> *Samhitopaniṣad*, Aitareya Āraṇyaka, III. 4-10.

<sup>2</sup> *Att. Up.*, III. 1.

<sup>3</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, I. 4-10. *Lit.* 'It knew only itself.'

<sup>4</sup> *Chchāndogya Up.*, VI. 8-7.



as a matter of fact we do not fail to understand it; nor could it be considered as a myth and an illusion as the sense it conveys is never contradicted.<sup>1</sup>

त्यागेऽपि प्रयोजनाभावस्य तुल्यत्वमिति चेत् “नाकृतेनेह कश्चन” इति स्मृतेः । य आहुर्विदित्वा ब्रह्म व्युत्थानमेव कुर्यादिति तेषामप्येष समानो दोषः प्रयोजनाभाव इति चेत् । न । अक्रियामात्रत्वाद्व्युत्थानस्य । अविद्यानिमित्तो हि प्रयोजनस्य भावो न वस्तुधर्मः । सर्वप्राणिनां तद्-  
(दद)शैनात् । प्रयोजनतृष्णया च प्रेर्यमाणस्य बाह्यनःकायैः प्रवृत्तिदर्शनात् “सोऽकामयत जाया मे स्यात्” इत्यादिना पुत्रवित्तादि पाङ्क्तलक्षणं काम्यमेवेति “उभे ह्येते साध्यसाधनलक्षणे एषणे एव” इति वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणेऽवधारणात् ।

Renunciation (abstention from karma) even in the case of an enlightened person, it may be said, is as purposeless (as adherence to karma) since the ~~Brahman~~ declares “for him here is no purpose served by performing some deed or not performing it.”<sup>2</sup> Those who aver that renunciation alone must be embraced after acquiring the knowledge of Brahman (are liable to) the same charge as renunciation also yields no fruit. This is not so (there is a vital difference between the two). Renunciation on the part of the Jñānin means mere cessation from works and nothing else. All notions of recompense arise from ignorance (avidyā), only and not from anything inherent in the object.

<sup>1</sup> If a verbal statement is to be dismissed as invalid it must be on one of these considerations: unintelligibility, indecisiveness, contradiction. Here none of these features of *aprāmāṇyatā* is found.

<sup>2</sup> *Bhagavadgītā*, III. 18.

This is common experience.<sup>1</sup> When one is prompted by longings to achieve an end, one's thought, speech, and bodily movements manifest themselves. (The scripture also supports this view.) "Let me have a wife, so he desired"<sup>2</sup> showing in this and other texts that the five-fold motives for action relating to sons, wealth, etc., all arise out of desire only.<sup>3</sup> "Both the end and the means are prompted by one's desire only."<sup>4</sup> This point is made explicit in Vājasaneyā Brāhmaṇa.<sup>5</sup>

अविद्याकामदोषनिमित्ताया वाङ्मनःकायप्रवृत्तेः पाङ्क्तलक्षणाया विदुषोऽविद्यादिदोषाभावादनुपपत्तेः क्रियाभावमात्रं व्युत्थानं न तु यागादिवदनुष्ठेयस्य सावात्मकं तच्च विद्यावत्पुरुषधर्म इति न प्रयोजनमन्वेष्टव्यम् । न हि तमसि प्रविष्टस्योदित आलोके यद्गतं पङ्कण्टकाद्यपतनं तत्किंप्रयोजनमिति प्रश्नार्हम् । व्युत्थानं तदर्थ्यप्राप्तत्वाच्च चोदनार्हमिति ।

<sup>1</sup> There are two readings : (a) तद्दर्शनात् because it is seen in all, viz., that longing for an object proceeds from one's own desire and not from anything inherent in the object. (b) तद् दर्शनात् since such a desire is not seen in an enlightened person as he is rid of avidyā.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, I. 4. 1.

<sup>3</sup> पाङ्क्तलक्षणं काम्यं—karma or ritual, so called because it is characterized by five, viz., wife, husband, son, wealth acquired from gods, wealth acquired from men. *Cp. Tait. Up. Sikṣavalli*, Ch. 8th:—पत्नी यजमान पुत्र दैव मानुषवित्तैः पञ्चभिः संपाद्यते इति यज्ञः, पाङ्क्त इत्यर्थः. The five indispensable elements for a sacrifice are here mentioned.

<sup>4</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, III. 5. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, I. 4. 17.

गार्हस्थ्ये चेत्परब्रह्मविज्ञानं जातं तत्रैवास्त्वकुर्वत आसनं न ततोऽन्यत्र गमनमिति चेत् ।

Because all activity connected with speech, mind and body is the result of the taint of desire generated by nescience, there is no room for the operation of the five motives to action (noted above) in an enlightened person who is free from the taint of avidyā and has nothing to do with works. Renunciation is nothing more than the abandonment of works (or as Ānandagiri puts it, renunciation in the case of a knower follows from no effort of his own—*ayatnasiद्धam*).

It is not positive activity, something to be done like a yāga, etc. Abandonment of desire is the very characteristic of a Brahmajñānin (and results from no effort). Hence no other specific advantage is to be sought there. He who has started on his journey in the dark will, when the light dawns, avoid falling into a pit or mire or treading on thorns and no question ought to arise as to the benefits of avoiding such risks. It will then be argued that since renunciation perforce results with the dawn of knowledge it is not something that can aptly come under scriptural injunction; hence if one should acquire in the state of a householder the knowledge of Parabrahman one might remain at home abandoning all works and need not proceed elsewhere (*i.e.*, need not take on the order of *saṁnyāsa*).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> अर्थप्राप्तत्वात्, etc.—Since renunciation does not depend upon one's effort but is the immediate consequence of *ātma-jñāna* there is no room here for the operation of the śruti like

न । कामप्रकृत्वाद्वाहंस्थस्य । एतावान्वै कामः, उमे क्षेते  
एषणे एवेत्यवधारणात् । कामनिमित्तपुत्रवित्तादिसंबन्धनिबन्धमात्रमात्रं  
न हि ततोऽन्यत्र गमनं व्युत्थानमुच्यते । ततो न गार्हस्थ्य एवाकुर्वत  
आसनमुत्पन्नविद्यस्य । एतेन गुरुश्रुत्वातपसोरप्यप्रतिपत्तिर्विदुषः  
मिद्धा ।

No. This argument cannot stand. The life of a  
householder implies desire, and renunciation is impos-  
sible as long as that desire lasts. There is the  
authority of the scriptures: "Indeed thus far is  
Kāma";<sup>1</sup> "Both these (*sādhya* and *sādhana*—object  
sought and the means adopted therefor) are desires  
only." It is only the absence of attachment to sons,  
wealth, etc., generated by desire that really constitutes  
the departure from *grhasthāśrama* (व्युत्थानं) and that  
is regarded as renunciation.<sup>2</sup> Hence in the case of

"व्युत्थाय अथ भिक्षाचर्यं चरन्ति"; hence no unavoidable neces-  
sity for an enlightened man to abandon his homestead. It  
is entirely optional. He might remain at home even after  
spiritual enlightenment and need not formally enter on the  
ascetic order: so says the *Pūrrapakṣin*.

<sup>1</sup> "एतावान्वै कामः" *Brh. Up.*, I. 4; जाया पुत्र वित्त कर्म लक्षणा  
साधनैषणा—*Śaṅkara*.

'Thus far indeed is desire' wife, sons, wealth and works  
are the means by which a man can discharge his obligations  
to R̥ṣis, manes of his ancestors and gods.

<sup>2</sup> The reading of the commentary here should be changed  
as follows: 'काम निमित्त पुत्रवित्तादि संबन्धाभाव मात्रमेव हि ।'  
omitting न. *Cp.* the *Smṛti*: नलिङ्ग धर्मकारणं, whose equivalent  
in English is 'It is not the cowl that makes the monk'. The  
mark of a *Paramahansa* is the total absence of all taint of  
desire—even the particular garb of a *Saṁnyāsin* has no attrac-  
tion for him.

one who has abandoned works and has gained the divine knowledge, residence at home is incompatible. It also follows from this that for a knower discipleship under a teacher, penance, meditation, etc., are ruled out.<sup>1</sup>

अत्र केचिद्गृहस्था भिक्षाटनादिभयात्परिभवाच्च त्रस्यमानाः सूक्ष्म-  
दृष्टिं दर्शयन्त उत्तरमाहुः । भिक्षोरपि भिक्षाटनादिनियमदर्शनाद्देह-  
धारणमात्रार्थिनो गृहस्थस्यापि साध्यसाधनैषणोभयविनिर्मुक्तस्य देहमात्र-  
धारणार्थमशनच्छादनमात्रमुपजीवतो गृह एवास्त्वासनमिति ।

Now some house-holders afraid of a mendicant's life and fearing also that they might be put to humiliation argue thus like knowing men:<sup>2</sup> Well, since an ascetic is enjoined to beg for food just enough to sustain his body, let a house-holder who has ceased to cherish desires to achieve ends and the means of their accomplishment and who is content with the minimum allowance of food and clothing necessary for the sustenance of the body keep to the house (and not wander away in the garb of a saṁnyāsin).

<sup>1</sup> If it is said that with the suppression of all desires even apprenticeship under a teacher should cease, the *Siddhāntin* admits that it is so since attachment of every kind vanishes after one acquires the true knowledge.

<sup>2</sup> Those who argue thus are guided by no principle; but the evident fear of mendicancy is the root cause of their trend of argument. It is to ridicule such men that Śaṅkara begins the next section with the words 'Some house-holders argue thus, etc.' सूक्ष्म दृष्टी तां—का का व्यतिरेकेण स्थूल दृष्टयः, sarcastic for dull-witted men—Ānandagiri.

न स्वगृहविशेषपरिग्रहनिमित्तं कामप्रयुक्तत्वादित्युक्तोत्तरमेतत् ।  
स्वगृहविशेषपरिग्रहभावे च शरीरधारणमात्रप्रयुक्तशान्तिद्वन्द्वार्थिनः  
स्वपरिग्रहविशेषभावेऽर्थान्निष्ठकत्वमेव ।

No; (such a view cannot be valid). It has already been stated that the sense of ownership argues a craving (for the home and its belongings).<sup>1</sup> But if such ownership is denied it follows as a corollary that mendicancy alone should be resorted to, by one who seeks food and raiment for the bare maintenance of life.

शरीरधारणार्थायां भिक्षाटनादिषु प्रवृत्तौ यथा नियमो भिक्षोः  
शौचादौ च तथा गृहिणोऽपि विदुषोऽकामिनोऽस्तु नित्यकर्मसु नियमेन  
प्रवृत्तिर्यावज्जीवादिश्रुतिनियुक्तत्वात्प्रत्यवायपरिहारायेति ।

Others again urge that because certain precepts are laid down for the guidance of an ascetic both in regard to the acceptance of food and daily ablutions the house-holder who has received enlightenment and renounced desires should also attend without fail (*niyamēna*) to the obligatory duties such as the performance of *Nityakarma* prescribed in texts like

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<sup>1</sup> There is no reference to this point above if we understand it literally although the fact that ownership implies desire has been mentioned in general. It is for this reason that Ānandagiri understands from the word *gṛha*, wife, to whom one of the Upaniṣadic passages cited above specifically refers. This does not, however, alter the sense of the passage in any way. The reading should be स्वपरिग्रह विशेषभावे and not विशेषभावे.

‘throughout life, etc.,’ to avoid the sins resulting from their neglect.<sup>1</sup>

एतस्त्रियोगाविषयत्वेन विदुषः प्रत्युक्तमशक्यनियोज्यत्वाच्चेति ।

यावज्जीवादिनित्यचोदनानर्थक्यमिति चेत् । न । अविद्वद्विषयत्वेनार्थवत्त्वात् । यत्तु भिक्षोः शरीरधारणमात्रप्रवृत्तस्य प्रवृत्तेर्नियतत्वं तत्प्रवृत्तेर्न प्रयोजकम् । आचमनप्रवृत्तस्य पिपासापगमवन्नान्यप्रयोजनार्थत्वमवगम्यते । न चाग्निहोत्रादीनां तद्वदर्थप्राप्तप्रवृत्तिनियतत्वोपपत्तिः ।

अर्थप्राप्तप्रवृत्तिनियमोऽपि प्रयोजनाभावेऽनुपपन्न एवेति चेत् । न । तस्त्रियमस्य पूर्वप्रवृत्तिसिद्धत्वात्तदतिक्रमे यत्नगौरवादर्थप्राप्तस्य व्युत्थानस्य पुनर्वचनाद्विदुषः कर्तव्यत्वोपपत्तिः ।

(To this the answer is) that the application of the Vedic mandate is irrelevant and that in fact he is not the one fit for receiving commands (in other words he is beyond the sphere of the ‘ought’). Nor can it be said that the śruti ordaining the performance of *agnihotra* and other obligatory acts (*nityakarma*) in texts like “throughout life” is rendered obsolete thereby, for the injunction does apply to persons who have not yet attained to the level of a knower of Brahman. (The śruti becomes meaningful and does not therefore fail of its purpose.) The contention that there is injunction regarding mendicancy in the case of an ascetic whose activity is limited only to the preservation of his body (is untenable), for that

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<sup>1</sup> ‘यावज्जीवादि, etc.’ The śruti lays down ‘यावज्जीवं अग्निहोत्रं जुहोति.’ Having advanced the view that a man may continue to reside at home after enlightenment the opponent now adds that he must also not forsake the *nityakarma*.

injunction does not furnish the motive for his activity (which is natural to him—*svabhāratāḥ*). One who sips water as forming part of the purificatory ritual may have one's thirst slightly quenched but that is only incidental and the quenching of thirst is not the motive for the mandate.<sup>1</sup> (In the case of a householder on the other hand) the injunction to perform agnihotra does not as in this case arise incidentally (but is positive. Hence there is no parallel between the two cases.) Then it may be said that one need not follow any injunction even of an incidental character since no good will result from it; but it must be understood that the habit of subjecting oneself to discipline has been acquired already, i.e., when preparing oneself for knowledge and to suppress it now involves greater trouble than in following it. Besides the śruti also reinforces it. It follows, therefore, that the enlightened person does renounce the world, thereby recognizing the Vedic injunction though it be by the way.

अविदुषाऽपि मुमुक्षुणा पारिव्राज्यं कर्तव्यमेव । तथा च “शान्तो-  
दान्तः” इत्यादिवचनं प्रमाणम् । शमदमादीनां चाऽऽशमदर्शनसाधना-

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<sup>1</sup> The counter argument is that in case the rule regarding agnihotra does not apply to the Vidvān let not the rule regarding begging also apply to him. But the reasoning here is wrong, for there is no injunction in the latter case. If impelled by hunger he should go about for food then he is required to bind himself to certain restrictions such as going only to seven houses, etc., but seeking food is optional with him and is not mandatory. There is no injunction impelling him to act.



नामन्याश्रमेऽनुपपत्तेः । “अत्याश्रमिभ्यः परमं पवित्रं प्रोवाच  
सम्यगृषिसंघजुष्टम्” इति च श्वेताश्वतरे विज्ञायते । “न कर्मणा न  
प्रजया धनेन त्यागेनैके अमृतत्वमानशुः” इति च कैवल्यश्रुतिः ।  
“ज्ञात्वा नैष्कर्म्यमाचरेत्” इति च स्मृतेः । “ब्रह्माश्रमपदे वसेत्”  
इति च । ब्रह्मचर्यादिविद्यासाधनानां च साकल्येनात्याश्रमिषूपपत्तेर्गार्ह-  
स्थेऽसंभवात् ।

The ascetic life is a *sine qua non* even for those who are yet unenlightened but who are in search of immortality, as witness the textual authority—‘He shall cultivate peace of mind and curb all desires.’<sup>1</sup> Self-restraint, detachment and such other virtues as are aids to *ātmajñāna* are not (fully) compatible with any life other than that of an ascetic. ‘The sage expounded to the holy ascetics the exalted knowledge of the Brahman;’ this is known from the Svetāsvatara.<sup>2</sup> ‘It is not by rites, not by progeny or wealth but by renunciation have some men attained the immortal state’ this is Kaivalya Śruti. *Kai. Up.*, 2. ‘The *saṁnyāsa* should be embraced having been initiated into the knowledge of the Brahman’, this we learn from the śmṛti. And this also—‘Let one become an ascetic (as it leads to the understanding of the Brahman).’ A life of celibacy and other auxiliaries (to the knowledge of the transcendental self) are possible in their entirety for those who have entered the *saṁnyāsa* order and not when they are in the family-fold.

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<sup>1</sup> तस्मादेवं विच्छान्तो दान्त उपरतिस्तिष्ठिष्ठुः समाहितो भूत्वात्मन्ये-  
वात्मानं पश्यति । *Brh. Up.*, IV. 4-23.

<sup>2</sup> *Svet. Up.*, VI. 21.

न चासंपन्नं साधनं कस्यचिदर्हस्य साधनायालम् । यद्विज्ञानयोगीनि  
च गार्हस्थ्याश्रमकर्मणि तेषां परं फलमुपसंहृतं देवतापूजकक्षणं  
संसारविषयमेव ।

No means that is inadequate can be productive of any result.<sup>1</sup> It has been conclusively established that the rites prescribed for house-holders in association with the knowledge (meditation) of the (conditioned Brahman—*Saguna*) yield us their highest fruit—*deratāpyaya*—becoming one with the God of one's devotion, all within the sphere of *samsāra*. Hence it is clear that *ātma-jñāna* here expounded has no relation to karma.

यदि कर्मिण एव परमात्मविज्ञानमभविष्यत्संसारविषयस्यैव फल-  
स्योपसंहारो नोपापत्स्यत । अङ्गफलं तदिति चेन्न । तद्विरोध्यात्मवस्तु-  
विषयत्वादात्मविद्यायाः । निराकृतसर्वनामरूपकर्मपरमार्थात्मवस्तुविषयं  
ज्ञानममृतत्वसाधनम् । गुणफलसंबन्धे हि निराकृतसर्वविशेषात्मवस्तु-  
विषयत्वं विज्ञानस्य न प्राप्नोति तच्चानिष्टम् । “यत्र त्वस्य सर्वमात्मैवा-  
भूत्” इत्यधिकृत्य क्रियाकारकफलादिसर्वव्यवहारनिराकरणाद्विदुषः ।  
तद्विपरीतस्याविदुषो यत्र हि द्वैतमिवेत्युक्त्वा क्रियाकारकफलरूपस्यैव  
संसारस्य दर्शितत्वाच्च वाजसनेयिब्राह्मणे । तथेहापि देवतापूजं संसार-  
विषयं यत्फलमश्ननायादिमद्रूपात्मकं तत्फलमुपसंहृत्य केवलसर्वात्मक-  
वस्तुविषयं ज्ञानममृतत्वाय वक्ष्यामीति प्रवर्तते ।

<sup>1</sup> One might say that the qualifications required for entering upon Vedāntic study, viz., equanimity, temperance, and so forth are found in some sense even in house-holders implying that they are also fitted to pursue Brahma-jñāna; it is to refute such a view the Bhāṣya makes this statement. It is not by occasional practice of virtues like calmness, etc., that one acquires fitness for the study of the Vedānta, but it is by a systematic cultivation of these virtues so that they become one's second nature.

If (indeed) the knowledge of the Supreme Self were possible to one devoted to karma only, then it would not be proper to conclude (as the previous section has done) with the assignment of a reward (Hiraṇyagarbha-lokaprāpti or devatāpyaya) that is only within the sphere of *samsāra*. If it be urged that it is *aṅgaphala* (the answer) is, no.<sup>1</sup> The knowledge of the *ātman* which is the very negation of karma is the subject-matter of the divine science of Brahmanavidya which can never suffer association with karma. The means to immortality is the knowledge of that Absolute entity from which all names, forms, and action recoil. If *aṅgaphala* (subsidiary reward) stands related to Jñāna, that Jñāna cannot have for its object an entity pure and attributeless—a conclusion which is undesirable. Having begun with “Where however all is Ātman to him”<sup>2</sup> the Vājasaneyā Brāhmaṇa denies to the wise man action, agency, result, and in fact activity of any kind and the very opposite of this is predicated of the ignorant man; having said “where indeed apparent duality, etc.”, the text makes it clear that the scope of *samsāra* is characterised by action, agency, and fruit of action. So here also having in

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<sup>1</sup> What the opponent now urges is that although liberation is the outcome of Jñāna, karma which must remain associated with Jñāna has its own subsidiary reward (*aṅgaphala*) to offer, namely, the attainment of the world of Hiraṇyagarbha. Hence in his view there is no contradiction between *samsāra-phala* and *muktiphala*. To this the answer is that the true self is relationless and it is therefore inconceivable that we should think of *aṅgaphala* in respect of it.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, II. 4-14.

the conclusion (of the earlier portions of the Aitareya) described the way of attaining the state of the gods, all within the region of *samsāra* characterised by hunger, etc., the Upaniṣad proceeds to expound for the attainment of immortality, the knowledge which has for its comprehension the sole reality (the basis of phenomenal existence).

ऋषप्रतिबन्धश्चाविदुष एव मनुष्यपितृदेवलोकप्राप्तिं प्रति, न विदुषः ।  
 “सौम्यं मनुष्यलोकः पुत्रेणैव” इत्यादिलोकत्रयसाधननियमश्च्युतेः ।  
 विदुषश्चर्षप्रतिबन्धाभावो दर्शित आत्मलोकार्थिनः “किं प्रजया करि-  
 ष्यामः” इत्यादिना । तथा “एतद् अ वै तद्विद्वांस आहुर्ऋषयः काव-  
 शेयाः” इत्यादि । “एतद् अ वै तत्पूर्वे विद्वांसोऽग्निहोत्रं न जुह्वां-  
 चक्रुः” इति च कौषीतकिनाम् ।

The obligation to discharge one's debt which one owes to men, manes, and gods is enjoined on the unenlightened person only and not on the enlightened. (In other words the obstacle resulting from *ṛṇas* is only with reference to the attainment of the three lokas and not to the wise who do not seek them.) The śruti, “That world of men by sons only etc.”, is imperative in regard to the means of attaining the three worlds.<sup>1</sup> To the wise man who is longing for the world of Ātman (*ātmaloka*) the non-fulfilment of *ṛṇas* does not serve as an obstacle as made evident in

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<sup>1</sup> सौम्यं मनुष्यलोकः पुत्रेणैव जय्यो नान्येन कर्मणा ; कर्मणा पितृलोको,  
 विद्यया देवलोकः ॥ *Bṛh. Up.*, I. 5-16.

To attain (conquer) the world of men one has to rear a family and not by any other karma, by ritual the world of manes and by meditation (Vedic study) the world of gods.

passages like "What shall we do with progeny?"<sup>1</sup> So also, "Indeed the wise ṛṣis—Kāvaṣeyas say, etc."<sup>2</sup> "Indeed in times past the enlightened men gave up performing *agnihotra*" thus is said by the Kausītakins. (*Kau. Up.*, II. 5.)

अविदुःपुस्तङ्गज्ञानपाकरणे पारिव्राज्यानुपपत्तिरिति चेत् । न । प्राग्गा-  
र्हस्थ्यप्रतिपत्तेर्ऋषित्वासंभवादधिकारानारूढोऽप्यृणी चेत्स्यात्सर्वस्यर्णित्व-  
मित्यनिष्टं प्रसज्येत । प्रतिपन्नगार्हस्थ्यस्यापि "गृहादनी भूत्वा  
प्रव्रजेद्यदि वेतरथा ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेद्गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा" इत्यात्मदर्शनो-  
पायसाधनत्वेनेष्यत एव पारिव्राज्यम् ।

Then if it be urged that to an unenlightened person the order of *saṁnyāsa* is prohibited as he has not fulfilled his obligations (the answer is) no, since no obligation exists before he enters on a married life i.e., he may embrace *saṁnyāsa* immediately in the Brahmacharya stage). If again it be urged that he is indebted even though he has not become a house-holder when indebtedness will accompany all *āśramas* (shutting out altogether the door to liberation)—an undesirable consequence. Having passed on to the life of a *śānaprastha* (the hermit's life) from that of the householder one may become a *saṁnyāsin*; or else in some other manner: from bachelorhood one may pass on to

<sup>1</sup> *Brh. Up.*

<sup>2</sup> "एतदस्म वैतद्विद्वांस आहु ऋषयः कावषेयाः किमर्था वयमध्येष्यामहे,  
.."—*Āitareyaśraṇyaka*, III. 2-6.

"Why indeed should we chant the Vedas? So say the sages, the Kāvaṣeyas," because they have accomplished every thing by meditation and *jñāna*, there is no thought of winning any reward here or elsewhere.

*saṁnyāsa*, from the household or from the hermitage. Thus verily is *saṁnyāsa* commended even to one who has embraced the house-holder's life for the cultivation of the means for the knowledge of the Ātman.<sup>1</sup>

यावज्जीवादिश्रुतीनामविद्वदमुमुक्षुविषये कृतार्थता । छान्दोग्ये च  
केषांचिद्द्वादशरात्रमग्निहोत्रं हुत्वा तत ऊर्ध्वं परित्यागः श्रूयते ।

The scriptural texts enjoining life-long performance of works find their fulfilment in the case of those who are lacking in knowledge and are not actuated by a desire for liberation. In Chchandogya it is enjoined on the followers of some of its branches (Śākhā) that having performed *agnihotra* (kindled Agnihotra Fire) for twelve nights they should give it up.

यत्स्वनधिकृतानां पारिव्राज्यमिति । तच्च । तेषां पृथगेवोत्सङ्गाग्निरन-  
ग्निर्को वेत्यादिश्रवणात् । सर्वस्मृतिषु चाविशेषेणाऽऽश्रमविकल्पः प्रसिद्धः  
समुच्चयश्च ।

The statement that asceticism is intended for those who are unfit (to pursue ritualistic practices by reason of some physical defect) is untenable. Because for them *saṁnyāsa* is enjoined in a different śruti—"whether his fire is extinguished or whether he has no fire, etc." From the smṛtis also it is evident that without making any exception option is given to choose any one of the āśramas or follow one after another in succession; (the idea is that a man may become an ascetic either

<sup>1</sup> "ब्रह्मचर्यं समाप्य गृही भवेत्, गृहीभूत्वा वनी भवेत्, वनीभूत्वा प्रव्रजेत् यदिवेतरथा-ब्रह्मचर्यादेव प्रव्रजेत् गृहाद्वा वनाद्वा," etc.

Jābala Up., IV Section.

<sup>2</sup> Jābala Up., IV Section.

after the three stages are passed or in any one of them, provided renunciation has come to him, it being immaterial whether he is physically fit or not.)<sup>1</sup>

यत्तु विदुषोऽर्थप्राप्तं व्युत्थानमित्त्वशास्त्रार्थत्वे गृहे वने वा तिष्ठतो न विक्षेप इति तदसत् । न त्यागस्त्वैवार्थप्राप्तत्वाच्चान्यत्रावस्थानं स्यात् । अन्यत्रावस्थानस्य कामकर्मप्रयुक्तत्वं ह्यवोचाम । तदभावमात्रं व्युत्थानमिति च ।

Again the contention that the enlightened person may choose at will either to remain within the family-circle or in a forest since his renunciation is only consequential and not the outcome of any direct scriptural teaching is not valid.<sup>2</sup> Renunciation alone and not residence at home is the incidental result. "We have already said (says the *Siddhāntin*) that

<sup>1</sup> Cf. (a) ब्रह्मचारी गृहस्थोवा वानप्रस्थोऽपि भिक्षुः ।

य इच्छेत्परमं स्थानमुत्तमां वृत्तिमाश्रयेत् ॥

(b) अवीक्ष्य विधिवद्वेदान्पुत्रानुत्पाद्य धर्मतः ।

इष्टा च शक्तितो यश्चैर्मनो मोक्षे निवेशयेत् ॥

<sup>2</sup> It has been already shown that there is no valid ground for the doubt whether an ascetic could remain at home or not. Here is refuted the contention of the opponent that no restriction should be placed on the jñānin as to his residence, which may be at home or in a forest (यथेष्ट चेष्टा). Because asceticism is only the indirect result and not the outcome of a scriptural injunction, the opponent pleads for freedom to the ascetic to choose the home or the forest. "No," says the Vedāntin, "because the incidental character of the śruti is applicable only to renunciation and not to residence at home." —Ānandagiri. Cf. व्युत्थाय भिक्षाचर्यं चरेत्—Having abandoned works, go about with the begging bowl of an ascetic.

residence at home presupposes desire and its promptings to action and also that renunciation is merely its absence (which here means discarding home).

यथाकामित्वं तु विदुषोऽत्यन्तमप्राप्तमत्यन्तमूढविषयत्वेनावगमात् । तथा शास्त्रोदितमपि कर्माऽऽत्मविदोऽप्राप्तं गुरुभारतयाऽवगम्यते किमुतात्यन्ताविवेकनिमित्तं यथाकामित्वम् । न ह्युन्मादतिमिरदृष्ट्युपलब्धं वस्तु तदपगमेऽपि तथैव स्यादुन्मादतिमिरनिमित्तत्वादेव तस्य । तस्मादात्मविदो व्युत्थानव्यतिरेकेण न यथाकामित्वं न चान्यत्कर्तव्यमित्येतत्सिद्धम् ।

It can never happen that a man of wisdom will allow his conduct to be swayed by his desires since that can be expected only of the most ignorant. For surely, when he discards karma though enjoined by the scriptures because it is so burdensome what doubt that he will renounce action prompted by extreme thoughtlessness? An object which comes within one's ken because of one's mental or optical aberration ceases to exist so soon as the aberration is gone because its very existence is due to such mental or optical defect. The conclusion therefore is that for one who has realized the nature of the Ātman there is nothing other than renunciation: he will neither follow the lead of his desires nor discharge any (scriptural) duty.

यत्तु—“विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह इति” न विद्यावतो विद्यया सहाविद्या वर्तत इत्ययमर्थः । कस्तर्हीकासिन्पुरुष एकदैव न सह संबध्येयातामित्यर्थः । यथा शुक्तिकायां रजतशुक्तिकाज्ञाने एकस्य पुरुषस्य । “दूरमेते विपरीते विपूची अविद्या या च विद्या” इति ज्ञातेति हि काठके । तस्मान्न विद्यायां सत्यामविद्यासंभवोऽस्ति ।



(There is a scriptural text, however, which seems to support the *samuchchaya* doctrine.) The text, however, "What knowledge is and what is not knowledge; he who knows them both, etc." (has to be interpreted aright).<sup>1</sup> It is not that it inculcates the co-existence of knowledge and action in the enlightened person. Then what does it mean? It means that their simultaneous existence is impossible in the same individual just as it is impossible for a person to have the notions of nacre and silver at the same time. The *Katha* makes it clear: "Avidyā and Vidyā are opposed to each other and lead in diverse ways."<sup>2</sup> Hence when knowledge dawns ignorance must vanish.

"तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व" इत्यादिश्रुतेः । तप आदिविद्योत्पत्ति-साधनं गुरुपासनादि च कर्माविद्यात्मकत्वादविद्योच्यते । तेन विद्यमुत्पाद्य मृत्युं काममतितरति । ततो निष्कामस्त्वैकैषणो ब्रह्मविद्ययाऽमृतत्वमश्नुते इति । इत्येतमर्थं दर्शयन्नाह—"अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते" इति ।

"Meditate and know the Brahman", etc From this and other texts what is meant is that meditation

<sup>1</sup> विद्यां चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयः सह ।

अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययाऽमृतमश्नुते ॥—*Isa. Up*, 2.

He who understands that Vidyā and Avidyā can exist in the same person, only at different times and not simultaneously (एकदा), he by avidyā, i.e. upasana, overcomes death and by vidyā attains immortality.

<sup>2</sup> दूरमेते विपरीते विभूचि अविद्या च विद्येति ज्ञाता, etc.

*Katha Up.*, I, 2-4.

<sup>3</sup> *Tait. Up*, Bṛghu Valli

and other helps to the origination of knowledge as also discipleship under a preceptor being of the essence of Avidyā are termed Avidyā. With that (i.e., by Avidyā which here means meditation) having acquired *jñāna* (Vidyā) he (the devotee) transcends death which is (no other than) desire. Thereafter being free from longings he will through Brahma-knowledge achieve immortality. This is the meaning of the next half of Īśa—"having subdued death by Avidyā he by Vidyā enjoys deathlessness."

यत्तु पुरुषायुः सर्वं कर्मणैव व्याप्तं "कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषे-  
च्छतः समाः" इत्यविद्वद्विषयत्वेन परिहृतमितरथाऽसंभवात् ।

The contention that pursuant to the text "If one should live a hundred years one should perform karma unceasingly" (Īśa. U p., 2), the whole of a man's life is to be occupied with works, has been met by the answer that this injunction is applicable only to the ignorant since *karma* by its very nature cannot exist by the side of *jñāna*.

यत्तु वक्ष्यमाणमपि पूर्वोक्तस्यत्वात्कर्मणाऽविरुद्धमात्मज्ञानमिति  
तत्सर्वविशेषनिर्विशेषात्मतया प्रत्युक्तमुत्तरत्र व्याख्याने च दर्शयिष्यामः ।  
अतः केवलनिष्क्रियब्रह्मात्मैकत्वविद्याप्रदर्शनार्थमुत्तरो ग्रन्थ आरभ्यते ।

Again the plea that what this Upaniṣad is meant to teach must be in conformity with the previous teaching and that therefore there could be no irreconcilability between knowledge and works has been rebutted by pointing out that while *Karmakāṇḍa* (the previous section) is concerned with Saṅga, the *Jñanakāṇḍa* (the present section) has to do only with

Nirguṇa—the attributeless Brahman. This position will be made clear also in the exposition that follows. To sum up, the subsequent section (*viz.*, the *Aitareya Upaniṣad*) is concerned with the inculcation of the Knowledge (*vidyā*) leading to the realization of the identity of the individual self with the pure Brahman—the only reality unrelated to action.

## CHAPTER I

### प्रथमाध्यायः

ॐ आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत् ।

Om, Atman lone this was at first.

आत्मेति । आत्माऽऽप्नोतेरत्तेरततेर्वा परः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिरक्षणा-  
यादिसर्वमंसारधर्मवर्जितो नित्यशुद्धबुद्धमुक्तस्वभावोऽज्ञोऽजरोऽमृतोऽ-  
भयोऽद्वयो वा इदं यदुक्तं नामरूपकर्मभेदमिदं जगदात्मैवैकोऽग्रे जगतः  
सृष्टेः प्रागासीत् ।

Ātman is so called because, it is pervading, destroying and unlimited also; (this Ātman is) Paramātmān (who is) all-wise, all-powerful, free from all the characteristics of *samsāra* such as hunger, etc.; of the nature of eternal purity, wisdom and freedom; birthless, ageless, immortal, fearless and secondless. It is verily so<sup>1</sup> (वा). This which has been described (in Pūrvakāṇḍa) as being differentiated by name and form, viz., the Universe, existed as the one Ātman only at first, i.e., before creation.

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<sup>1</sup> वा इदं, वै इदं; “अभिव्यक्त नामरूपव्यावर्तनेनाज्म मात्रावधारणार्थो वै शब्द इत्याह.”

The particle वै is used to emphasize the notion of Ātman by dissociating it from its manifestations—name and form; इदं goes with the sentence following—“this that which has been described as etc.”

किं नेदानीं स एवैकः । न । कथं तर्ह्यामीदित्युच्यते । यद्यपीदानीं स एवैकस्तथाऽप्यस्ति विशेषः । प्रागुत्पत्तेरव्याकृतनामरूपभेदात्म-  
भूतमात्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं जगदिदानीं व्याकृतनामरूपभेदत्वाद्नेक-  
शब्दप्रत्ययगोचरमात्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं चेति विशेषः । यथा सलिला-  
त्पृथक्फेननामरूपव्याकरणात्प्राक्सलिलैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरमेव फेनं यदा  
सलिलात्पृथङ्नामरूपभेदेन व्याकृतं भवति तदा सलिलं फेनं  
चेत्यनेकशब्दप्रत्ययभावसलिलमेवेति चैकशब्दप्रत्ययभावश्च फेनं भवति  
तद्वत् ।

Then is He not now the single existing entity?  
(and is there something else beside Him?) No. Then  
how is it that the past tense '*existed*' आसीत् is used?  
(The reason is) that though even now He alone exists,  
there is a difference. Before creation, the world  
undifferentiated by name and form, remaining undis-  
tinguished from Ātman, cognizable by the notion  
conveyed by the single word Ātman, is now, because  
it is differentiated by name and form, cognized by  
notions conveyed by several words and it is also cogniz-  
ed by the single word Ātman.<sup>1</sup> This is the difference.  
For example, the notion of 'foam' remains merged in  
that of 'water' before it is differentiated from 'water'  
and assigned a name and a form. The two notions  
'water' and 'foam' will arise only after this differentia-  
tion and what was previously indicated by a single

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<sup>1</sup> आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्ययगोचरं च—even after differentiation, the  
wise understand that it is only the Ātman that manifests  
itself under various names and forms. 'आत्मैकशब्दप्रत्यय-  
गोचरत्वं विवेकिनाम्' इत्यर्थः.

word 'water', is thereafter designated by several words, such as 'water', 'foam', etc. And (it must be understood that) the notion 'foam' is comprehended also by the single term 'water'.<sup>1</sup>

नान्यत्किञ्चन मिषत् ।

And nothing other was there to act.

नान्यत्किञ्चन न किञ्चिदपि मिषन्निमिषद्वयापारवदितरद्वा । यथा सांख्यानमनात्मपक्षपाति स्वतन्त्रं प्रधानम् । यथा च काणादानामणवो न तद्दिहान्यदात्मनः किञ्चिदपि वस्तु विद्यते । किं तर्ह्यैवैक आसीदित्यभिप्रायः ।

No other operating or functioning entity beside the Ātman there existed or any other; like the Pradhāna (primordial matter) of the Sāṃkhyas, falling under the category of insentient existence and regarded as independent (of Puruṣa), or like the atoms (apart from Īśvara) of the Kāṇādas, here (in the Vedānta) no entity independent of Ātman (is admitted) to exist. What then? Ātman alone existed—that is the import (of the text).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Vide Note (1) page 36.

By implication, the passage means that it is only to the undiscriminating mind that the world of variety appears to be real. The wise regard it as a mere manifestation of the Supreme.

<sup>2</sup> मिषत्—व्यापारवत्, इतरद्वा—The use of the phrase इतरद्वा is to exclude the existence of even those objects which do not operate. The point is that though Māyā is premised (to account for the world-creation) a second entity apart from Ātman is negated because Māyā cannot operate by itself and

स ईक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति ।

Let me create the worlds—so thought the Lord.

स सर्वज्ञस्वाभाव्यादात्मैकः सञ्जीक्षत लोकान्नु सृजा इति । ननु प्रागुत्पत्तेरकार्यकरणत्वात्कथमीक्षितवान् । नायं दोषः । सर्वज्ञस्वाभाव्यात् । तथा च मन्त्रवर्णः—“अपाणिपादो जवनो ग्रहीता” इत्यादिः । केनाभिप्रायेणेत्याह— लोकानस्मःप्रभृतीन्प्राणिकर्मफलोपभोगस्थानभूतान्नु सृजै सृजेऽहमिति ।

He, the Ātman being omniscient by nature and secondless, cogitated (perceived) thus, ‘Let me create the worlds’. It might be questioned, how, before the creation, Īśvara perceived having neither body nor the senses. There is no flaw here; because of his omniscience by nature. To the same effect is the Śruti, ‘without hands and feet he runs and grasps’, etc. What object had He (in creating the worlds)? The answer is here: ‘Let me create the worlds and the rest which are the regions where the results of karma done by the creatures may be enjoyed.’<sup>1</sup>

स इमाँल्लोकानसृजत ।

(And) He created (all) these worlds.

एवमीक्षित्वाऽऽलोच्य स आत्मेमाँल्लोकानसृजत सृष्टवान् । यथेह

has no independent existence. Hence it may be inferred that Ātman is without a second अद्वितीय and that the world has a mere phenomenal existence since, before its creation, it existed only as Ātman.

<sup>1</sup> If the phenomenal aspect of the Universe is well brought home its negation becomes evident. It is in this sense that the creation-Śrutis have to be understood.

बुद्धिमांस्तथादिरेवंप्रकारान्प्रासादादीन्सृज इतीक्षित्वेक्षानन्तरं प्रासादादीन्सृजति तद्वत् ।

Having cogitated,<sup>1</sup> He the Ātman created these worlds; just as here an intelligent carpenter or some other (workman) having first decided upon the plan of constructing a mansion builds it, even so (has Īśvara created the worlds).

ननु सोपादानस्तक्षादिः प्रासादादीन्सृजतीति युक्तं निरुपादानस्वात्मा कथं लोकांस्सृजतीति । नैष दोषः । सलिलफेनस्थानीये आत्मभूते नामरूपे अव्याकृते आत्मैकशब्दवाच्ये व्याकृतफेनस्थानीयस्य जगत उपादानभूते संभवतः । तस्यादात्मभूतनामरूपोपादान स्सन्सर्वज्ञो जगन्निर्मितीति इत्यविरुद्धम् । अथवा यथा विज्ञानवान्मायावी निरुपादान आत्मानमेवाऽऽत्मान्तरत्वेनाऽऽकाशेन गच्छन्तमिव निर्मितीति तथा सर्वज्ञो देवः सर्वशक्तिर्महामाय आत्मानमेवाऽऽत्मान्तरत्वेन जगद्रूपेण निर्मितीति इति युक्तरम् । एवं च सति कार्यकारणोभयासद्वाद्यादिपक्षाश्च न प्रसज्यन्ते सुनिराकृताश्च भवन्ति ।

It is no doubt true that a carpenter builds a mansion with the aid of appropriate materials (like timber, etc.) but how can Ātman who is without such materials create the worlds? No objection can be raised (on this ground). Just as foam is spoken of separately though it is a variant of the same substance—water, and is designated by a single name (सलिलफेन, the undifferentiated foam, standing for Ātman) before the change occurs, so the one and the same Brahman may become the

<sup>1</sup> The analogy of the carpenter is to show that the creation is accomplished by a Being endowed with consciousness and not by the insentient Pradhāna and the like.



cause of the manifested world which corresponds to the differentiated foam. Hence the All-knowing becoming the material cause created the Universe since he is the substratum of the Universe of names and forms.<sup>1</sup> Or just as a magician having deliberated beforehand projects without any material aid his own self into a different self as though moving in the sky, the all-knowing Īśvara, all-potent, the mighty magician, projects his self into a different self—the world-manifestation; this is a better explanation (of creation).<sup>2</sup> Hence the position of those who hold that either the effect is unreal or the cause or both, becomes untenable and their views are thus wholly contradicted.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> From the text 'लोकानसृजत', 'He created the worlds,' Brahman's being the efficient cause of the Universe alone can be inferred but from another text 'सोऽकामयत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति'—His being the material cause also is established. Cf. *Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya on Vedānta Sū.*, 1. 4. 23 where it is explained how Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the Universe.

Another point to be noticed is that Brahman being the sole entity without a second can create the worlds only with the aid of Māyā or beginningless Illusion and as such He is only the *Vivartopādāna* or the mere ground of the Universe and not *Parīṇāmyupādāna*, the evolutionary cause.

<sup>2</sup> The second explanation is preferred because it brings home the *Vivartopādānatva* of Brahman as against his *Parīṇāmyupādānatva* and further it has the support of the Scriptures.

<sup>3</sup> The materialists—यदृच्छावादिनः, are of the view that creation is the result of chance concatenation of elements; the Naiyayikas—असत् कार्यवादिनः, that a totally new thing comes

काष्ठोक्तामसृजतेत्याह—

अम्भो मरीचीर्मरमापोऽदोऽम्भः परेण  
दिवं द्यौः प्रतिष्ठाऽन्तरिक्षं मरीचयः  
पृथिवी मरो या अधस्तात्ता आपः ।

Which worlds did He create ? It is these :—

Ambhas, Marichi, Maram, Apah ;  
That Ambhas is above the Heavens  
Sustained by them ; the Marichis form  
The sky ; the Maram is the earth  
And those below, they are the Apah.

अम्भो मरीचीर्मरमाप इति । आकाशादिक्रमेणाण्डमुत्पाद्याम्भः-  
प्रभृतील्लोकानसृजत । तत्राम्भःप्रभृतीन्स्वयमेव व्याचष्टे श्रुतिः ।  
अदन्तदम्भःशब्दवाच्यो लोकः परेण दिवं द्युलोकात्परेण परस्तात्सोऽम्भः-  
शब्दवाच्योऽम्भोभरणात् । द्यौः प्रतिष्ठाऽऽश्रयस्तस्याम्भसो लोकस्य ।  
द्युलोकादधस्तादन्तरिक्षं यत्तन्मरीचयः । एकोऽप्यनेकस्थानभेदात् बहु-  
वचनमाहमरीचय इति । मरीचिभिर्वा रश्मिभिः संबन्धान् । पृथिवी  
मरो न्नियन्तेऽस्मिन्भूतानीति या अधस्तात्पृथिव्यास्ता आप उच्यन्ते  
आप्तेर्लोकः । यद्यपि पञ्चभूतात्मकत्वं लोकानां तथाऽप्यबाहुल्या-  
दब्नामभिरेवाम्भो मरीचीर्मरमाप इत्युच्यन्ते ।

Having created the mundane egg in due order  
beginning with ether,<sup>1</sup> He brought into existence  
Ambhas and the rest. The scripture itself explains  
what these mean. That region designated by the  
word Ambhas is above the heavenly world. It is

into being out of a previous non-existence ; and a Section of  
the Bauddhas, that both cause and effect are void.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Tait. Up.*, II. 1.

called Ambhas because it is filled with water. The heaven sustains the watery world. The sky which is beneath the heavenly world is known as Marichis.<sup>1</sup> Though one, the plural 'Marichis' is used because of the several regions which it fills, or because the myriad rays of the sun pervade it. The Maram (from *mr*—to die) is the earth, because all creatures on it die. That which is below the earth is described as Āpaḥ because the people living there are filled with joy.<sup>2</sup> Though the worlds are composed of the five elements, still on account of the preponderance of water the creation is described as Ambhas, Marichis, Maram, and Āpaḥ (which are all names of water).

स ईक्षतेमे नु लोका लोकपालान्नु सृजा इति ।

He pondered—these are the worlds (I've wrought);  
May I create the Lords of the worlds.

सर्वप्राणिकर्मफलोपादानाधिष्ठानभूतांश्चतुरो लोकान्सृष्ट्वा—स ईश्वरः पुनरेवेक्षत । इमे न्वम्भःप्रभृतयो मया सृष्टा लोकाः परिपालयितृवर्जिता विनश्येयुः । तस्मादेषां रक्षणार्थं लोकपालाँल्लोकानां पालयितृषु सृजै सृजेऽहमिति ।

Having created the four worlds in which the fruit

<sup>1</sup> The reason is, the sky is the substratum of the rays of the sun. It is through the sky-medium that the sun's rays travel.

<sup>2</sup> The worlds beneath the earth are known as Pātāla fit for enjoyment by the dwellers therein such as Nāgas. Āpaḥ is connected with *āpyāyanam* (giving pleasure). Here the use of 'āpaḥ' is to designate the lower regions.

of karma is experienced by all the creatures,<sup>1</sup> He, the Over-Lord, thought again thus:—These worlds indeed, Ambhas and so forth which have been created by me, are sure to perish if left without their guardians. Therefore I will create for the well-being of these worlds, their rulers.

एवमीक्षित्वा—

सोऽद्भ्य एव पुरुषं समुद्धृत्यामूर्छयत् ।

Having thought thus:—

From out the waters e'en He bore  
The Purusa up and fashioned him.

सोऽद्भ्य एवाप्सधानेभ्य एव पञ्चभूतेभ्यो येभ्योऽम्भःप्रभृतीन्सृष्ट्वा-  
स्तेभ्य एवेत्यर्थः । पुरुषं पुरुषाकारं शिरःपाण्यादिमन्तं समुद्धृत्याद्भ्यः  
समुपादाय मृत्पिण्डमिव कुलालः पृथिव्या अमूर्छयन्मूर्छितवान्संपिण्डित-  
वान्स्वावयवसंयोजनेनेत्यर्थः ।

He, *Īśvara*, from the waters only,<sup>2</sup> i.e., from the five elements (of which the water is the most important)

<sup>1</sup> सर्वप्राणिकर्मफलोपादानाधिष्ठानभूतांश्चतुरो लोकान् ।

Having created the four worlds which are the abodes (अधिष्ठान) of the fruit of karma which all the creatures have to experience. The consequences of one's deeds have to be realized in the world of men or of gods.

<sup>2</sup> The Purusa is described as having been brought out from the depths of waters, though as a matter of fact the Virāt was fashioned from the five elements; this is because of the preponderance of the water-element.

अमूर्छयन्—मूर्तं कठिनं अकरोत्—He hardened it as the potter hardens the clay.

having created the Ambhas and the rest of the worlds, from them alone lifted up Puruṣa, as the potter takes out the clay-lump from the earth and gave him shape by joining limbs thereto.<sup>1</sup>

तमभ्यतपत्तस्याभितप्तस्य मुखं निरभिद्यत यथाऽण्डम् ।

He brooded over him ; in him  
Thus brooded o'er burst forth the mouth  
As in the egg (of a bird when hatched).

तं पिण्डं पुरुषविधमुद्दिश्याभ्यतपत् । तदभिध्यानं संकल्पं कृतवानित्यर्थः । “ यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः ” इत्यादिश्रुतेः । तस्याभितप्तस्येश्वर-संकल्पेन तपसाऽभितप्तस्य पिण्डस्य मुखं निरभिद्यत मुखाकारं सुषिर-मजायत । यथा पक्षिणोऽण्डं निरभिद्यतैवम् ।

He brooded over that, *i.e.*, the lump, desirous of giving it the shape of a man:—the meaning is that following His contemplation the Lord formed a resolution. ‘His penance consists in mere thought, etc.,’ according to the Śruti.<sup>2</sup> By Īśvara’s resolve which is His penance a hole in the shape of mouth manifested

<sup>1</sup> The Puruṣa is the Viradāṭma, the presiding Lord over the aggregate of gross elements—स्थूलशरीराभिमानी. He is the guardian of the visible universe.

<sup>2</sup> अभ्यतपत्-अभिध्यानं, संकल्पं कृतवान्—He resolved. Īśvara created the worlds by will. *Cp.* यस्य ज्ञानमयं तपः—*Mund. Up.*, I. 1. 9. God’s penance is no other than pure thought and does not involve any austere practice as in the case of men. *Chand. Up.*, VI. 2. gives a detailed account of the order of creation—सृष्टिक्रमः.

itself in that mass which was brooded over by Him, just as a bird's egg bursts when hatched.

मुखाद्वाचाऽग्निर्नासिके निरभिद्येतां नासिकाभ्यां  
प्राणः प्राणाद्वयुरक्षिणी निरभिद्येतामक्षीभ्यां चक्षु-  
श्चक्षुष आदित्यः कर्णौ निरभिद्येतां कर्णाभ्यां श्रोत्रं  
श्रोत्रादिशस्त्वङ्निरभिद्यत त्वचो लोमानि लोमभ्य  
ओषधिवनस्पतयो हृदयं निरभिद्यत हृदयान्मनो  
मनसश्चन्द्रमा नाभिर्निरभिद्यत नाभ्या अपानोऽपा-  
नान्मृत्युः शिश्रं निरभिद्यत शिश्राद्रेतो रेतस आपः ॥

From out the mouth (came forth) the speech  
Agni from speech ; the nostrils two  
Burst forth, from nostrils breath ; Vayu  
From breath ; and both the eyes burst forth,  
The sight from eyes, and Aditya  
From sight ; and both the ears burst forth,  
Hearing from ears, and space from hearing ;  
The skin came forth, from skin the hairs,  
The herbs and plants from hairs ; the heart  
Burst forth, from heart the mind, from mind  
The moon ; the navel (then) burst forth,  
From the navel, downward air,  
And death from downward air ; burst forth  
The engendering organ then and from  
The organ seed, water from seed.

तस्माच्चिर्भित्तान्मुखाद्वाक्करणमिन्द्रियं निरवर्तत तद्विद्यताऽग्निस्ततो  
वाचो लोकपालः । तथा नासिके निरभिद्येताम् । नासिकाभ्यां प्राणः

प्राणाद्वायुरिति सर्वत्राधिष्ठानं करणं देवता च त्रयं क्रमेण निर्भिन्नमिति ।  
 अक्षिणी कर्णौ त्वरघृदयमन्तःकरणाधिष्ठानं मनोऽन्तःकरणं नाभिः सर्व-  
 प्राणबन्धनस्थानम् । तस्मादपानसंयुक्तत्वादपान इति पाय्विन्द्रियमुच्यते ।  
 तस्याधिष्ठात्री देवता मृत्युः । यथाऽन्यत्र तथा शिश्नं निरभिघत  
 प्रजननेन्द्रियस्थानमिन्द्रियं रेतो रेतोविसर्गार्थत्वात्सह रेतसोच्यते रेतस  
 आप इति ॥

From that, i.e., from the mouth thus burst forth the speech-sense was produced. Agni from thence, the Lord of the worlds having speech as his seat. So also the nostrils burst forth; from the nostrils *prāṇa*<sup>1</sup> proceeded; from *prāṇa*, *Vāyu*. What is to be understood is, that in all cases, the seat of each sense, the sense-organ, and the presiding deity manifested themselves in order. Proceeded also, the two ears, the skin, the heart, the seat of *antahkaraṇa*, the mind—the inner sense, the navel—the place where all the vital airs are intertwined. Because of its connection with the downward wind the sense of evacuation is called *apāna*. Of that the presiding deity is Death. As in the other case, the generative organ (both male and female) proceeded. (The *Āpaḥ* which is the presiding deity here is *Prajāpati* conditioned by the five elements as indicated by the word *āpaḥ*.)

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<sup>1</sup> प्राणेन्द्रियं—The word *prāṇa* denotes the sense of smell. लोम denotes the sense of touch connected with the skin on which लोम, the hair, grows. हृदयान्मनः—From the heart arises the mind; the primary feelings have their seat in the heart

## CHAPTER II

### द्वितीयाध्यायः

ता एता देवताः सृष्टा अस्मिन्महत्यर्णवे प्रापतन् ।

Those very gods created thus  
Into the mighty ocean fell.

ता एता अग्न्यादयो देवता लोकपालत्वेन संकल्प्य सृष्टा ईश्वरेण, अस्मिन्संसारार्णवे संसारसमुद्रे महत्यविद्याकामकर्मप्रभवदुःखोदके तीव्र-रोगजरामृत्युमहाप्राहेऽनादावनन्तेऽपारे निरालम्बे विषयेन्द्रियजनित-सुखलवलक्षणविग्रामे पञ्चेन्द्रियार्थतृष्णामास्तविक्षोभोत्थितानर्थशतमहोमौ महारौरवतापेऽजितप्रपानशोऽव्याधेः प्रहृष्टाद्वेष्टाजलोद्भूतमहारवे सत्यार्जव-दानदयार्हिसाशमदमष्टयात्मगुणपायेयपूर्णज्ञानोद्भुपे सत्सङ्गसर्वस्वागमार्गे मोक्षतीर एतस्मिन्महत्यर्णवे प्रापतन्पतितवत्यः ।

Those deities—Agni and the rest created by Īśvara as meant for the guardianship of the worlds—fell into this great ocean of *samsāra* (life). filled with the waters of sorrow generated by the doings of men prompted by desires, themselves the offspring of primal ignorance (*avidyā*); infested by monster-crocodiles in the shape of dire diseases, old age and death; beginningless, endless, shoreless, refugeless; affording rest (seeming) in the slight pleasures begotten of the contact of senses and their objects; agitated by the mighty waves of the thousand and one pangs raised by the tempestuous wind of desire for satisfying the cravings of the five senses; echoing with the howlings and dolorous cries of those who are plunged in many an infernal region ;



disclosing at the same time the ship of wisdom sailing on the bosom of the ocean, well-stowed with the provision of such personal virtues as truth, righteousness, charity, sympathy, non-violence, tranquillity, detachment, courage, and so on; and having the well-defined route—association with the holy preceptors and renunciation—pointing to the shore beyond of liberation—into such a vast ocean the gods fell!

तस्मादग्न्यादिदेवताप्ययलक्षणाऽपि या गतिर्व्याख्याता ज्ञानकर्म-  
समुच्चयानुष्ठानफलभूता साऽपि नालं संसारदुःखोपशमायेत्ययं विवक्षितो-  
ऽथोऽत्र । यत एवं तस्मादेवं विदित्वा परं ब्रह्माऽऽत्माऽऽत्मनः सर्व-  
भूतानां च यो वक्ष्यमाणविशेषणः प्रकृतश्च जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिसंहारहेतुत्वेन  
सर्वसंसारदुःखोपशमनाय वेदितव्यः । तस्मात् “ एष पन्था एतत्कर्मै-  
तद्ब्रह्मैतत्सत्यं यदेतत्परब्रह्मात्मज्ञानम् ” । “ नान्यः पन्था विद्यतेऽयनाय ”  
इति मन्त्रवर्णात् ।

Hence the path of knowledge and works combined, the pursuit of which enables one to attain to the deity of Agni and the rest (*i.e.*, becoming one with the God of one's meditation) as already described in the *Karmakāṇḍa* is not adequate for stilling the sorrows of life. This is what has to be understood here. When this is the case and knowing thus (*i.e.*, that the performance of works combined with meditation is not the true path for the attainment of wisdom), one ought to comprehend that He who is described in the sequel as the inner being of one's self and also of all the objects of creation and who is here described as the originator, preserver and destroyer of the universe is Himself the supreme Brahman so that by such

comprehension the miseries of recurring births may come to end. We have the scriptural corroboration—  
 'That is the path, that is karma, that is Brahman, that is truth, that is the knowledge of the unity of Parabrahma and Ātma'; 'For liberation there is no other path'.'

तमशनापिपासाभ्यामन्ववार्जत् ।

Assailed He him with hunger and thirst.

नं स्थानकरणदेवतोत्पत्तिबीजभूतं पुरुषं प्रथमोत्पादितं पिण्डमात्मान-  
 मशनायापिपासाभ्यामन्ववार्जदनुगमितवान्संयोजितवानित्यर्थः । तस्य  
 कारणभूतस्याशनायादिदोषवत्त्वात्तत्कार्यभूतानामपि देवतानामशनायादि-  
 मत्त्वम् ।

Him who is the source from which spring the seat of each sense, the sense-organ, and the presiding deity, the Puruṣa—the first created, the unitary individual (Virāt), the universal self, He (Īśvara) united with hunger and thirst. Because the Virāt who is the cause is contaminated with hunger and thirst, those that are produced by him, viz., the gods are also associated with them.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> *Ait. Aranyaka*, II.1.1.

<sup>2</sup> *Svet. Up.*, III. 8; VI.15.

The Vedic texts quoted above make it evident that for the attainment of *mokṣa*, the knowledge of the unity of Ātman and Brahman and not the pursuit of knowledge and karma is the proper means. Works and meditation, however, are a preliminary discipline but certainly they are not the direct path to deliverance.

<sup>3</sup> Īśvara first subjected the Virāt-deha, the aggregate body, to hunger and thirst and as a consequence gods like

ता एनमब्रुवन्नायतनं नः प्रजानीहि यस्मिन्प्रति-  
ष्ठिता अन्नमदामेति ।

And they to Him thus spake, 'an abode,  
For us create wherein we may  
Reside and regale ourselves with food.'

तास्ततोऽशनायापिपासाभ्यां पीड्यमाना एनं पितामहं स्रष्टारमब्रुव-  
न्नुक्तवत्यः । आयतनमधिष्ठानं नोऽस्मभ्यं प्रजानीहि विधत्स्व । यस्मिन्नायतने  
प्रतिष्ठिताः समर्थाः सत्योऽन्नमदाम भक्षयाम इति ।

They the gods being thus tormented by hunger and  
thirst addressed Him, their grandfather (*svajanaka-  
piṇḍajanakam*), the Creator thus : 'Permit us an abode  
residing in which we may be able to enjoy our food.'<sup>1</sup>

ताभ्यो गामानयत्ता अब्रुवन् वै नोऽयमलमिति ।

He brought a cow to them; they said,  
'For us indeed this is not good.'

एवमुक्त ईश्वरस्ताभ्यो देवताभ्यो गां गवाकृतिविशिष्टं पिण्डं ताभ्य  
एवाद्भयः पूर्ववत्पिण्डं समुद्घृत्य मूर्छयित्वाऽऽनयद्दर्शितवान् । ताः

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Agni who are but emanations of Virāt were also assailed by  
hunger and thirst. What is in the cause must be found in  
the effect. Cf. Śaṅkara's introduction.

<sup>1</sup> The abode अधिष्ठानं, means the body. No doubt  
there was the Virāt-deha which the gods had entered but it  
was too vast for them to occupy and obtain sufficient food  
for their satisfaction as embodied in Virāt. Hence they  
prayed Īśvara to create individual bodies—व्यष्टिं शरीरं,  
so that resting in them they could come into contact with the  
external world. This is their enjoyment, this is their food.

MFN  
HOM

पुनर्गवाकृतिं दृष्ट्वाऽब्रुवन् । न वै नोऽयमर्धमधिष्ठानावाप्तमनुमयं  
पिण्डोऽलं, न वै पर्याप्तोऽस्तु न योग्य इत्यर्थः ।

Thus addressed Īśvara having as at first lifted up, for their sake only, from out the waters a lump of earth and hardening it turned it into the form of a cow's body and showed it to them—the gods. They however, seeing the figure of the cow, said, 'No, indeed this body is not adequate for us to serve as our abode and for the enjoyment of food.'<sup>1</sup>

ताभ्योऽश्वमानयत्ता अब्रुवन् वै नोऽयमलमिति ।

He brought a horse to them; they said,  
'For us indeed this is no good.'

गवि प्रत्याख्याते ताभ्योऽश्वमानयत्ता अब्रुवन् वै नोऽयमलमिति ।  
पूर्ववत् ।

When the cow was discarded, Īśvara led a horse to them but they said as before, 'This is not adequate for us.'<sup>2</sup>

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What is here referred to is the microcosmic as opposed to the macrocosmic creation—the Virāt.

<sup>1</sup> नालं, अलं means sufficient; it is not the right one for our abode. 'The gods rejected the cow because lacking in the upper row of teeth it cannot pull the grass by the root.' This explanation seems somewhat fanciful. What is meant is that creation does not reach perfection in animals.

<sup>2</sup> Though there is no physical defect in the horse as in the case of the cow it has the mental defect of non-discrimination.

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ताभ्यः पुरुषमानयत्ता अब्रुवन्सुकृतं ब्रूतेति  
पुरुषो वाव सुकृतं ता अब्रवीद्यथायतनं  
प्रविशतेति ।

He brought a man to them ; they said,  
' Well done, hurrah ! 'tis man alone  
The master-piece.' To them He said,  
' Let enter each his own abode.'

सर्वप्रत्याख्याने ताभ्यः पुरुषमानयत्स्वयोनिभूतम् । ताः स्वयोनिपुरुषं  
दृष्ट्वाऽस्त्रिधाः सत्यः सुकृतं शोभनं कृतमिदमधिष्ठानं ब्रूतेत्यब्रुवन् । तस्मा-  
त्पुरुषो वाव पुरुष एव सुकृतं सर्वपुण्यकर्महेतुत्वात् । स्वयं वा  
स्वनैवाऽऽमना स्वमायामिः कृतत्वात्सुकृतमुच्यते । ता देवता  
ईश्वरोऽब्रवीदिष्टमासामिदमधिष्ठानमिति मत्वा सर्वे हि स्वयोनिषु रमन्ते ।  
अतो यथायतनं यस्य यद्वदनादिक्रियाद्योग्यमायत्तनं तत्प्रविशतेति ।

When all were rejected (the whole of the animal kingdom as indicated by the mention of cow and horse), He brought to them man, born of himself (*i.e.*, having a body similar to that of Virāt Puruṣa).<sup>1</sup> Seeing man born of Īśvara himself the gods became elated with joy and exclaimed, 'Hurrah ! our abode is indeed well done ! It is man alone that is the best of creation for it is from him that all good deeds proceed. Because man was created directly by Īśvara by his magic powers, this creation is pronounced to be well

<sup>1</sup> When the horse was rejected because of its lack of discrimination Parameśvara created man endowed with intelligence. At once the gods uttered words of joy ; *cf. Ait. Āraṇyaka*, II. 3. 2, where reasons are given for preferring man to animals.

accomplished—sukṛtam or svakṛtam. Īśvara knowing that such an abode would be pleasing to the gods said to them, 'All rejoice to dwell in their native home; you may enter your respective abodes residing in which from eternity each deity has been aptly functioning.'

अग्निर्वाग्मूत्वा मुखं प्राविशद्वायुः प्राणो मूत्वा  
नासिके प्राविशदादित्यश्चक्षुर्मूत्वाऽक्षिणी प्रावि-  
शद्विशः श्रोत्रं मूत्वा कर्णौ प्राविशन्नोषधिवनस्प-  
तयो लोमानि मूत्वा त्वचं प्राविशंश्चन्द्रमा मनो  
मूत्वा हृदयं प्राविशन्मृत्युरपानो मूत्वा नाभिं  
प्राविशदापो रेतो मूत्वा शिश्वं प्राविशन् ।

And Agni turned to speech, entered  
The mouth, and Vayu turned to breath  
Entered the nostrils, Aditya  
To sight he turned, entered the eyes,  
To hearing quarters turned, entered  
The ears, and herbs and plants to hairs  
Did turn, entered the skin, and Moon,  
To mind did turn, entered the heart ;  
And Death did turn to downward air,  
Entered the navel and waters  
To seed did turn and the organ sought.

तथाऽस्त्वित्यनुज्ञां प्रतिलभ्येश्वरस्य नगर्यामिव बलाधिकृतादयोऽ-  
ग्निर्वागमिमानी वागेव मूत्वा स्वां योनिं मुखं प्राविशत्तथोक्तार्थमन्यत् ।

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<sup>1</sup> Let each god enter his own abode (the aperture in the body) and let there be no trespassing.

वायुर्नासिके आदित्योऽक्षिणी दिशः कर्णावोषधिवनस्पतयस्त्वचं चन्द्रमा  
हृदयं मृत्युर्नाभिमापः शिश्रं प्राविशन् ।

‘So be it as Thou commandest’; thus accepting God’s injunctions just as the generals of armies enter a town (at the command of their sovereign), Agni, the presiding deity over speech, became speech itself and entered the mouth, his own place of birth. The rest of the passage has to be construed similarly. Vāyu (entered) the nostrils; the Sun, the two eyes; the quarters (*diśah*), the two ears; shrubs and plants, the skin; the Moon, the heart: Death, the navel; the waters, the generative organ.<sup>1</sup>

तमशनापिपासे अब्रूतामावाभ्यामभिप्रजानीहीति  
ते अब्रवीदेतास्वेव वां देवतास्त्राभजाभ्येतासु  
मागिन्यौ करोमीति । तस्माद्यस्यै कस्यै च देवतायै  
हविर्गृह्यते मागिन्यावेवास्यामशनापिपासे भवतः ॥

And Him, Hunger and Thirst addressed,  
‘To us, O Lord (a place) assign.’

He answered them, ‘In these same gods  
I offer you your place; with them  
Partakers make, that so to which  
God so-ever oblation is given  
Hunger and Thirst therein will share.’

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<sup>1</sup> The mere physical or mental faculties cannot function without impulsion from a conscious being. Hence the deities Agni and the rest are spoken of as presiding over the different senses. It is not to be supposed, however, that the relation between these deities and the senses is one of cause and effect. For a fuller elucidation of this topic, *vide Ved. Sut.*, II. 4-14.

एवं लब्धाधिष्ठानासु देवतासु निरधिष्ठाने सत्त्वावशनायापिपासे तमीश्वरमब्रूतामुक्तवत्यावावाभ्यामधिष्ठानमभिप्रजानीहि चिन्तय विधत्स्वेत्यर्थः । स ईश्वर एवमुक्ते अशनायापिपासे अब्रवीत् । न हि युवयोर्भावस्वरूपत्वाच्चेतनावद्वस्त्वनाश्रित्याच्चात्तत्वं संभवति । तस्मादेतास्वेवान्याद्यासु वां युवां देवतास्वध्यात्माधिदेवतास्वाभजामि वृत्तिमंविभागनानुगृह्णामि । एतासु भागिन्यौ यद्देवत्यो यो भागो हविरादिलक्षणः स्यात्तस्यास्तेनैव भागेन भागिन्यौ भागवत्यौ वां करोमीति सृष्ट्यादावीश्वर एवं व्यदधाद्यस्मात्तस्मादिदानीमपि यस्य कस्य च देवताया अर्थाय हविर्गृह्णाने चरुपुरोडाशादिलक्षणं भागिन्यावेव भागवत्यावेवास्यां देवतायामशनायापिपासे भवतः ॥

Thus when the deities secured their residence, Hunger and Thirst, remaining without any resting place, said to Īśvara, 'Think of a site and grant it to us.' Thus addressed, Īśvara said to them, 'Since you belong to the category of abstract notions, enjoyment of food is not possible for you without association with a tangible body as in the case of a sentient being. Therefore in these very gods, Agni and the rest who dwell both within and outside the human body I assign you your abode and make you partakers of their subsistence.' Since Īśvara with the object of making them sharers in the oblations offered to the gods, decreed thus in the beginning of creation, even now hunger and thirst are sharers of oblations like rice-cakes, etc., offered for the acceptance of whichever deity.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> It is the jīva (self) that derives satisfaction from food and drink ; still as the jīva is in reality the Brahman and is free from such affections as hunger and thirst, his supposed enjoyment is therefore only through the satisfaction of the sense-deities.



## CHAPTER III

### तृतीयाध्यायः

स ईक्षतेमे नु लोकाश्च लोक-  
पालाश्चान्नेभ्यः सृजा इति ।

He pondered thus—yes, these are the worlds,  
Their rulers these ; let me create  
For them (what) food (sustains their being).

स एवमीश्वर ईक्षत । कथमिमे नु लोकाश्च लोकपालाश्च मया सृष्टा  
अशनायापिपासाभ्यां च संयोजिताः । अतो नैषां स्थितिरन्नमन्तरेण  
तस्मादन्नमेभ्यो लोकपालेभ्यः सृजै सृज इति । एवं हि लोक ईश्वराणाम-  
नुग्रहे निग्रहे च स्वातन्त्र्यं दष्टं स्वेषु तद्वन्महेश्वरस्यापि सर्वेश्वरत्वात्सर्वान्प्रति  
निग्रहानुग्रहेऽपि स्वातन्त्र्यमेव ।

“Thus thought he,” the Lord. How ? “Well these worlds and their rulers have been created by me and conjoined with hunger and thirst. Their existence is now impossible without food. Therefore I shall create food for these world-rulers.” Even so is seen in the world that men in power exercise freedom in their own sphere both in bestowing largess and in meeting out punishment. Similarly, Mahesvara, because He is the Supreme Ruler, has freedom in inflicting punishment or bestowing gifts on all.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> It pleased the Lord even without the prayers of the deities to think of creating food for them. In his potency he can do and undo things. There is his *Īśvaratva*.

सोऽपोऽभ्यतपत्ताम्योऽभितप्ताम्यो मूर्तिरजायत या  
वै सा मूर्तिरजायतान्नं वै तत् ।

He brooded over the waters (there)  
And from the waters brooded o'er  
A solid substance rose and that  
Itself was verily the food.

स ईश्वरोऽन्नं सिसृक्षुस्ता एव पूर्वोक्ता अप उद्दिश्याभ्यतपत् ।  
ताम्योऽभितप्ताम्य उपादानभूताम्यो मूर्तिर्धनरूपं धारणसमर्थं चराचर-  
लक्षणमजायततात्पन्नमन्नं वै तन्मूर्तिरूपं या वै सा मूर्तिरजायत ।

He the Lord, desirous of creating food, brooded  
over the waters mentioned before. From the waters  
thus brooded over serving as the material cause some-  
thing solid, sentient and non-sentient, was born  
capable of sustaining beings. That which sprang up as  
solid substance that indeed was the created food.<sup>1</sup>

तदेनत्सृष्टं पराङ्मत्यजिघांसत्तद्वाचाऽजिघृक्षत्तन्ना-  
शक्नोद्वाचा ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैनद्वाचाऽग्रहैष्यदभिव्या-  
हृत्य हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत् ।

What thus as food created was  
Away it turned and began to flee,

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<sup>1</sup> सोऽपोऽभ्यतपत्, Īśvara brooded over the waters. Here, water being one of the elements stands for all the five elements पञ्चभूतानि. मूर्तिरजायत, Organic matter—both vegeta-  
ble and animal, like rice, wheat, mouse, etc., was born. अन्नं वै तत्, that (organic substance) serves indeed as food—  
rice and wheat for man, mouse for cat, etc. धारण समर्थं—  
शरीर धारण समर्थ capable of sustaining life.

And he desired with speech to grasp  
 But failed to grasp the same with speech ;  
 And if indeed he'd grasped the food  
 With speech by uttering ' food '  
 Even to-day appeased would be !

तदेनदन्नं लोकपालानामर्थेऽभिमुखे सृष्टं तद्यथा मूषकादिर्माजा-  
 रादिगोचरे सन्मम सृष्ट्युरन्नाद इति मत्वा परागच्छतीति पराङ्मदत्तृन-  
 तीत्याजिघांसदतिगन्तुमैच्छत्पलायितुं प्रारभतेत्यर्थः । तदन्नाभिप्रायं मत्वा  
 स लोकलोकपालसंघातः कार्यकारणलक्षणः पिण्डः प्रथमजत्वादन्यांश्चान्ना-  
 दानपश्यंस्तदन्नं वाचा वदन्व्यापारेणाजिघृक्षद्ब्रहीतुमैच्छत्तदन्नं नाशक्रोञ्च  
 समर्थोऽभवद्वाचा वदन्क्रियया ग्रहीतुमुपादातुम् । स प्रथमजः शरीरी  
 यद्यदि हैनद्वाचाऽग्रहैष्यद्गृहीतवान्स्यात्सर्वोऽपि लोकस्तत्कार्यभूतत्वादन्न-  
 मभिग्राह्य हैवान्नमन्नप्यत्तृप्तोऽभविष्यत् । न चैतदस्त्यतो नाशक्रोद्धाचा  
 ग्रहीतुमित्यवगच्छामः पूर्वजोऽपि । समानमुत्तरम् ।

That food which was created and placed within the  
 sight of the world-rulers turned away and began to run  
 as evidenced when a rat being within the range of a  
 cat's sight runs away thinking, ' the cat is my death,  
 my eater '. He, the aggregate being, representing the  
 world-agents (like agni, vāyu, etc.), the embodied self,  
 because he was the first in creation and so not having  
 seen other eaters of food, desired to secure his food,  
 by words, *i.e.*, by the action of the tongue (by nearly  
 uttering the name ' food '). But he was not able to  
 get it by merely expressing his desire for food in words.  
 If he, the first-born, Virāt the first embodied Being,  
 had grasped the food by speech only the men now who  
 are all his creation, by the mere mention of the word  
 ' food ' would have had their hunger appeased. But

such is not the case. Hence we understand that even the first-born (Virāt) was incapable of getting his food with the aid of speech. Similar is the explanation of the rest—(समानमुत्तरम्).<sup>1</sup>

तत्प्राणेनाजिघृक्षत्तन्नाशकोत्प्राणेन ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैन-  
नत्प्राणेनाग्रहैप्यदभिप्राप्य हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत्तच्चक्षु-  
षाऽजिघृक्षत्तन्नाशकोच्चक्षुषा ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैन-  
च्चक्षुषाऽग्रहैप्यदृष्ट्वा हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत्तच्छ्रोत्रेणाजि-  
घृक्षत्तन्नाशकोच्छ्रोत्रेण ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैनच्छ्रोत्रेणाग्र-  
हैप्यच्छ्रुत्वा हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत्तत्त्वचाऽजिघृक्षत्तन्ना-  
शकोत्त्वचा ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैनत्त्वचाऽग्रहैप्यत्स्पृष्ट्वा  
हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत्तन्मनसाऽजिघृक्षत्तन्नाशकोन्मनसा  
ग्रहीतुं स यद्वैनन्मनसाऽग्रहैप्यद्व्यात्वा हैवान्नमत्र-  
प्स्यत्तच्छिक्षेनाजिघृक्षत्तन्नाशकोच्छिक्षेन ग्रहीतुं स  
यद्वैनच्छिक्षेनाग्रहैप्यद्विसृज्य हैवान्नमत्रप्स्यत्तदपा-  
नेनाजिघृक्षत्तदावयत्सैषोऽन्नस्य ग्रहो यद्वायुरन्ना-  
युर्वा एष यद्वायुः ।

By scenting he wished to grasp the food  
But failed to grasp the food by scent,  
Indeed by scent had he grasped the food  
Appeased by scenting man would be ;

<sup>1</sup> The distinctive functions of the sense-organs are enunciated here and though the account seems fanciful it makes clear that the functional activity of each organ, innate as it is, was acquired after repeated trials and errors.

With his eye he wished to grasp the food  
 But failed to grasp the food with his eye,  
 Indeed by sight had he grasped the food  
 Appeased by seeing man would be ;  
 With his ear he wished to grasp the food  
 But failed to grasp the food with his ear,  
 Indeed with his ear had he grasped the food  
 Appeased by hearing man would be ;  
 With the skin he wished to grasp the food  
 But failed to grasp the food with his skin.  
 Indeed with his skin had he grasped the food  
 Appeased by touching man would be ;  
 With his mind he wished to grasp the food  
 But failed to grasp the food with his mind,  
 Indeed with his mind had he grasped the food  
 Appeased by thinking man would be ;  
 With the begetting organ he wished to grasp the food  
 But failed to grasp the food ;  
 Had he with the organ grasped the food  
 Appeased by ejecting man would be,  
 With his breath he wished to grasp the food  
 With it he caught the food and ate,  
 That breath which grasps the food, the same  
 Indeed is giver of life by food.

तत्प्राणेन तच्छ्रुषा तच्छ्रोत्रेण तत्त्वचा तन्मनसा तच्छिश्नेन तेन तेन  
 करणव्यापारेणाञ्च ग्रहीतुमशक्नुवन्पश्चादपानेन वायुना मृस्वच्छिद्रेण  
 तदन्नमधिष्टुक्षत्तदावयत्तदन्नमेवं जग्राहाशितवान् । तेन स एषोऽपान-  
 वायुरन्नस्य ग्रहोऽन्नग्राहक इत्येतत् । यद्वायुर्यो वायुरन्नायुरन्नबन्धनोऽ-  
 न्नजीवनो वै प्रसिद्धं स एष यो वायुः ।

He by scenting, by hearing, by touch, by mind, by the regenerative organ, i.e., by the distinctive functions of the sense organs failed to secure the food; then with the aid of *apānatāyu* caught the food in the mouth; in other words, he succeeded in eating the food. Because he ate the food with the aid of *apāna* the air that courses down the hollow of the mouth, that *apāna* is called *annagrāhaka*,—catcher of food. That air which binds the food and supports life thereby is known as *annāyuh*.<sup>1</sup>

स ईक्षत कथं न्विदं मदते स्वादिति स ईक्षत  
 कतरेष प्रपद्या इति स ईक्षत यदि वाचाऽभिव्या-  
 हतं यदि प्राणेनाभिप्राणितं यदि चक्षुषा दृष्टं यदि  
 श्रोत्रेण श्रुतं यदि त्वचा स्पृष्टं यदि मनसा ध्यातं  
 यद्यपानेनाभ्यपानितं यदि शिश्नेन विसृष्टमथ कोऽ-  
 हमिति ।

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<sup>1</sup> It is matter of common experience that we are able to swallow our food with the help of *apāna*, i.e., of the air which we draw in through the mouth.

अन्नायुः—अन्नद्वारेण आयुष्यहेतुः—the air is the prime cause in supporting life through food. It is therefore called the cord that binds life—अन्नदाम. When this cord gets thin life abandons the body; cf. यावद्धयस्मिञ्शरीरे प्राणो वसति तावदायुः (*Kau. Up.*, III. 2), life lasts only so long as the breath remains in the body.

He pondered—how can this remain  
 Bereft of me ? He pondered thus :—  
 By which of the two (ways) may I get in ?  
 He thought—if speech can name, if nose  
 Can smell, if eye can see, if ear  
 Can hear, if skin can feel, if mind  
 Can think, if apāna can digest,  
 If the organ can beget, what am I ?

स एवं लोकलोकपालसंघातस्थितिमन्निमित्तां कृत्वा पुरपौरतत्पाल-  
 यितृस्थितिसमां स्वामीवेक्षत । कथं नु केन प्रकारेणेति वितर्कयन्निदं  
 मद्गते मामन्तरेण पुरस्वामिनम् । यदिदं कार्यकारणसंघातं कार्यं वक्ष्यमाणं  
 कथं नु खलु मामन्तरेण स्यात्परार्थं सत् । यदि वाचाऽभिव्याहृतमित्यादि  
 केवलमेव वागव्यवहरणादि तन्निरर्थकं न कथंचन भवेद्वलिस्तुत्यादिवत् ।  
 पौरवन्द्यादिभिः प्रयुज्यमानं स्वाम्यर्थं सत्तत्स्वामिनमन्तरेणासत्येव  
 स्वामिनि तद्वत् । तस्मान्मया परेण स्वामिनाऽधिष्ठात्रा कृताकृतफल-  
 साक्षिभूतेन भोक्त्रा भवितव्यम् पुरस्येव राज्ञा । यदि नामैतत्संहतकार्यस्य  
 परार्थत्वं परार्थिनं मां चेतनमन्तरेण भवेत्पुरपौरकार्यमिव तत्स्वामिनम् ।  
 अथ कोऽहं किंस्वरूपः कस्य वा स्वामी । यद्यहं कार्यकारणसंघातमनु-  
 प्रविश्य वागाद्यभिव्याहृतादिफलं नोपलभेय राज्ञेव पुरमाविश्याधिकृत  
 पुरुषकृताकृतावेक्षणम्, न कश्चिन्मामयं सञ्चेवंरूपश्चेत्यधिगच्छेद्विचारयेत् ।  
 विपर्यये तु योऽयं वागाद्यभिव्याहृतादीदमिति वेद स सन्वेदनरूपश्चेत्यधि-  
 गन्तव्योऽहं स्याम् । यदर्थमिदं संहतानां वागादीनामभिव्याहृतादि ।  
 यथा स्तम्भकुड्यादीनां प्रासादादिसंहतानां स्वावयवैरसंहतपरार्थत्वं  
 तद्वदिति । एवमीक्षित्वास्तः कतरेण प्रपद्या इति । प्रपदं च मूर्धा  
 चास्य संघातस्य प्रवेशमार्गावनयोः कतरेण मार्गेणेदं कार्यकारणसंघातलक्षणं  
 पुरं प्रपद्यै प्रपद्येयमिति ।

Having brought into existence, in this manner, the worlds and the world-rulers and individual beings all depending upon food, comparable to a city and its inhabitants requiring one for their protection, He reflected as a king would reflect. How? In what way, without me, the lord of the city, can this aggregate, this manifold creation to be described presently, exist, being from its nature intended for the benefit of some one other than itself? If speech and the rest by themselves could go on functioning, their activities would be in vain, just as feast and laudation would be useless if there is no king to accept them. Hence like a king in regard to a city I, who am different from the world of creation, but yet its substratum and sole witness, must become the enjoyer (as *sākṣin*) of the fruit of deeds accomplished and to be accomplished (by men). If the functions of the aggregate (*Kāryakāraṇasamghata*) meant for another could go on without me, who am that other, and their very self, it will be like the activities undertaken by the citizens with no thought of their ruler. Then who am I? What is my nature? Whose ruler am I either? Suppose I keep away from entering the human body and do not experience the fruit of speech, etc. (*i.e.*, if I am not the witness of the bodily and mental activities), as does a king who enters the city and witnesses acts of commission and omission on the part of his subjects, none will ever bestow any thought on my existence or my nature. If on the contrary I cognise the names uttered by speech, etc., I shall be understood as the very principle of cognition. Just as a mansion—a structure composed of pillars and



walls, is intended for one who is not an element in that aggregate, so here (as regards the body and the senses).<sup>1</sup> He then took thought as to which of the two ways he should choose to enter the body. The two entrances to this corporal aggregate are (at one end) the feet and (at the other) the crown of the head. His concern was by which of these two ways he should find ingress into the body.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The entry of Īśvara into the composite body is justified on two grounds—(1) An aggregate like the body implies an owner for whose sake it exists, and the functions of the sense of speech, etc., become possible only when informed by Īśvara. (2) The real nature of Īśvara can be understood only through Jiva. Unrelated to the Ātman, the Absolute is impossible of comprehension :—यतः प्रवेशस्य वागादिव्यवहार-सिद्धिर्मत्वरूपबोधश्चेति प्रयोजनद्वयं सिद्ध्यर्थं कर्तव्यत्वं—for a comparison of the human body to a house *vide Upadeśasāhasrī*, para 56.

<sup>2</sup> What a vast preparation for the pilgrimage of Jiva! What tribulation to the servitors and camp-followers! The worlds were created first, then the gods presiding over the elements, like agni, vāyu, etc., then the senses and sense-organs, food for man and beast, and finally Īśvara individuating himself entered the body as Jiva to experience the joys and sorrows of life. It may here be remarked that the Upaniṣad refers to both macrocosmic and microcosmic creations. The gods, the cosmic deities are as it were so many categories imbued with spirit and the very same gods function in man propelling his different senses. As such they are microcosmic. Reference to the entry of Ātman by the toe (प्रपदाभ्यां=पादप्राभ्यां) occurs in *Ait. Āraṇyaka*, II, i-4; also in *Mait. Up.*, II, 2—स वायुरिव आत्मानं कृत्वाऽभ्यन्तरं प्राविशत्.

स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्यैतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत ।

He slit the suture of the skull  
Indeed and entered by that door.

एवमीक्षित्वा न तावन्मद्भृत्यस्य प्राणस्य मम सर्वार्थाधिकृतस्य प्रवेशमार्गेण प्रपदाभ्यामधः प्रपद्ये । किं तर्हि पारिशेष्यादस्य मूर्धानं विदार्य प्रपद्येमिति लोक इवेक्षितकारी स स्रष्टेश्वर एतमेव मूर्ध्वसीमानं केशविभागावसानं विदार्य च्छिद्रं कृत्वैतया द्वारा मार्गेणैमं लोकं कार्यकारणसंचातं प्रापद्यत प्रविवेश ।

He thought thus—It is not meet that I should enter by the forepart of the feet meant as entrance to my servant, *Prāṇa*, who carries out my behests. If so which entrance remains? As one could judge for oneself in the world, the other entrance is the suture in the head which being cut affords ingress. He thus splitting open the suture following up to end of the line parting the hair entered the body.<sup>1</sup>

सैषा विद्वतिर्नाम द्वास्तदेतन्नानन्दनम् ।

That very door is *Vidṛti* named  
It is (indeed) the door of bliss!

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<sup>1</sup> *Īśvara* cut open the head along the line where the two skulls meet and entered the middle of the body in his essence as *Jñānaśakti*, knowledge-principle. Hence it is that the head is predominantly the seat of thinking (consciousness). As *Īśvara* entered the body by the tip of the foot in his essence as *Kriyāśakti*, active-principle, motor activity is predominant in the body below the neck. But for the informing spirit of *Īśvara*, the world would remain a dead matter. This is indeed divine incarnation!

सेयं हि प्रसिद्धा द्वाः । मूर्ध्नि तैलादिधारणकाले तद्रसादिसंवेदनात् । सैषा विदतिर्विदारितत्वाद्विदतिर्नाम प्रसिद्धा द्वाः । इतराणि तु श्रोत्रादिद्वाराणि श्रुत्यादिस्थानीयसाधारणमार्गत्वान्न समृद्धीनि नाऽऽनन्द-हेतूनि । इदं तु द्वारं परमेश्वरस्यैव केवलस्येति । तदेतन्नानन्दनं नन्दनमेव नानन्दनमिति दैर्घ्यं छान्दसम् । नन्दत्यनेन द्वारेण गत्वा परस्मिन्ब्रह्मणाति ।

That passage is indeed well known to all, for when anointing the crown of the head with oil one experiences the cooling sensation. Because the passage is made by cutting open the head it is called Vidṛti. The other openings like the ear and the rest are ordinary passages meant for agni, etc., who are the servants of Īśvara and therefore cannot produce full pleasure. This door, however, is intended for Parameśvara alone. And it is the door of bliss ! Nāndanam is nandanam—joy ; the lengthening of the vowel is justifiable by Vedic usage. The meaning is that the soul departing by this door rejoices in Parabrahman.<sup>1</sup>

तस्य तत्र आवसथास्त्रयः स्वप्ना अय-

मावसथोऽयमावसथोऽयमावसथ इति ॥

For him three seats there are, and three

The dreams ; this is the seat, this

The seat, this is the seat—Ev'n thus.

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<sup>1</sup> The door-way by which Īśvara entered the body is known as विदति (cut) because of its distinction from the ordinary entrances like the socket of the eye, etc., intended to serve as passages to His servants like agni and the rest. This door-way is also known as नन्दनं द्वारं, happy gate,

तस्यैवं सृष्ट्वा प्रविष्टस्य जीवेनाऽऽत्मना राज्ञ इव पुरं त्रय आवसथाः । जागरितकाल इन्द्रियस्थानं दक्षिणं चक्षुः । स्वप्नकालेऽन्तर्मनः । सुषुप्ति-  
काले हृदयाकाश इत्येतद्वक्ष्यमाणा वा त्रय आवसथाः । पितृशरीरं मातृ-  
गर्भाशयः स्वंच शरीरमिति । त्रयः स्वप्ना जाग्रत्स्वप्नसुषुप्त्याख्याः ।  
ननु जागरितं प्रबोधरूपत्वाच्च स्वप्नः । नैवं । स्वप्न एव । कथम् ।  
परमार्थस्वात्मप्रबोधाभावात्स्वप्नवदसद्वस्तुदर्शनाच्च । अयमेवाऽऽवसथ-  
श्चक्षुर्दक्षिणं प्रथमः । मनोऽन्तरं द्वितीयः । हृदयाकाशस्तृतीयः ।  
अयमावसथ इत्युक्तानुकीर्तनमेव तेषु द्वयमावसथेषु पर्यायेणाऽऽत्मभावेन  
वर्तमानोऽविद्यया दीर्घकालं गाढं प्रसुप्तः स्वाभाविक्या न प्रबुध्यतेऽ-  
नेकशतसहस्रानर्थसंनिपातजडुः सप्सुद्राभिघातानुभवैरपि ।

To him (Īśvara), who having created thus entered the body as jivātman, there are three resorts just as a king may have three cities for his residence; in the waking state, the region of the sense of sight—the right eye, in the dream state, the inward organ—the mind, and in the deep slumber state, the ether in the heart. Or the three residences may be those to be mentioned hereafter, namely, the father's body, the mother's womb, and his own body. The three dreams are what are called the waking, the dream, and sleep conditions. It may be objected that waking being a normal conscious state cannot be described as dream. That is not so. It is dream only. How? Because there has not arisen the consciousness of the ultimate reality and because the world-spectacle is as illusory as the dream-world. (Now) the right eye is the first

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because if at death the jīva should take its exit by this crevice —ब्रह्मरंध्रं—it attains liberation by reaching Brahmālōka.

residence; the mind, the internal organ is the second, and the heart-ether is the third. The phrase 'this is the seat' is repeated by way of emphatic assertion. It is in these abodes that Īśvara mistaking himself as jīva, the individual soul, sojourning alternately and long lost in deep sleep, the operation of the congenital nescience is not awakened though subjected to the severest hammerings of sorrow caused by thousands upon thousands of calamities.<sup>1</sup>

स जातो भूतान्यभिव्यैरुय-  
त्किमिहान्यं वावदिषदिति ।

Thus born He named all things and thought  
If aught beside Him He could name.

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<sup>1</sup> Three points stand out clear—(1) The brain, the neck and the heart are the three centres of consciousness ; (2) all the three states—waking, dream and sleep—are of the nature of dream ; (3) the jīva is lost in profound slumber and fails to wake up even when assailed by countless griefs.

The justification for designating even the waking state as dream is because it satisfies the definition of dream. It is the obscuring of reality and the presentation of that which is other than reality that constitutes a dream. The awakening to Reality comes only with the dawn of knowledge.

"It is in contrast with the desired condition of the metaphysically awakened self that the ordinary condition of waking is regarded as 'sleep'." (Hume. *The Thirteen Principal Upaniṣads*, I. 297. Oxford University Press.)

For a description of the three states of waking, dream and sleep, *vide Kaiv. Up.*, XII, XIII and XIV.

The *Brahmopaniṣad* describes the soul's abodes thus:—

नेत्रस्थं जाग्रतं विद्यात्कण्ठे स्वप्नं विनिर्दिशेत् ।  
सुषुप्तं हृदयस्थं तु तुरीयं मूर्ध्नि संस्थितं ॥

स जातः सरीरे प्रविष्टो जीवात्मना भूतान्यभिग्नैक्यद्वयाकरोत् ।

He having been born, *i.e.*, having entered the body as the individual soul, assigned names to all things.<sup>1</sup>

स एतमेव पुरुषं ब्रह्म तत-  
ममपश्यदिदमदर्शमिदं ।

And he perceived that very Being—  
The Brahman, over-spreading all—  
And wondering cried—for sure I've seen.

स कदाचित्परमकारुणिकेनाऽऽचार्येणाऽऽत्मज्ञानप्रबोधकृच्छ्रद्विकायां  
वेदान्तमहावाक्यभेदां तत्कर्ममूले तावन्मानायामेतमेव सृष्ट्यादिकर्तृत्वेन

<sup>1</sup> He perceived all things beginning with the elements, as identical with himself and gave utterance to this understanding thus: 'I am man', 'blind am I', 'happy am I', etc. Even so the śruti: 'Let me enter the body as jivātman and differentiate things by name and form.' When the knowledge of the true nature of the Ātman which is subversive of all notions of duality is acquired, how could Īśvara delude himself by such identity? The śruti therefore says: 'What else besides the Ātman is there for me to name?' There is none. Or this mantra may be taken as concluding the discourse on superimposition by denying the existence of every thing but the Ātman.

The second verse of the Mantra is not commented upon by Śaṅkara either because he might have thought its import to be plain or the omission is due to the negligence of the scribe.

Sāyaṇa in his *Dīpikā* interprets the *mantra* as meaning that the individuated soul at some distant future acquiring right knowledge through the study of the scriptures and disciplinship under a preceptor understands that in the world there is nought beside the Absolute, *i.e.*, he realizes that all is but superimposition—अध्यारोप.

प्रकृतं पुरुषं पुरि शयानमात्मानं ब्रह्म बृहत्तमं तकारेणैकेन लुप्तेन तततमं  
 ब्रह्मास्तमं परिपूर्णमाकाशवत्प्रत्यबुध्यतापश्यत् । कथम् । इदं ब्रह्म  
 ममाऽऽत्मनः स्वरूपमदर्शं दृष्टवानस्मि । अहो इति विचारणार्था प्लुतिः  
 पूर्वम् ।

When, however, on some rare occasion a preceptor in his graciousness beats in the recesses of his ears the sounding drum of the great Vedāntic text (mahāvākya like 'tatvamasi') he, the individual jīva comprehends this very Puruṣa—the one who has been described as the creator, etc., and who dwells in the body—this Brahman—the vast, who is all-pervading ('tatamam' should be 'tatatamam one 'ta' having been left out) and who fills all like ether. How (does he comprehend)? I have realized that this Brahman is of the nature of my own self (i.e., Brahman and my ātman are one)! Iti—the prolation of the vowel is to indicate prolonged thought on the part of the individual who arrives at last to the conclusion that his self is identical with the Absolute; and it also indicates the joy of success achieved after deep reflection.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Īśvara when he takes on the flesh plunges as it were into the depths of *samsāra* and finds no release till by divine grace and fruition of discipleship and scriptural study he comes to know the real nature of both organic and inorganic creation. It is by reflection on what he has heard and studied that he gets the conviction that the world is an illusion and that nothing exists other than Brahman. Hence the basic reality of the world of perception is Brahman only. It is only thus that the magic superimposition *अध्यास* is sublated.

तस्मादिदन्द्रोनामेदन्द्रो ह वै नाम तमि-  
दन्द्रं सन्तमिन्द्र इत्याचक्षते परोक्षेण ।

Therefore Idamdra is His name  
For sure Idamdra is His name  
And Him who is as Idamdra known  
They call Indra by His indirect name.

यस्मादिदमित्वेवं यत्साक्षादपरोक्षाद्ब्रह्म सर्वान्तरमपश्यदपरोक्षेण  
तस्मादिदं पश्यतीतीदन्द्रो नाम परमात्मा । इदन्द्रो ह वै नाम प्रसिद्धो  
लोक ईश्वरः । तमेवमिदन्द्रं सन्तमिन्द्र इति परोक्षेण परोक्षाभिधानेना-  
ऽऽचक्षते ब्रह्मविदः संबन्धद्वारांश्च पूज्यतमत्वात्प्रत्यक्षनामग्रहणमभात् ।

Because the jīva directly perceived his own ātman as the self-luminous universal inner principle, therefore Idamdra (literally, It-seeing) is his name. Hence it is, that Paramātmā (because he is one with the jīva) is Idamdra. And it is well known that the śrutis describe Īśvara as Idamdra. Yes, the same Idamdra is given (by the elision of a letter) the indirect name, Indra by the knowers of Brahman for practical purposes (such as for prayer and worship). They are afraid of addressing him directly because he is the most adorable Being.

परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवाः ॥

Indeed the gods love secrecy  
Indeed the gods love secrecy !

तथा हि परोक्षप्रियाः परोक्षनामग्रहणप्रिया इव स्वेव हि यस्माद्देवाः ।  
किमु सर्वदेवानामपि देवो महेश्वरः । द्विर्वचनं प्रकृताध्यायपरिसम्प-  
त्यर्थम् ॥



Yes, the gods love to be addressed indirectly, because they are worthy of adoration. When that is so what should be said of Maheśvara who is the Lord of Lords !

The repetition of the statement is to indicate the close of the present chapter.<sup>1</sup>

अस्मिंश्चतुर्थेऽध्याय एष वाक्यार्थो, जगदुत्पत्तिस्थितिप्रलयकृदसंसारी सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्ववित्सर्वमिदं जगत्स्वतोऽन्यद्दस्वन्तरमनुपादायैवाऽऽकाशादिक्रमेण सृष्ट्वा स्वात्मप्रबोधनार्थं सर्वाणि च प्राणादिमच्छरीराणि स्वयं प्रविवेश प्रविश्य च स्वमात्मानं यथाभूतमिदं ब्रह्मास्मीति साक्षात्प्रत्यबुध्यत, तस्मात्स एष सर्वशरीरेष्वेक एवाऽऽत्मा नान्य इति । अन्योऽपि सम आत्मा ब्रह्मास्मीत्येवं विद्यादित्यात्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीदिति । ब्रह्म ततममिति चोक्तम् ।

This is the gist of the fourth Adhyāya.

The Lord who is the originator, preserver and 'destroyer'<sup>2</sup> of the worlds is untouched by *samsāra* (not subject like the jiva to transmigration), is all-knowing, all-powerful,<sup>3</sup> all-discerning. He having created in

<sup>1</sup> In the world of men also it is well known that a preceptor loves one who addresses him indirectly as आचार्य, उपाध्याय, and not by his direct name विष्णुमित्र, etc. When it is said that the gods love being addressed by other than their direct names it means that they would like to remain behind the veil !

<sup>2</sup> It is true that the previous texts refer only to the creation of the worlds and of food indicating thereby origination and preservation only but by implication the Lord's power of destruction also has to be understood—Ānandagiri.

<sup>3</sup> सर्वज्ञः, one who knows all things in their entirety ; सर्वविद्, one who knows the particulars of all things.

the order of ether, etc.,<sup>1</sup> the whole universe by his own might without the aid of any other material object himself entered all living bodies so that his nature might be clearly cognised. And after the entry he (as jīva) woke up to the immediate knowledge—‘I am this very Brahman who is my ātman’.<sup>2</sup> Therefore he alone is the one entity in all bodies and no other. Another scriptural text also says ‘(Know that) He is my ātman’,<sup>3</sup> which means ‘Know I am Brahman’. In the beginning indeed all this was ātman ‘alone’. It has also been said that ‘Brahman is all-pervading.’<sup>4</sup> In other texts also this (the oneness of jīva and Ātman) is stated.

अन्वत्र च सर्वगतस्य सर्वात्मनो बालाग्रमात्रमप्यप्रविष्टं नास्तीति  
कथं सीमानं विदार्थं प्रापद्यत पिपीलिकेव सुषिरम् ।

To one who is all-pervading and who is the inner self of all, there is not even so much space as the point

<sup>1</sup> Cf. आत्मन आकाशस्मभूतः, आकाशाद्रायुः—*Tait. Up.*, II, 1.

<sup>2</sup> This means that Īśvara and no other is the single entity in all bodies.

<sup>3</sup> The full text is सम आत्मेति विद्यात्—*Ait. Āraṇyaka*, III, 2-4.

<sup>4</sup> The identity of jīva and Īśvara is expressed as it is by such knowledge only that *samsāra* ceases to exist. सम आत्मा, may be split up either as समः, एकः, आत्मा or as सः, ईश्वरः, मे, मम, आत्मस्वरूपः—*ibid.*, I, i.

<sup>5</sup> Cf. i. सदेवसौम्य इदमग्र आसीत्—*Chan. Up.*, VI, 2, 1.

ii. तदेतद् ब्रह्म अपूर्वं अनन्तरमबाह्यं etc.—*Brh. Up.*, I, 3-10.

of a hair unpenetrated.<sup>1</sup> Then how could it be said that he entered like a worm (lit. an ant) the fissure in the head caused by cutting open the skull ?

नन्वत्यल्पमिदं चोद्यं बहु चात्र चोदितव्यम् । अकरणः सञ्जीविताऽनु-  
पादाय किञ्चिल्लोकानसृजताद्भ्यः पुरुषं समुद्धृत्यामूर्च्छयत् । तस्याभि-  
ध्यानान्मुखादि निर्भिन्नं मुखादिभ्यश्चाग्न्यादयो लोकपालास्तेषां चाशनाया-  
पिपासादिसंयोजनं तदायतनप्रार्थनं तदर्थं गवादिप्रदर्शनं तेषां  
यथायतनप्रवेशनं सृष्टस्यान्नस्य पलायनं वागादिभिस्तज्जिघृक्षा । एतत्सर्वं  
सीमाविदारणप्रवेशसममेव ।

(Referring to the interlocutor Śaṅkara says)—‘The objection that you have raised is indeed a trifle. Several such (contradictions) could be pointed out here. Having no sense-organ he is the seer; without any material object he created the worlds (with no extraneous aid he created the Universe); having lifted up the puruṣa from out the waters he fashioned him (he joined hands, feet, etc., to the lump taken out of the waters); by his contemplation (brooding over the puruṣa), the mouth, etc., burst forth; from the mouth, etc., (came forth) Agni and the rest who are the rulers of the regions; the uniting them with hunger and thirst; their prayer for habitation; for that purpose the presentation of cows, etc., their (gods’) entry into their respective abodes; the flight of the food created by (Īśvara); the desire to grasp the food by speech, etc.—all these are on a par with the slitting open the skull and entry therein.

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<sup>1</sup> *Svet. Up.*, V, 9.

अस्तु तर्हि सर्वमेवेद मनुपपन्नम् ।

Then let all this be regarded as irrational.

न । अत्राऽऽत्मावबोधार्थमात्रस्य विवक्षितत्वात्सर्वोऽयमर्थवाद इत्यदोषः । मायाविवक्षा महामायावी देवः सर्वज्ञः सर्वशक्तिः सर्वमेतच्चकार सुखावबोधनप्रतिपत्त्यर्थं लोकवदाख्यादिकदिप्रपञ्च इति युक्ततरः पक्षः । न हि सृष्ट्याख्यायिकादिपरिज्ञानात्किञ्चित्फलमिष्यते । ऐकात्म्यस्वरूपपरिज्ञानात्त्वमृतत्वं फलं सर्वोपनिषत्प्रसिद्धम्, स्मृतिषु च गीताद्यासु “समं सर्वेषु भूतेषु तिष्ठन्तं परमेश्वरम्” इत्यादिना ।

No; since the object here is to expound only the nature of the Ātman, the rest is all figurative (arthavāda,<sup>1</sup> not to be understood literally).

Thus there is no irrelevancy. Or like a magician, Īśvara who is a mighty magician, the omniscient, the omnipotent, has done all this in order that it (ātmāsrarūpa) may be the more easily comprehended. The

<sup>1</sup> Arthavāda is of three kinds :—(i) *Guṇavāda*, where the literal explanation is ruled out on account of patent contradiction as in the statement, ‘the boy is a lion’. This should be interpreted as meaning that the boy is as brave as a lion; (ii) *Anuvāda*, where something already known is emphasized as in the statement, ‘fire is medicine for cold’ (अग्निर्हिंसस्य भेषजं); (iii) *Bhūtārthavāda*, things which exist but are not known, are brought home as in the Mahāvākya—that thou art (तत्त्वमसि). All Upaniṣads belong to this class.

The Arthavāda mentioned by Śaṅkara may be either *Guṇavāda* or *Bhūtārthavāda*. The latter is to be preferred if ‘मायाविवत्’ is taken as the illustration in point. In the Mīmāṃsa view, the mandatory passages alone (विधिवाक्यानि) are of supreme validity, while in the Vedāntic view, the *Bhūtārtha* is of equal validity.

amplification of the story (of creation) is in consonance with the practice obtaining among men; (instruction by a parable is more helpful in inculcating a doctrine than its direct teaching). The latter explanation is to be preferred.<sup>1</sup> There is absolutely nothing to be gained by the knowledge of the story of creation. It is patent, however, that all the Upaniṣads declare that the gain from the knowledge of the unity of Ātman is immortality. Further, the doctrine of the unity of Ātman has the support of the Smṛtis like the Bhagavad-gīta: “(who sees) the one and the same supreme Lord unchanged and residing in all beings ”<sup>2</sup>

ननु त्रय आत्मानो भोक्ता कर्ता संसारी जीव एकः सर्वलोकशास्त्र-प्रसिद्धः । अनेकप्राणिकर्मफलोपभोगयोग्यानेकाधिष्ठानवल्लोकदेहनिर्माणेन लिङ्गेन यथाशास्त्रप्रदर्शितेन पुरप्रासादादिनिर्माणलिङ्गेन तद्विषयकौशल-ज्ञानवांस्तत्कर्ता तक्षादिरिवेश्वरः सर्वज्ञो जगतः कर्ता द्वितीयश्चेतन आत्माऽवगम्यते । “ यतो वाचोनिवर्तन्ते ”, “ नेति नेति ” इत्यादिशास्त्र-प्रसिद्ध औपनिषदः पुरुषस्तृतीयः । एवमेते त्रय आत्मानोऽन्योन्य-विलक्षणाः । तत्र कथमेक एवाऽऽत्माऽद्वितीयोऽसंसारीति ज्ञातुं शक्यते ।

(A second) objection is raised. There are three selves (Ātmānaḥ)—the one is jīva, the individual self, who is the enjoyer, doer, and *samsārin*, as corroborated both by experience and scriptures. The second self is Īśvara, the all-knower and the world-creator whose existence is to be inferred from the fact of the creation of manifold worlds and bodies (to serve) as fit abodes

<sup>1</sup> Vide Note on Arthavāda (ante).

<sup>2</sup> Bhagavadgīta, XIII, 27.

for the enjoyment of the fruit of action and as corroborated by the scriptures and on the analogy of the inference of the existence of a builder (नष्ट, carpenter) skilled in the knowledge of construction after we see a built city or a mansion, etc.<sup>1</sup> The third self is the puruṣa of the Upaniṣads so well borne witness to by the scriptures in passages like "from whom words recoil,"<sup>2</sup> "Not that, not that".<sup>3</sup> Hence these three selves are dissimilar to each other. How is it then possible to conceive of Ātman as one only, having no second and unrelated to the life-current ?

तत्र जीव एव तावत्कथं ज्ञायते ।

To this question the answer is 'How do you even know jīva ?'<sup>4</sup>

नन्वेवं ज्ञायते श्रोता मन्ता द्रष्टाऽऽदेष्टाऽऽघोष्टा विज्ञाता प्रज्ञातेति ।

Is it not thus that the jīva is understood, i.e., as hearer, thinker, seer, utterer of words, utterer of sounds,<sup>5</sup> knower and reflector ?

<sup>1</sup> This is what may be termed the design-argument.

<sup>2</sup> *Tait. Up.*, Ānandavalli.

<sup>3</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, II, 3-8.

<sup>4</sup> What the Vedāntin means to say is that there is no means (instrument of knowledge) to prove the existence of the jīva. The more so is it difficult to understand the jīva with the attributes as described by the opponent.

<sup>5</sup> आदेष्टा—वर्णात्मकशब्दवक्ता, i.e., one who utters articulate sounds ; आघोष्टा—ध्वन्यात्मकशब्दवक्ता, i.e., one who utters mere sounds.

ननु विप्रतिषिद्धं, ज्ञायते यः श्रवणादिकर्तृत्वेनामतो मन्ताऽविज्ञातो विज्ञातेति च<sup>1</sup> । तथा न मतेर्मन्तारं मन्वीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीया इत्यादि च ।

Is there not here contradiction ? He (jīva) who is known as agent in the act of hearing, etc., is (according to the śruti) unknowable and unthinkable. Alike there is the text: "You cannot cognize the cognizer of cognition, you cannot understand the understander of understanding"<sup>2</sup>

सत्य विप्रतिषिद्धम् । यदि प्रत्यक्षेण ज्ञायेत सुखादिवत् । प्रत्यक्षज्ञानं च निवार्यते न मतेर्मन्तारमित्यादिना । ज्ञायते तु श्रवणादिलिङ्गेन तत्र कुतो विप्रतिषेधः ।

True, there would be contradiction if jīva be the object of perception like pleasure, etc. (i.e., felt experience).<sup>3</sup> The text 'not the cognizer of cognition, etc.,' negates perceptive knowledge; jīva, however, is known through inferential marks like hearing. Where then is the contradiction?"<sup>4</sup>

ननु श्रवणादिलिङ्गेनापि कथं ज्ञायते यावता यदा शृणोत्यात्मा श्रोतव्यं शब्द तदा तस्य श्रवणाक्रियैव वर्तमानत्वान्मननविज्ञानक्रिये न

<sup>1</sup> The altered reading according to Ānandagiri is — श्रवणादिकर्तृत्वेना मतोऽविज्ञात इति च.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, III, 7-23.

<sup>3</sup> Pleasure and pain are directly cognized by the Sakṣin.

<sup>4</sup> In his answer, the opponent admits the untenability of his position only on the supposition that the jīva is an object of perception. for then the texts cannot be reconciled, but he takes his stand upon inference. The jīva or individual self can be inferred by the fact of our hearing, thinking, etc. Hearing implies the hearer, thinking, the thinker, and so on.

संभवत आत्मनि परत्र वा । तथाऽन्यत्रापि मनवादिक्रियासु भ्रवणादि-  
क्रियाश्च स्वविषयेष्वेव । न हि मन्तव्यादन्यत्र मन्तुर्मनवक्रिया संभवति ।

The *Siddhāntin* rejoins. How can the jīva be inferred even by the inferential mark of one's act of hearing, etc., since when one is hearing something that can be heard one is engaged in that act of hearing only and it is not possible for an act of inference to exist either with reference to one's self or another?<sup>1</sup> Other mental processes such as are involved in the act of thinking, etc. though similar cannot exist side by side; (in other words, if it be urged that similar processes may exist together if not dissimilar ones as hearing and inference, the answer is that even then co-existence is impossible).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Since there cannot exist two psychical processes at the same time, while the mind is directed towards hearing something, inference (मनन) and cogitation (विज्ञान) are impossible. Hence the Vedāntin combats the view that the jīva can be inferred by such acts as hearing, etc. In the act of hearing the self is occupied with that act only and neither the Ātman nor anything else (outside of oneself as 'the mountain has fire') can be inferred then. Here in this passage 'Manana' and 'Vijñāna' should both be taken to mean 'inference' since the opponent's object is to establish jīva by means of inference.

<sup>2</sup> Then the opponent varies his argument: It is not that an inferential mark is the cause—लिङ्ग as witness the sūtra—'linga or hetu is not the instrument by which an inference is drawn because even when the linga has disappeared an inference is possible.' But it is the *consciousness* of linga or mark that is the *karana*. And it is not necessary that at the time of arriving at inference this consciousness should exist.



ननु मनसा सर्वमेव मन्तव्यम् ।

(The opponent says,) 'Are not all things known by the mind?' (What he means to say is that the mind can reach all including the Ātman.)

सत्यमेवम् । तथाऽपि सर्वमपि मन्तव्यं मन्तारमन्तरेण न मन्तुं शक्यम् ।

'True, it is so'; 'but still (it must be admitted that) it (i.e., all that is to be known) is incapable of being known without a knower.'

यद्येवं किं स्यात् ।

'Well, if it be so what is it that you gain?'

इदमत्र स्यात् । सर्वस्य योऽयं मन्ता स मन्तैवेति न मन्तव्यः स्यात् । न च द्वितीयो मन्तुर्मन्ताऽस्ति यदा स आत्मनैव मन्तव्यस्तदा येन च मन्तव्य आत्माऽऽत्मना यश्च मन्तव्य आत्मा तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयाताम् । एक एवाऽऽत्मा द्विधा मन्तुर्मन्तव्यत्वेन द्विशकली भवेद्वंशादिवदुभयथाऽप्यनुपपत्तिरेव । यथा प्रदीपयोः प्रकाश्यप्रकाशकत्वानुपपत्तिः समत्वात्तद्वत् । न च मन्तुर्मन्तव्ये मननव्यापारशून्यः कालोऽस्यात्ममननाय । यदाऽपि लिङ्गेनाऽऽत्मानं मनुते मन्ता तदाऽपि पूर्ववदेव लिङ्गेन मन्तव्य आत्मा यश्च तस्य मन्ता तौ द्वौ प्रसज्येयाताम् । एक एव वा द्विधेति पूर्वोक्तो दोषः ।

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It acquires its karnatva by its presence at the moment previous to the origination of inference. Hence there is no flaw in the argument that the existence of jīva is a fact of inference. The *Siddhāntin* points out that even when considering the marks लिङ्गानि the sākṣin आत्मा is premised as inseparably mixed up with these upādhis or limitations since the Ātman as sākṣin is inherently free from attributes.

'This then results; he who is the knower of all is the knower only and cannot (himself) be an object to be known.'<sup>1</sup> There is no second knower of the (first) knower. If this knower (the first) is to be known by an Ātman, then there would be need for two selves (ātmānau): that by which the one self is to be known and the other self which is to be known.<sup>2</sup> Or the one self only will have to be split up like a bamboo into two parts the one being regarded as knower (mantā) and the other as object to be known

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<sup>1</sup> The view of the Bhāṭṭa school of Mimāṃsakas is that the Ātman consists of two parts, one achit and the other chit (जडबोधत्मक) the second being the perceiver and the first perceived. This view is brought forward by the *Pūrva-pakṣin* forgetting the fact that then the Ātman would be composed of parts—सावयवत्व.

Let not, then, says the opponent, inference of the self arise from the act of hearing something outside, say, sound but the act of hearing may point at the same time to the Ātman as its object viṣaya.

But hearing, etc., can only relate to their appropriate objects (and not to the Ātman) who is the agent in all forms of knowing). Moreover the śruti says, 'inference cannot grasp one who infers', i.e., the process of inference which is a mental act cannot refer to anything except that which is its suitable object. Hence the Ātman cannot be an object of inference as stated by the opponent.

<sup>2</sup> *Opponent*—Even admitting that apart from manas there is a knower (mantā) what is it that results?

*Siddhānti*.—This is it that results. The Ātman cannot become an object of cognition, for he is himself the cognizer and the same being cannot be both subject and object.

(mantavya).<sup>1</sup> Either way the view (advanced) will not hold good: (whether one ātman is regarded as split up into two or two distinct ātmans are posited in one and the same body, it will lead to absurdity). Of two lights one is not the illuminator and the other illuminated, both being of like nature (of luminous character). It is so here. Nor can it be said that there is any time at which the mind is left disengaged when it can cognize the ātman.<sup>2</sup> If you say that the ātman can be inferred (लिङ्गेन) even then you will have to posit one self that infers and the other that is inferred or conceived, or a single ātman has to be regarded as being split up into two. In either case the said blemish remains.

न प्रत्यक्षेण नाप्यनुमानेन ज्ञायते चेत्कथमुच्यते सम आत्मेति विद्यादिति । कथं वा श्रोता मन्तेत्यादि ।

<sup>1</sup> Two alternatives are premised—either the knower of ātman must be insentient जड or अनात्मा, or another sentient being. Both suppositions would lead to absurdity.

<sup>2</sup> There is no time when the mind free from occupations (i.e., when it is not functioning) can cognize the ātman. Cp. “परां चिच्छीनिव्यतृणन् स्वयंभूः etc.” *Kaṭha Up.*, II. 1, 1. The perception of things outside but not of the inner self is possible for the senses since they are all fixed into the body outside, by God. If however the mind remains steadfast and unruffled by the life-current, then the ātman shines itself, i.e., the self-luminous ātman becomes manifest when distractions cease to affect the mind. The point is that though a purified mind can reflect the ātman it does not serve as an instrument for its understanding.

(Now the *Pūroapakṣin* confronts the *Siddhāntin* with scriptural texts opposed to the view expressed by the latter; the śruti definitely says that Ātman is to be known.)

If Ātman remains undiscovered either by perception (*pratyakṣa*) or by inference (*anumāna*) how is the text 'Know the one self is Brahman' or 'Know He is myself' to be explained? How again can Ātman be described as He is the hearer, thinker, etc., (i.e., the agent in hearing, etc., whose existence is indicated by the act of hearing, thinking, etc.?)

ननु श्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवानात्माऽश्रोतृत्वादि च प्रसिद्धमात्मनः किमत्र विषमं पश्यसि । यद्यपि तव न विषमं तथाऽपि मम तु विषमं प्रतिभाति । कथम् । यदाऽसौ श्रोता तदा न मन्ता यदा मन्ता तदा न श्रोता । तत्रैवं मति पक्षे श्रोता मन्ता पक्षे न श्रोता नापि मन्ता । तथाऽन्यत्रापि च । यदैवं तदा श्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवानात्माऽश्रोतृत्वादिधर्मवानेति संशयस्थाने कथं तव न वैषम्यम् । यदा देवदत्तो गच्छति तदा न स्वाता गन्तैव । यदा तिष्ठति तदा न गन्ता स्यातैव तदाऽस्य पक्ष एव गन्तृत्वं स्वातृत्वं च न नित्यं गन्तृत्वं स्वातृत्वं वा तद्वत् ।

(The *Siddhāntin* answers):—'Are you not aware that Ātman is possessed of the qualities of hearing, etc., and is it not well known that non-hearing also is predicated of Ātman? What discrepancy do you see here? Though you may think that there is nothing incongruous in your reasoning, viz., that Ātman must either be śrota—hearer, or aśrota—non-hearer and not both, to me, however, your statement is evidently discrepant. How? (you may ask). When he (Ātman) is hearer, then he is not thinker; when he is thinker then

he is not hearer. When this is so, sometimes he is śrota and manta and sometimes he is not śrota or manta either (but not always śrota or manta). The same holds good as regards other mental activities. Hence it is clear that Ātman may be characterized by the qualities of hearing, etc., and also of non-hearing, etc. Thus when there is the possibility of an alternative how do you (feel sure) that your view is not partial? When Devadatta is going he is not standing but is going only. When he is standing he is not going but standing only. Therefore his going and standing alike are variable and neither going nor standing is constant. Similar is the Ātman in possessing the qualities of hearing and non-hearing, etc.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Ānandagiri's gloss which throws some light on this rather difficult passage is summarised below :—There are two readings here :—According to the first the criticism (पूर्वपक्ष) begins with 'न प्रत्यक्षेण' and ends with 'मन्तेत्यादि'; the answer (सिद्धान्त) begins with 'ननु श्रोतृत्वादि' and ends with 'स्थातृत्वं वा तद्वत्'; according to the second where 'प्रसिद्धं अनात्मनः' is to be substituted for 'प्रसिद्धं आत्मनः', the criticism begins with 'न प्रत्यक्षेण' and ends with 'प्रसिद्धं अनात्मनः', the rest of the passage being the answer as above. The objection according to the first reading is raised on the ground that contradictory attributes like hearer and non-hearer, thinker and non-thinker, etc., cannot be attributed to Ātman and that to be consistent the positive attributes (श्रोतृत्वं, etc.), alone should be regarded as constant and the negative ones explained otherwise. The answer is based on the existence of the (seemingly contradictory) texts and it is explained that

अत्र काष्ठादादयः पश्यन्ति । पक्षप्राप्तेनैव श्रोतृत्वादिनाऽऽत्मोच्यते श्रोता मन्तेत्यादिसंयोगज्जत्वमयौगपद्यं च ज्ञानस्य ह्यवच्छते । दर्शयन्ति चान्यत्रमना अभूवं नादर्शमित्यादि युगपज्ज्ञानानुत्पत्तिर्मनसो विद्ममिति च न्याय्यम् ।

In this connection the Logicians (Kāpādas and the rest interpose and thinking that they have scored a

there is no inconsistency in Ātman's being described as both hearer and non-hearer, because the mental operations of hearing, thinking, etc., do not take place simultaneously. When one is hearing, one is not thinking; and when one is thinking, one is not hearing; hence Ātman is both श्रोता and अश्रोता. According to the second reading the statement of the objector is to be construed thus: 'श्रोतामन्ता' इत्यादि श्रुत्या श्रोतृत्वादि धर्मवानात्मा इति वक्तव्यं, ननु तत् कथं स्यात्; अश्रोतृत्वादि च प्रसिद्धमनात्मनः. Following the text "He is hearer, thinker, etc." Ātman, it must be described, as possessing the attributes of hearing, etc., but how is this possible according to you who maintain that Ātman is not to be known either by the senses or by inference—(नप्रत्यक्षेण नाप्यनुमानेन); and further you cannot maintain that non-hearing is characteristic of Ātman, for the world-experience is against such a view. Non-hearing is a quality of that which is other than the Ātman. The *Siddhāntin* tries to show that both characteristics, hearing and non-hearing can be reconciled in Ātman and that thereby the claims of the scriptural texts and of experience can be satisfied. The answer to the first question, "how is the text—'know he is my Ātman' to be understood if the pramāṇas, perception, inference, etc., fail to reach him," is that, as explained later on, it means that the Ātman being self-luminous is self-evident and not cognizable by other means. Here however it is only the second question, 'how is the text 'he is the hearer, thinker, etc.,' that is answered.

victory) observe (as follows):—it is because of the occasional nature only, of hearing, etc., that the Ātman is described as hearer, thinker, etc. It is well known also that a thought (jñāna) is the out-come of contact (between the Ātman and manas) and does not simultaneously arise with another thought as is evident in such expressions as, ‘my mind was elsewhere,’ ‘I did not notice this,’ and so on. There is the textual authority (*Goutama Sūtra*, I. 1. 16) for them:—The fact that two thoughts cannot rise together is the proof of the existence of manas. Such a view they consider as conforming to reason.

भवत्वेवं किं तव नष्टम् यद्येवं स्यात् ।

Now the *Pūrvapakṣin* asks the *Siddhāntin*: ‘Let it be so, what is it that you lose if it is pertinent as the logicians say ?<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The *Vaiśeṣikas* hold that hearing, thinking, etc., are the attributes of Ātman who in consequence is engaged now in one act and now in another, indicating that thought processes appear and disappear in him ; hence the Ātman is described as hearer, thinker, etc. They assume a mind which is of atomic size as a necessary factor in explaining all forms of jñāna implying that mental acts can only succeed one another and therefore be कदाचित्क and not नित्य. The *Siddhāntin* relying on the śruti refuses to accept this doctrine. Even in सुषुप्ति deep slumber, when the mind has ceased to function, according to him there is some form of experience and that state is not a mere blank as the *Vaiśeṣika* takes it to be.

The final verdict of Vedānta is that Ātman being the Sākṣin is Eternal Witness of all mental acts ; so Ātman is eternal hearer, etc., but as the mental modes themselves are fleeting and unreal they are not characteristics of Ātman who is therefore eternal non-hearer, etc.

अस्त्वेवं तवेष्टं चेत्, शुल्यर्थस्तु न संभवति ।

‘Yes, let it be so if you desire ; the śruti, however, cannot mean that.’

किं न श्रोता मन्तेत्यादिशुल्यर्थः ।

Why not the śruti mean that the Ātman is hearer, thinker, etc.

न । न श्रोता न मन्तेत्यादिवचनात् ।

No, because the scripture has it that he is neither hearer nor thinker, etc.

ननु पाक्षिकत्वेन प्रत्युक्तं त्वया ।

Did you not aver (in reply to my objection) that hearing, etc., were occasional traits of Ātman ?<sup>1</sup>

न, नित्यमेव श्रोतृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमात् । न हि श्रोतुः श्रुतिरित्येते विद्यत इत्यादिश्रुतेः ।

No, because it is maintained that such traits are permanent: ‘indeed there is no cessation of the hearing of the hearer’. Such is the śruti.<sup>2</sup>

एवं तर्हि नित्यमेव श्रोतृत्वाद्यभ्युपगमे प्रत्यक्षविरुद्धा युगपज्ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरज्ञानाभावश्चाऽऽत्मनि कल्पितः स्यात् । तच्चानिष्टमिति ।

If the permanency of hearing, etc., be accepted, simultaneous manifestation of all forms of consciousness, a thing opposed to experience, and absence (at any time) of ajñāna (lack of consciousness) would result in Ātman. This is something undesired.

<sup>1</sup> No doubt the *Siddhāntin* did make this answer but only as the view of the Kānādas.

<sup>2</sup> *Bṛh. Up.*, IV. 3. 27.



नोभयदोषोपपत्तिरात्मनः श्रुत्यादिधर्मवत्त्वश्रुतेः । अनित्यानां मूर्तानां चक्षुरादीनां दृष्ट्याद्यनित्यमेव संयोगवियोगधर्मिणाम् । यथाऽऽरेर्ज्वलनं तृणादिसंयोगजत्वात्तद्वत् । न तु नित्यस्यामूर्तस्यासंयोगविभागधर्मिणः संयोगजदृष्ट्याद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वं संभवति । तथा च श्रुतिः—“न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेर्विपरिलोपो विद्यते” इत्याद्याः ।

There is no room for either of the two charges ; because of the existence of the śruti declaring hearing, etc. (in its double form of *sākṣijñāna* and *ṛttijñāna*) as characteristics of Ātman.<sup>1</sup> It is only in the case of the sense of sight, etc., which are impermanent, gross, and which function or not according as they come into contact or otherwise with objects that impermanency is predicated, even as the bursting of fire into flame is occasional (impermanent) because it results from contact with (some combustibles) like straw, etc. Of Ātman, however, who is eternal, non-material, who by his nature cannot enter into relation with and so cannot be said to dissociate himself from (any object) perception and other (mental processes) which arise from contact (of sense and object) and which are fleeting in their nature cannot be the actual characteristics.

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<sup>1</sup> We should speak of two kinds of knowing in respect of the self, the one which constitutes its essence and is eternal, the other which as a mode of the *Antahkarana* is impermanent. Hence the śruti describes the Ātman as नित्यश्रोता and नित्यमन्ता hearer, thinker in its nature as *sākṣin* ; again the śruti describes the Ātman as ‘न श्रोता, न मन्ता’ in its relation to the super-imposed hearing which is occasional. Therefore the declaration of the śruti regarding jīva that he is both hearer and non-hearer, etc., is valid.

Even so the śruti:—‘Of the seer seeing will not fail,’ etc.

एवं तर्हि द्वे दृष्टी चक्षुषोऽनित्या दृष्टीर्नित्या चऽऽत्मनः । तथा च द्वे श्रुती श्रोत्रस्यानित्या नित्याऽऽत्मस्वरूपस्य । तथा द्वे मती विज्ञासी बाह्यावाह्ये ।

If so there will be two orders of sight: one impermanent, that of the eye, and the other permanent, that of the Ātman; so also two orders of hearing: of the ear impermanent, and permanent, that of the Ātman; so also two orders of cogitation and reflection, viz., external and internal.

एवं ह्येव इयं श्रुतिरूपपञ्चा भवति दृष्टेर्दृष्टा श्रुतेः श्रोतेत्याद्या । लोकेऽपि प्रसिद्धं चक्षुषस्तिमिरागमापाययोर्नष्टा दृष्टिर्वाता दृष्टिरिति चक्षुर्दृष्टेरनित्यत्वम्, तथा च श्रुतिमत्यादीनाम्; आत्मदृष्ट्यादीनां च नित्यत्वं प्रसिद्धमेव लोके वदति ह्युद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्नेऽथ मया ज्ञाता दृष्ट इति । तथाऽवगतबाधिर्यः स्वप्ने श्रुतो मन्त्रोऽद्येत्यादि । यदि चक्षुः-संयोगजैवाऽऽत्मनो अनित्या दृष्टिस्तन्नाशे नश्येत्तदोद्धृतचक्षुः स्वप्ने नीलपीतादि न पश्येत् । न हि द्रष्टुर्दृष्टेरित्याद्या च श्रुतिरनुपपन्ना स्यात् । तच्चक्षुः पुरुषे येन स्वप्ने पश्यतीत्याद्या च श्रुतिः । नित्यात्मनो दृष्टिर्बाह्या-नित्यदृष्टेर्ग्राहिका । बाह्यदृष्टेश्चोपजनापायाद्यनित्यधर्मवत्त्वात्तद्ग्राहिकाया आत्मदृष्टेस्तद्ब्रह्मभासत्वमनित्यत्वादिभ्रान्तिनिमित्तं लोकस्येति युक्तम् । यथा भ्रमणादिधर्मवद्बलातादिवस्तुविषयदृष्टिरपि भ्रमतीव तद्वत् । तथा च श्रुतिः—ध्यायतीव लेलायतीवेति । तस्मादात्मदृष्टेर्नित्यत्वान्न यौगपद्य-मयौगपद्यं वाऽस्ति । बाह्यानित्यदृष्ट्युपाधिवशात्तु लोकस्य तार्किकाणां चाऽऽत्मसंस्पृदायवर्जितत्वादनित्याऽऽत्मनो दृष्टिरिति भ्रान्तिरूपपञ्चैव । जीवेश्वरपरमात्मभेदकल्पना चैतन्निमित्तैव । तथाऽस्ति नास्तीत्याद्याः

यावन्तो वाङ्मनसयोर्भेदा यत्रैकं भवन्ति तद्विषयाया नित्याया दृष्टेर्निर्विशेषायाः ।

अस्ति नास्तीत्येकं नानागुणवदगुणं जानाति न जानाति क्रियावदक्रियं फलवदफलं सबीजं निर्बीजं सुखं दुःखं मध्यममध्वं शून्यमशून्यं परोऽहमन्य इति वा सर्ववाक्प्रत्ययागोचरे स्वरूपे यो विकल्पयितुमिच्छति स नूनं स्वमपि चर्मवद्वेष्टयितुमिच्छति सोपानमिव च पद्मयामारोढुम् । जले स्वे च मीनानां वयसां च पदं दिदृक्षते । नेति नेति, यतो वाचो निवर्तन्त, इत्यादिश्रुतिभ्यः । को अद्वा वेदेत्यादिमन्त्रवर्णात् ।

Yes, thus only the śruti, 'He is the seer of sight, hearer of hearing, etc.,' acquires correct significance (i.e., the seer is eternal while the vṛttis associated with sight, etc., are evanescent). It is common knowledge that the sight of the (physical eye is impermanent) because (we speak of) the loss of sight when some eye-disease blinds the eye and of its restoration after the disappearance of the disease. Even so as regards hearing, thinking, etc. But of the sight, etc., of the Ātman permanency is indeed a matter of universal acceptance. A man whose eyes are plucked out does surely say 'to-day in dream my brother was seen by me;' so also a man who is unmistakably deaf, 'to-day in my dream I heard the Vedic Mantra, etc.'. If perceptive knowledge arising from the contact of the eye (with the object) were itself the sight of the Ātman, and with the loss of the eye, the sight also disappeared, then the man with blinded eyes could not see blue, yellow, etc., in dreams; the śruti, 'the sight indeed of the seer, etc.,' would be inappropriate then, and also the śruti 'that by which

one who sees dreams is Sākṣin'.<sup>1</sup> It is the eternal sight of the Ātman that illuminates the fleeting external sights (i.e., all our sense-activities presuppose the light of the eternal consciousness; but for the light of the Ātman the world would be nought). Because the external sights (i.e., the activities of the senses and of the antahkarana in general) appear (sometimes) and disappear (at other times) and are characterized by (the quality of) impermanence, it is quite intelligible that the sight of the Ātman being the illuminator (of the sense-objects) should appear to the world as evanescent due to the illusory transference to it of features belonging to the sense-activities.<sup>2</sup> One's sight directed towards a (rapidly) moving torch appears also to move.

<sup>1</sup> The objection may be raised that since sight in dreams is independent of the eye the term sight is itself a misnomer. To this it may be replied that the application of the term 'sight' is restricted to the immediate knowledge of form, etc., which need not necessarily presume the existence of the eye. In dreams objects of sight there are, without the aid of the eye. It should not be supposed that dream-perception is recollection because it is immediate (अपरोक्ष). It is not illusory knowledge because it is not negated as long as the dream lasts. Further the experience one has in deep slumber and which is recalled after one wakes up with the feeling of having had a happy sleep must be eternal, for then all the sense-organs including *Manas* are quiescent and in consequence there is no room for any impermanent experience resulting from sense-contact.

<sup>2</sup> उपाधिगत वर्माणं उपधेये प्रतीतिः—The characteristics of mental modes are superimposed on jīva.

It is so here. The śruti (*Bṛh. Up.*, IV. 37) also (corroborates this view):—“(The Ātman) *appears* to contemplate, *appears* to move.” Hence, because the sight of the Ātman is eternal (i.e., because of the eternality of the witnessing consciousness) there is no question of simultaneous or non-simultaneous notions arising.<sup>1</sup> Deluded by external and fleeting sights and not having come under the discipline of scriptural study and tradition it is but natural for common people and even for rationalistic philosophers (like Kāṇādas) to delude themselves into thinking that Ātman’s perception is evanescent. It is for this very reason that they imagine that jīva, Īśvara and Paramātmā are distinct entities (i.e., they not only imagine that Ātman’s sentience is discursive but posit also discrete Ātmans.) Similar is the ascription of existence, non-existence, etc., to the eternal and attributeless Ātman whose nature is such that all distinctions whatsoever<sup>2</sup> of speech and thought become merged in Him.

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<sup>1</sup> The notion of simultaneity gets its significance only with reference to the multiple objects but not with reference to Ātman who is one —अनेकरूपत्वव्याप्यस्य तदभावरूपत्वादयौगपद्यस्यैकस्यां दृष्टौ तदुभयमपि नास्ति.

<sup>2</sup> वाच्यनस्योर्भेदाः; वाग्भेदाः=नामविशेषाः; मनसो भेदाः=रूपविशेषाः—names and forms.

When Ātman is realized both names and forms become merged in Him; ‘All Vedas become one there (in Ātman), all men become one there.’ The very nature of Ātman is eternal perception which is homogeneous and unassociated. Hence the attribution of predicates like existence by the *āstikas* (Theists) and non-existence by the *anāstikas* (Nihilists) or both existence and non-existence by the Jains, etc., to the

'Is', 'Is not', one, many, qualified, unqualified, cognizant, non-cognizant, kinetic, static, fruitful, unfruitful, having origin, having no origin, is joy, is sorrow, is inside (body) only, is not inside,<sup>1</sup> is blank, is not blank, it is other than me, I am other than that<sup>2</sup> and so on—thus whoever wishes to superimpose such contradictory notions upon that which by nature cannot be grasped by speech or thought (i.e., cannot be comprehended either by verbal description or by any process of reasoning), he certainly also desires to roll up the sky like a piece of leather, certainly also desires to step up the sky as if climbing a flight of steps, yes, he wishes to trace the path of fishes in water and of birds in the firmament. (What do the *śrutis* say?) "He is not that, he is not that", "From him speech rebounds," and so on; "who truly knows It?" so says the Vedic Mantra.

कथं तर्हि तस्य स म आत्मेति वेदनं ब्रूहि केन प्रकारेण तमहं स म आत्मेति विद्याम् । अत्राऽऽख्यायिकामाचक्षते । कश्चिद्विल मनुष्यो मुग्धः कैश्चिदुक्तः कस्मिंश्चिदपराधे सति चित्त्वां नासि मनुष्य इति । स मुग्धतयाऽऽत्मनो मनुष्यत्वं प्रत्याययितुं कंचिदुपेत्याऽऽह । ब्रवीतु भवान्कोऽहमस्मीति । स तस्य मुग्धतां ज्ञात्वाऽऽह । क्रमेण बोधयिष्यामीति । स्थावराद्यात्मभावमपोह्य न त्वममनुष्य इत्युक्तवोपरराम । स तं मुग्धः प्रत्याह । भवान्मां बोधयितुं प्रवृत्तस्तूर्ण्यं बभूव किं न

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eternal witnessing consciousness or eternal, homogeneous perception has its source in avidyā only.

<sup>1</sup> अमध्यम्—Ātman is both inside and outside the body.

<sup>2</sup> परः—मत्तः परिदृश्यमानः पदार्थः (अयं) अन्यः, ततः—परिदृश्यमान पदार्थात् अहं अन्यः, I am other than the things perceived.

बोधयतीति । तादृगेव तद्भवतो वचनम् । नास्यमनुष्य इत्युक्तेऽपि मनुष्यत्वमात्मनो न प्रतिपद्यते यः स कथं मनुष्योऽस्तीत्युक्तेऽपि मनुष्यत्वमात्मनः प्रतिपद्येत ।

Then how, tell me, can the knowledge of the Ātman as enjoined in the śruti, 'He is my Ātman', arise? In what manner can I know, 'He is my Ātman'?<sup>1</sup>

(In answering the query) they (the *Veāntins*) relate an anecdote:—A certain foolish person for having committed an offence was rebuked by some one thus, 'you be cursed, you are no human being!' As he was a dunce he went to a third party to make sure if he was a man and said, 'please, your worship, tell me who am I?' Perceiving his stupidity he said to himself—'Let me teach him step by step.' Then having dispelled the idea of his being any one of the inanimate objects he said 'You are not non-human' and assumed silence. That stupid man once again asked, 'You, sir, having begun to instruct me are now silent; why don't you instruct me?' 'Exactly alike is your utterance' (says the *Siddhāntin*), 'He who cannot comprehend that he is a man when he is told, 'You are not non-human', how can such a man comprehend that

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<sup>1</sup> If neither word nor thought can compass the Ātman, then, the questioner says, it is impossible for the knowledge of the Ātman to arise. But such a position is indefensible since the evidence of the śruti which declares that the Ātman is to be known as one's own self is unassailable. Hence the questioner seems to merely present his difficulty thus: 'I am not criticising the śruti but asking its right explanation.'

he is a human being even when he is told, 'you are a human being !'<sup>1</sup>

तस्माच्चयाज्ञास्रोपदेश एवाऽऽमावबोधविवर्तनान्यः । न ह्यग्नेर्दाहं  
तृणाद्यन्येन केनचिद्गुणं शक्यम् । अत एव ज्ञाःमात्मस्वरूपं बोधयितुं  
प्रवृत्तं सदमनुष्यत्वप्रतिषेधेनेव नेति नेतिस्त्युक्तवोपरराम । तथाऽनन्तर-  
मवाह्यमयमात्मा ब्रह्म सर्वानुभूतित्यनुशासनम् । "तत्त्वमसि" "यत्र  
हवस्य सर्वमात्मैवामूचत्केन कं पश्येत्" इत्येवमाद्यपि च ।

Hence the scriptural method of instruction alone is the right one and none other for the proper understanding of the Brahman. It is indeed impossible to burn straw, etc., by anything except fire. Therefore it is that the scripture having begun to expound the nature of self remained silent after making the statement—not that, not that, very like the denial of the non-human nature (of the questioner in the illustration). Such is also the scriptural injunction:—'Nothing intervenes (between the Ātman and something else)', 'Nothing

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<sup>1</sup> When the possibility of his being anything that is non-human is excluded by a detailed demonstration, the enlightenment of his own true nature needs must follow; otherwise there is some defect in the man's faculty of comprehension. When what is a subjective and immediate experience is shrouded by something, all that is required is to remove the object obscuring it and it is unnecessary to denote specifically what that experience is; for with the removal of the veil it reveals itself. But if a person cannot be made to see the truth by this negative method it means that he is unfit to receive instruction because of his dense ignorance.

*Cf.* अपरोक्षतया प्रतीयमाने वस्तुनि, विपर्ययेण गृह्यते विपर्यय निरास मात्रे यत्नः कार्यः, न तु स्वरूपबोधे, तस्य स्वयमेव प्रतीतिः.



exists outside (the Ātman)' 'This Ātman is Brahman who is the all-witness', 'That thou art'<sup>1</sup>; 'When, however, all becomes identified with the Ātman, then what can be perceived and by whom?'<sup>2</sup> (*Bṛh. Up.*, II. 4. 14).

यावदयमेवं ययोक्तमिममात्मानं न वेत्ति तावदयं बाह्यानित्यदृष्टि-  
लक्षणमुपाधिमात्मत्वेनोपेत्याविद्ययोपाधिधर्मानात्मनो मन्यमानो ब्रह्मादि-  
स्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु देवतियङ्गुनरस्थानेषु पुनः पुनरावर्तमानोऽविद्याकामकर्म-  
वशात्संसरति ।

So long as a person fails to realize the true nature of the self in the way inculcated, he goes on holding the superimposed notions of sight, etc., which are external and transient as identical with the Ātman and holding too that such ascriptions really belong to the Ātman, again and again takes on births in the (different) orders of beings ranging from Brahma (*Hiranyagarbha*) to a tiny insect and surrendering

<sup>1</sup> 'तत्त्वमसि' इत्यत्रापि तत्पदार्थसामानाधिकरण्ये न त्वं पदार्थे कर्तृत्वादि निषेधेनैव तस्य (जीवस्य) ब्रह्मत्वबोधः—In the passage 'That Thou art' the jīva's identity with the Brahman is established by *negating* agency, etc., of the jīva. The same negative process is followed in explaining 'तत्त्वेन कं पश्येत्'. Here is denied the possibility of the Ātman's becoming the object of sight.

<sup>2</sup> The method of negation is the only right method. When the superimpositions such as, 'I am a man,' etc., are all negated as in 'not that, not that' the Ātman shines by its own light and requires no further *pramāṇa* for its proof. The scripture in its exposition of the Ātman is concerned only with the removal of false ascriptions.

himself to the desires and actions which *avidyā* engenders remains unredeemed in *samsāra*.<sup>1</sup>

स एवं संसरन्नुपात्तदेहेन्द्रियसंघातं त्यजति । त्यक्त्वाऽन्यमुपादत्ते ।  
पुनः पुनरेवमेव नदीस्रोतोवज्जन्ममरणप्रबन्धाविच्छेदेन वर्तमानः कामि-  
रवस्थाभिर्वर्तत इत्येतमर्थं दर्शयन्त्याह श्रुतिर्वैराग्यहेतोः ।

Thus passing through life he abandons the aggregate of the body and the sense-organs which he has assumed ; having abandoned (one body) he takes another and this process goes on repeatedly like the continuous current of a river ; and being unable to escape from the bonds of births and deaths, he is held bound to one of the (three) orders of beings (*Deva*, *manuṣya*, and *thīryak*, i.e., gods, men and beasts). Impressing this idea and with a view to creating a feeling of detachment the śruti states what is detailed in the following section.

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<sup>1</sup> Since it is evident that the Ātman in its essence is pure and uncontaminated and that agency (कर्तृत्व), enjoyment, etc., are but false ascriptions ; since again Īśvara is identical with the Brahman and that predicates like all-knowingness, etc., are also false ascriptions, the conclusion is that there is only one Ātman and not three as averred by the *pūrvapakṣin*. It is Māyā that is the cause of the diremption of the Brahman into Jīva and Īśvara.

## CHAPTER IV

### चतुर्थोऽध्यायः

(अपक्रामन्तु गर्भिण्यः)

(Let the pregnant women withdraw.)<sup>1</sup>

ॐ पुरुषे ह वा अयमादितो गर्भो भवति यदेतद्रेतः ।

Om !

In man indeed the jiva first

Appears conceived, for there as seed

(the food that one doth eat is changed).

अयमेवाविद्याकामकर्माभिमानवान्यज्ञादिकर्म कृत्वाऽऽसाल्लोकात्-  
धूमादिक्रमेण चन्द्रमसं प्राप्य क्षीणकर्मा वृष्ट्यादिक्रमेणेनं लोकं प्राप्याश्चभूतः  
पुरुषाग्नौ हुतः । तस्मिन्पुरुषे ह वा अयं संसारी रसादिक्रमेणाऽऽदितः  
प्रथमतो रेतोरूपेण गर्भो भवतीत्येतदाह यदेतत्पुरुषे रेतस्तेन रूपेणेति ।

The very jiva actuated by desires due to nescience engages himself in ritualistic practices and as a result reaches gradually the region of the moon by the path of smoke and comes down along with rain, etc., to this world after working out his karma (in Chandraloka). Enveloped in food he is offered up in the fire of man. And in him the jiva having now entered *samsāra* (the

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<sup>1</sup> The direction that pregnant women should withdraw indicates that women enjoyed equal privileges with men in learned assemblies where they could participate in religious and philosophical discussions. Since the subject of this Chapter relates to the processes of gestation, it is appropriate that expectant mothers should not be permitted to listen to such a delicate topic.

life-current) is conceived at first, since he is imbedded in the seed to which the food is changed after being successively transformed into different juices.<sup>1</sup>

तदेतत्सर्वेभ्योऽङ्गेभ्यस्तेजः संभूतमात्मन्ये-  
वाऽऽत्मानं विभर्ति तद्यदा स्त्रियां सिञ्च-  
त्यथैनज्जनयति तदस्य प्रथमं जन्म ।

That seed which is their quintessence  
From all the limbs doth issue forth ;  
And thus within his self alone  
He bears himself. But when he casts  
The seed in woman, he begets  
The seed and that is the first of his births.

यच्चैतद्रेतोऽश्वमयस्य पिण्डस्य सर्वेभ्योऽङ्गेभ्योऽवयवेभ्यो रसादि-  
लक्षणेभ्यस्तेजः साररूपं शरीरस्य संभूतं परिनिष्पन्नं तत्पुरुषस्याऽऽत्म-  
भूतत्वादात्मा । तमात्मानं रेतोरूपेण गर्भीभूतमात्मन्येव स्वशरीर  
एवाऽऽत्मानं विभर्ति धारयति । तद्रेतो यदा यस्मिन्काले भार्यतुमती  
तस्यां योषायां स्त्रियां सिञ्चत्युपगच्छन् । अथ तदैतदेतद्रेत आत्मनो

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<sup>1</sup> The śruti proceeds now to describe the career of the soul enslaved by ignorance. A life of piety and sacrifice leads one along the path of the fathers—पितृयान or धूमादिमार्ग to Chandraloka otherwise known as Svarga or पितृलोक, but who after a temporary sojourn there, is hurled down to this world. The imponderable jīva in its descent is conveyed by rain which fructifies the earth and so the jīva takes its lodgement in the grain which latter, becoming the food of man, is changed into the vital fluid and gives asylum to the jīva. Hence it is said that the first conception of jīva is in man, i.e., in the body of the father.

गर्भभूतं जनयति पिता । तदस्य पुरुषस्य स्थानाश्रिगमनं रेतःसेककाले  
रेतोरूपेणास्य संसारिणः प्रथमं जन्म प्रथमावस्थाभिव्यक्तिः, तदेतदुक्तं  
पुरस्तादसावात्माऽमुमात्मानमित्यादिना ।

The seed in man who is nourished by food is the quintessence of all his organs and having proceeded from them constitutes, as it were, his very self. The man may be said to be carrying himself within himself since it is his bodily essence only that is turned into the seed and is lodged in him (as the foetus is lodged in the womb). When he transfers that seed to his wife at the time she is fit to conceive he is said to deposit it in the fire of woman. He, the father, is then delivered of the seed which he had borne. Hence the jiva in his career (*samsāra*) takes his first birth when having been conceived as seed in man is transferred to the woman.<sup>1</sup>

तस्त्रिया आत्मभूयं गच्छति यथा  
स्वमङ्गं तथा तस्मादेनां न हिनस्ति  
साऽस्यैतमात्मानमत्र गतं भावयति ।

That seed is now become transformed  
Into the woman's very self;  
As is her limb so is it now,  
And her therefore it doth not hurt.  
And she protects that self of his  
Which has its lodgement found in her.

तद्रेतो यस्यां स्त्रियां सिक्तं सत्तस्या आत्मभूयमात्माव्यतिरेकतां  
यथा पितुरेवं गच्छति प्राप्नोति यथा स्वमङ्गं स्तनादि तथा तद्वदेव ।

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Chand. Up., V. 8. 1.

तस्माद्धेतोरेनां मातरं स गर्भो न हिनस्ति पिटकादिवत् । यस्यास्तनादि  
स्वाङ्गवदात्मभूयं गतं तस्माच्च हिनस्ति न बाधत इत्यर्थः । साऽन्तर्वत्न्ये-  
तमस्य भर्तुरात्मानमत्राऽऽत्मन उदरे गतं प्रविष्टं बुद्ध्वा भावयति  
वर्धयति परिपालयति गर्भविरुद्धासनादिपरिहारमनुकूलशनाद्युपयोगं च  
कुर्वती ।

The vital germ having been transferred to the woman becomes her very self, i.e., it remains inseparable from her even as it was part and parcel of the father. As is a limb of hers, say the bosom, so is it now. For that reason the foetus does no injury to the mother as an abscess does. Because the seed has become one with her body like her bosom it does not cause her pain. Being pregnant and knowing that her husband's self has entered her body and found lodgement within herself she nourishes it and helps its growth by eschewing such food as is detrimental to a pregnant woman and taking that which is wholesome.<sup>1</sup>

सा भावयित्री भावयितव्या भवति तं स्त्री गर्भं  
विभर्ति सोऽग्र एव कुमारं जन्मनोऽग्रेऽधिभावयति ।

And she the protectress then deserves  
Herself all care. The woman bears  
The son in her womb and the man bestows  
His protecting care on the child before  
'Tis born and when 'tis born and after.

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<sup>1</sup> From this it is evident that during pregnancy which is a critical period, the growing child requires all possible care. भावयति—भावयेत्, indicative for the imperative mood.

सा भावयित्री वर्धयित्री भर्तुरात्मनो गर्भभूतस्य भावयितव्या रक्षयितव्या च भर्ता भवति । न ह्युपकारप्रत्युपकारमन्तरेण लोके कस्व-  
चित्केनचित्संबन्ध उपपद्यते । तं गर्भं स्त्री यथोक्तेन गर्भधारणविधानेन  
बिभर्ति धारयत्यग्रे प्राग्जन्मनः । स पिताऽग्रे एव पूर्वमेव जातमात्रं  
जन्मनोऽध्यूर्ध्वं जन्मनो जातं कुमारं जातकर्मादिना पिता भावयति ।

Because she protects and nourishes during pregnancy what is in essence the very self of her husband she too deserves to be well taken care of by the husband. No relationship of any kind will arise in the world without mutual obligation. The mother bears the child in her pregnancy as aforesaid, the father looks after it before its nativity (by requiring his wife to go through the *śimanta* —“parting of the hair” ceremony), at the time of nativity (by certain auspicious rites to ensure easy delivery), and after nativity by *jātakarma* or birth ritual.

स यत्कुमारं जन्मनोऽग्रेऽधिभावयत्यात्मानमेव  
तद्भावयत्येषां लोकानां संतत्या एवं संतता  
हीमे लोकास्तदस्य द्वितीयं जन्म ।

That son whom he with tender care  
Protects at birth and after birth  
Is verily his self whom he  
Has cherished that so these worlds may last  
Without a break. Even thus these worlds  
Retain their one perpetual course.  
Thus born he has his second birth.

स पिता यद्यस्मात्कुमारं जन्मनोऽध्यूर्ध्वमग्रे जातमात्रमेव जातकर्मा-  
दिना यद्भावयति तदात्मानमेव भावयति पितुरात्मैव हि पुत्ररूपेण  
जायते । तथा ह्युक्तं पतिर्जायां प्रविशतीत्यादि । तत्किमर्थमात्मानं

पुत्ररूपेण जनयित्वा भावयतीति । उच्यते—एषां लोकानां संतत्या अविच्छेदायेत्यर्थः । विच्छिद्येरन्हीमे लोकाः पुत्रोत्पादनादि यदि न कुर्युः केचन । एवं पुत्रोत्पादनादिकर्माविच्छेदेनैव संतताः प्रबन्धरूपेण वर्तन्ते हि यस्मादिमे लोकास्तस्मात्तदविच्छेदाय तत्कर्तव्यं न मोक्षायेत्यर्थः । तदस्य संसारिणः कुमाररूपेण मातुरुदराद्यभिर्गमनं तद्रेतोरुपापेक्षया द्वितीयं जन्म द्वितीयावस्थाभिव्यक्तिः ।

The father when he cherishes his son just when born and even afterwards by performing such ceremonies as *jātakarma*, cherishes (it may be said) his own self, because it is the father's self only that is born as son. So says the *śruti*, 'The husband enters the wife, etc.' Why does the father cherish the child having begotten (as it were) his own self? Lest there should be discontinuity in the world-process.<sup>1</sup> If none begot children the world-process would indeed cease. Because the continuous succession of the generations of men is possible only by not ceasing to beget sons it is binding on one to possess sons. It (the obligation), however, is not for the purpose of obtaining one's release.<sup>2</sup> Hence when he, the *samsārin*, leaves the mother's womb as son he is (said to take on) the second birth in contradistinction to (his state) as the seed: *i.e.*, his second state manifests itself.

<sup>1</sup> लोक here should be taken to mean sons and grandsons through whom the father attains the worlds of *svarga*, etc.

<sup>2</sup> पुत्रोत्पादनस्य लोकसंततिरेव प्रयोजनमिति वदन्त्या श्रुत्या तस्य मोक्षसाधनत्वं निरस्तं.

The propagating of one's progeny is only for the purpose of maintaining the world-cycle in unbroken continuity. It is by no means helpful for one's *mokṣa*.



सोऽस्यायमात्मा पुण्येभ्यः कर्मभ्यः प्रतिधीयते ।

That son who is his very self  
Is stationed now in his father's stead  
His acts of merit to continue.

अस्य पितुः सोऽयं पुत्रात्मा पुण्येभ्यः शास्त्रोक्तेभ्यः कर्मभ्यः कर्मनिष्पादनार्थं प्रतिधीयते पितुः स्थाने पित्रा यत्कर्तव्यं तत्करणाय प्रतिनिधीयत इत्यर्थः । तथा च संप्रतिविद्यायां वाजसनेयके—“पित्राऽ-नुशिष्टोऽहं ब्रह्माहं यज्ञ इत्यादि प्रतिपद्य [ते]” इति ।

Being born as the very self of his father the son steps into his place to perform all the good deeds enjoined in the scriptures. He now represents the father in whatever deed he, the father, had to do. In the *vājasaneyaka* (*śuklayajurveda*) dealing with the *Samprattividyā*,<sup>1</sup> it is stated thus: “Commanded by my father I am Brahman, I am sacrifice.”<sup>2</sup>

अथास्यामितर आत्मा कृतकृत्यो  
वयोगतः प्रैति स इतः प्रयत्नेव  
पुनर्जायते तदस्य तृतीयं जन्म ।

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<sup>1</sup> संप्रतिः संप्रदानं स कर्तव्यस्य पुत्रे स्थापनं यत्रोच्यते सा संप्रति-विद्येत्यर्थः—*Ānandagiri*.

*Sampratti* means the giving away or transference; that topic is termed *Samprattividyā* wherein is described the duty which, having been transferred to him by the father, the son has to do; *vide Brh. Up.*, I. v-17.

<sup>2</sup> Desiring to reach the heavenly regions the father when about to part this life addresses his son thus: ‘You are Brahman, you are Yogin, you are loka’, i.e., the Veda (*Brahman*) which I had to recite, you recite; the sacrifice I had to perform, you perform; the worlds to be obtained by me, you ought to attain.’ *Cf. Brh. Up.*, I. 5. 17.

Then, this his other self, from life  
Doth part, his duties all discharged  
And decrepit with age. And he  
Assumes another birth while yet  
He is casting his mortal self behind;  
And of his births that is the third.

अयानन्तरं पुत्रे निवेश्याऽऽत्मनो भारमस्य पुत्रस्वेतरोऽयं यः  
पित्रात्मा कृतकृत्यः कर्तव्याहणत्रयाद्विमुक्तः । कृतकर्तव्य इत्यर्थः ।  
वयोगतो गतवया जीर्णः सन्प्रैति म्रियते । स इतोऽस्मात्प्रयत्नेव शरीरं  
परित्यज्येव तृणजलकावेहान्तरमुपाददानः कर्मचितं पुनर्जायते ।  
तदस्य मृत्वा प्रतिपत्तव्यं यत्तत्तृतीयं जन्म ।

After transferring his own responsibility to his son  
this alter ego, namely, the father, having accomplished  
his duties by fulfilling the three obligations and wasted  
with years, dies and while yet leaving his body behind,  
like the caterpillar takes on another body as determined  
by his karma. That life which he has to assume after  
death constitutes his third birth.<sup>1</sup>

ननु संसरतः पितुः सकाशाद्रेतोरूपेण प्रथमं जन्म । तस्यैव

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<sup>1</sup> It is to be noted that the śruti declares that the assumption of a new body by those who depart either along the path of the gods देवयान or of the manes पितृयान is only after reaching the worlds beyond ; Cf. Ved. Sūt. IV. 3. 35. Hence doubt arises as to how the jīva can take on another body even when departing this life. It is explained that the jīva when about to migrate assumes the subtle body वासनामयशरीर, though not the gross body which alone is the proper vehicle for experiencing joy and sorrow. The question, however, is purely eschatological.

कुमाररूपेण मातुर्द्वितीयं जन्मोक्तम् । तस्यैव तृतीये जन्मनि वक्तव्ये  
प्रेतस्य पितुर्यजन्म तत्तृतीयमिति कथमुच्यते । नैष दोषः । पितापुत्रयो-  
रैकात्म्यस्य विवक्षितत्वात् । सोऽपि पुत्रः स्वपुत्रे भारं निधायेतः प्रयत्नेन  
पुनर्जायते यथा पिता । तदन्यत्रोक्तमितरत्राप्युक्तमेव भवतीति मन्यते  
श्रुतिः । पितापुत्रयोरेकात्मकत्वात् ।

A question may be raised. A *samsārin* (one who has entered on the life-current) has his first birth in the form of seed in relation to his father; and it is said that for him there is the second birth in the form of son in relation to his mother; if to him only, a third birth is to be ascribed how can the birth of his deceased father be regarded as his third birth? Here is no flaw; because we have already spoken of the identity between his self and that of his father. Again the son also having shifted the burden on to his son is born again while in the act of leaving this world. What has been said in one place is in reality to be understood in another place; such is the implication of the śruti, as witness the identity of selves in the case of father and son.

तदुक्तमृषिणा—

गर्भे नु सन्नन्वेषामवेदमहं देवानां जनिमानि विश्वा ।

शतं मा पुर आयसीररक्षन्नघः श्येनो जवसा निरदीयमिति

गर्भ एवैतच्छयानो वामदेव एवमुवाच ।

(Referring to the Supreme Reality) the mantra (R̥ṣi) has said :—

“Albeit I dwelt inside the womb,  
All the births of all the gods

I saw ; and a hundred bodies

Iron-wrought held me fast ;

Then out I came as quick as a hawk."

Thus spake Varnadeva while yet in the womb.

एवं संसारबन्धव्याभिव्यक्तित्रयेण जन्ममरणप्रबन्धारूढः सर्वो लोकः  
संसारसमुद्रे निपतितः कथंचिद्यथाश्रुत्युक्तमात्मानं विजानाति यस्यां  
कस्यांचिदवस्थायां तदैव मुक्तसर्वसंसारबन्धनः कृतकृत्यो भवतीत्येतद्वस्तु  
तद्दृष्ट्वा मन्त्रेणाप्युक्तमित्याह—गर्भे नु मातुर्गर्भाशय एव सन् । न्विति  
वितर्के । अनेकजन्मान्तरभावनापरिपाकवशादेशां देवानां वागग्न्यादीनां  
जनिमानि जन्मानि विश्वा विश्वानि सर्वाण्यन्ववेदमहमहो अनुबुद्ध-  
वानस्मीत्यर्थः । शतमनेकं बह्व्यो मा मां पुर आयसीरायस्यो लोहमय्य  
इवाभेद्यानि शरीराणीत्यभिप्रायः । अरक्षन्रक्षितवत्यः । संसारपाश-  
निर्गमनादधोऽधः श्येन इव जालं भित्त्वा ज्वसाऽऽत्मज्ञानकृतसामर्थ्येन  
निरदीयं निर्गतोऽस्मि । अहो ; गर्भे एव शयानो वामदेव ऋषिरेवमुवाच-  
तन् ।

Thus migrating from one to the other of the three states as they become manifest in turn the whole of mankind has entered on the endless cycle of births and deaths and fallen into the ocean of *samsāra*. If however some individual (a purified jīva) in whatever stage he might be (either in the mother's womb or in any of the āśramas-brahmacharya, etc.) should realise the nature of the Ātman as delineated in the scriptures, in that stage only, he finds that all his worldly ties are snapped and that he has achieved the ultimate aim of life. The mantra (Ṛṣi) also has given utterance to this truth in the hymn beginning with the words, 'In the womb, etc.' i.e., remaining in the mother's womb only. The particle 'nu' indicates reflection.

‘Having cogitated upon the problem of self and non-self (Bhāvana) through many a life I came to know of all the births of all the gods like Vāk, Agni, etc. Ah ! I woke up (from my slumbers).’ The second half of the mantra may be interpreted thus: ‘Manifold have been the bodies which like impenetrable iron houses held me safe (lest I should escape). As a bird cuts underneath,<sup>1</sup> the net in which it has been caught and escapes so I got out quick with the strength of the knowledge of the Ātman.’<sup>2</sup> Ah! the Ṛṣi Vamadeva even when dwelling in the womb spoke thus.

स एवं विद्वानस्माच्छरीरभेदादूर्ध्व  
उत्क्रम्यामुष्मिन्स्वर्गे लोके सर्वान्का-  
मानाप्त्वाऽमृतः समभवत्समभवत् ॥  
(यथास्थानं गर्भिण्यः) ।

<sup>1</sup> अयः=अधोलोकेष्वेव ; निकृष्टलोकेष्वेव, अरक्षन्, i.e., kept me safe in the lower worlds ; or अय may be understood as having been used for अय—then, after receiving enlightenment.

What was previously said in the Brāhmaṇa (पुरुषेहवा etc.) is repeated here in the mantra “Ah ! residing in the womb, etc.”

<sup>2</sup> Because the process of purification had gone on in previous births enlightenment was imminent and Vāmadeva spoke words of wisdom while yet in the mother’s womb. He remained in life as a Jīvanmukta till his prārabdha-karma was worn out and then with the severance of his mortal self he reached the highest state of bliss. No doubt to one in the womb there is no instruction either from the scriptures or from a preceptor but the discipline of past lives came to fruition and the truth dawned on Vāmadeva even before his actual birth.

Emerging thus from these mortal coils  
 The enlightened sage his upward path  
 Betook and in the land of bliss  
 Had all his longings satisfied ;  
 Became immortal, became immortal.

(Let the pregnant women re-assemble).

स वामदेव ऋषिर्यथोक्तमात्मानमेवं विद्वानसाच्छरीरभेदाच्छरीरस्या-  
 विद्यापरिकल्पितस्याऽऽयसवदनिर्भेद्यस्य जननमरणाद्यनेकानर्थशताविष्ट-  
 शरीरप्रबन्धनस्य परमात्मज्ञानामृतोपयोगजनितवीर्यकृतभेदाच्छरीरोत्प-  
 त्तिबीजाविद्या निमित्तोपमर्दहेतोः शरीरविनाशादित्यर्थः ऊर्ध्वः  
 परमात्ममृतः सन्नद्योभावात्संसारादुत्क्रम्य ज्ञानावद्योतितामलसर्वात्मभाव-  
 मापन्नः सन्नमुष्मिन्यथोक्तेऽजरेऽमरेऽमृतेऽभये सर्वज्ञेऽपूर्वेऽनपरेऽनन्तेऽ-  
 बाह्ये प्रज्ञानामृतैकरसे प्रदीपवज्जिर्वाणमत्यगमत्स्वर्गे लोके स्वस्मिन्नात्मनि  
 स्वे स्वरूपेऽमृतः समभवदात्मज्ञानेन पूर्वमाप्तकामतया जीवन्नेव सर्वा-  
 न्कामानाप्त्वेत्यर्थः । द्विवचनं सफलस्य सोदाहरणस्याऽऽत्मज्ञानस्य  
 परिसमाप्तिप्रदर्शनार्थम् ॥

He, the Ṛṣi Vāmadeva, realizing the nature of the Ātman as described, having forced his way out of his body which is fashioned by nescience, and is as impenetrable as iron, and held in the grip of *samsāra* teeming with a hundred ills due to recurring births and deaths—all with the strength generated by the tasting of the nectar of divine knowledge (paramātmajñāna) and thus having caused the destruction of the seed of *samsāra* which is the product of *avidyā*; in other words, with the decay and death of the body he rose upwards, became himself paramātman—the Absolute; stepping out of the downward-dragging *samsāra* and assuming the pure

state of universal self, illumined by knowledge, attained the supreme state of radiant bliss in that region of joy (svarga),<sup>1</sup> described as ageless, deathless, immortal, fearless, all-wise, having neither priority nor posteriority, endless, having no exteriority, being one continuous flow of the nectar of wisdom. This attainment of bliss is no other than the return to one's own true nature. Even in the Jivanmukti state the liberated self will have had its desires fulfilled (there is no greater joy than that which comes from one's realization of the supreme).<sup>2</sup> The repetition (of *anantabharat*—attained) is to indicate the conclusion of the description of the fruit of ātma-jñāna and of the illustration therefor.

<sup>1</sup> The word स्वर्ग should not be taken to mean the land of joy which is its usual sense. It is not the goal of one who has scrupulously performed the Vedic ritual that is spoken of here. It means the bliss of Brahman, liberation itself. The term svarga is appropriate only to the state of eternal happiness. In a relative sense alone can it be applied to the region abounding in the joys of sense.

<sup>2</sup> Though the pleasures of sense are absent in the liberated condition it must be pointed out that all our worldly happiness is but an infinitesimal fraction of the joy that comes from Brahmajñāna. It is but a partial expression of the all-pervading bliss of the knowledge of the eternal and it baffles all attempts at definition and description. When the Jivanmukti state is attained the purified self becomes the Supreme Ātman who is the giver of all joys from the smallest to the highest (Cf. *Tait. Up.*, II. 8.1-4). Śaṅkara therefore explains that the joys mentioned as falling to the share of Vāmadeva refer to the felicities of the Jivanmukti state.

## CHAPTER V

### पंचमोऽध्यायः

ॐ कोऽयमात्मेति वयमुपास्महे कतरः स आत्मा ।

Om ! who is this Atman whom we adore ?

Which of the two is he, that Atman ?

ब्रह्मविद्यासाधनकृतसर्वात्मभावफलावार्तिं वामदेवाद्याचार्यपरम्परया श्रुत्याऽवद्योत्यमानां ब्रह्मवित्परिषद्यत्नन्तप्रसिद्धामुपलभमाना मुमुक्षवो ब्राह्मणा अधुना ब्रह्म जिज्ञासवोऽनित्यात्साध्यसाधनलक्षणात्संसारादा-जीवभावाद्वयाविवृतसवो विचारयन्तोऽन्योन्यं पृच्छन्ति कोऽयमात्मेति कथं यमात्मानमयमात्मेति साक्षाद्वयमुपास्महे कः स आत्मेति । यं चाऽऽत्मानमयमात्मेति साक्षादुपासीनो वामदेवोऽमृतः समभवत्तमेव वयमप्युपास्महे को नु खलु स आत्मेति । एवं जिज्ञासापूर्वमन्योन्यं पृच्छतामतिक्रान्तविशेषविषयश्रुतिसंस्कारजनिता स्मृतिरजायत । तं प्रपदाभ्यां प्रापद्यत ब्रह्मेमं पुरुषम् । स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्यैतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत । एतमेव पुरुषम् । अत्र द्वे ब्रह्मणी इतरेतरप्रातिकूल्येन प्रतिपन्ने इति । ते चास्य पिण्डस्याऽऽत्मभूते । तयोरन्यतर आत्मोपास्यो भवितुमर्हति । योऽत्रोपास्यः कः स आत्मेति विशेषनिर्धारणार्थं पुनरन्योन्यं पप्रच्छुर्विचारयन्तः ।

Intent on achieving the goal of universal selfhood (सर्वात्मभाव) rendered possible only with the aid of Brahma-vidyā, which preceptors like Vāmadeva and the rest (by their realization) and the scriptures (by their teaching) have made explicit and which is the most reputed topic of discussion in the assembly of the



learned, the Brāhmaṇās, the seekers after Brahman, longing for immortality, now discoursing on Brahman and anxious to get rid of their finite selfhood (जीवभावत्व) which is impermanent, subject to the operation of the law of cause and effect and bound to (the wheel of) *samsāra*, ask each the other in their inquiry, "Who is this Ātman? Who is the Ātman whom we are endeavouring to realize as our own immediate self?"<sup>1</sup> We would also like to realize that very Ātman meditating on whom as his very self the Ṛṣi Vāmadeva became immortal." When thus interlocuting, there flashed upon their minds the recollection of a former scriptural text (1. III. 6) wherein specific reference had been made to the entry of the two Puruṣas into the body: "Brahman entered this person by the feet": "He split open the skull and entered the same person by this passage".<sup>2</sup> Here, two Brahmins are seen to have entered the body from opposite directions. They both became the selves of this body. But one of these two selves is fit to be meditated upon. Then who is he that is to be meditated upon? Thus in order to determine who in special has to be regarded as the object of meditation they (the Brahma-seekers) again questioned each other, *i.e.*, conducted their investigation.

<sup>1</sup> उपास्महे, *lit.* we meditate upon; but here the word *upāsana* means realization.

<sup>2</sup> Prāṇa (Hiraṇyagarbha) and Brahman are both described as having found entry into the body. Doubt arises as to which of these two should the seekers turn their minds.

येन वा पश्यति येन वा शृणोति येन वा  
गन्धानाजिघ्रति येन वा वाचं व्याकरोति  
येन वा स्वादु चास्वादु च विजानाति ।

And that indeed by which he sees  
And that indeed by which he hears  
And that indeed by which he smells  
The scents, and that indeed by which  
He utters speech, and that by which  
He tastes what's sweet and what is not.

पुनस्तेषां विचारयतां विशेषविचारणास्पदविषया मतिरभूत् । कथं,  
द्वे वस्तुनी अस्मिन्निषण्ड उपलभ्येते अनेकभेदमिच्छेन करणेन येनोप-  
लभते यश्चैक उपलभते करणान्तरोपलब्धविषयस्मृतिप्रतिसंधानात् ।  
तत्र न तावद्येनोपलभते स आत्मा भवितुमर्हति । के न पुनरुपलभत  
इति । उच्यते । येन वा चक्षुर्भूतेन रूपं पश्यति येन वा शृणोति  
श्रोत्रभूतेन शब्दं येन वा घ्राणभूतेन गन्धानाजिघ्रति येन वाक्करणभूतेन  
वाचं नामात्मिकां व्याकरोति गौरश्च इत्येवमाद्यां साध्वसाध्विति च येन  
वा जिह्वाभूतेन स्वादु चास्वादु च विजानातीति ।

Again to those engaged in deliberation there arose  
the desire to make a more specific enquiry. How?  
Two entities are cognized in the body: that which  
serves as an instrument of cognition through its  
different functional activities and that which cognizes  
remaining single, by recollecting and recognizing  
(pratyabhijñā) what has been garnered by the senses.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> The witnessing consciousness साक्षिन् is one, and  
being the ground of all modes of cognition acquires as many  
names as are the channels of cognition. Cf. "श्रोत्रस्य श्रोत्रं  
मनसो मनो यद्वाचोह्वाचं स उ घ्राणस्य घ्राणश्चक्षुषश्चक्षुः"

—Kena Up., 1-2; also Brh. Up., IV. 4-18.

Of these two the one through whose instrumentality cognition takes place is not fit to become the Ātman (because it is only an instrument). (Hence the cognizer must be the Ātman as explained later on.) By what then is cognition possible (*i.e.*, who is it that cognizes?) This is the answer:—By that which having become sight perceives shapes, by that which having become hearing hears sounds, by that which having become (the sense of) smell scents odours, by that which having become (the organ of) speech distinguishes words which are only names as *gau* (cow) and *astah* (horse), etc., and determines which are (grammatically) correct and which not; and by that which having become (the sense of) taste understands what is sweet and what is not.

किं पुनस्तदेवैकमनेकधा भिन्नं करणमिति, उच्यते—

How again is it to be understood that the very (prāṇa which entered the body by the feet) is the single sense-organ split up into diverse ones? The śruti answers:—

तदेतद्धृदयं मनश्चैतत् ।

The same is the heart, the same is the mind.

यदुक्तं पुरस्तात्प्रजानां रेतो हृदयं हृदयस्य रेतो मनो मनसा सृष्टा आपश्च वरुणश्च हृदयान्मनो मनसश्चन्द्रमास्तदेवैतद्धृदयं मनश्चैकमेतदनेकधा । एतेनान्तःकरणेनैकेन चक्षुर्भूतेन रूपं पश्यति श्रोत्रभूतेन शृणोति घ्राणभूतेन जिघ्रति वाग्भूतेन वदति जिह्वाभूतेन रसयति स्वेनैव विकल्पनारूपेण मनसा विकल्पयति हृदयरूपेणाध्यवस्यति । तस्मात्सर्व-करणविषयव्यापारकमेकमिदं करणं सर्वोपलब्ध्यर्थमुपलब्धुः । तथा च

कौपीतिकिनाम्—“प्रज्ञया वाचं समाख्य वाचा सर्वाणि नामान्वाप्नोति प्रज्ञया चक्षुः समाख्य चक्षुषा सर्वाणि रूपाण्यवाप्नोति” इत्यादि । वाजसनेयके च—“मनसा ज्ञेयं पश्यति मनसा शृणोति हृदयेन हि रूपाणि जानाति” इत्यादि । तस्मादहृदयमनोवाच्यस्य सर्वोपलब्धि-करणत्वं प्रसिद्धम् । तदात्मकश्च प्राणो यो वै प्राणः सा प्रज्ञा या वै प्रज्ञा स प्राण इति ब्राह्मणम् । करणसंहतिरूपश्च प्राण इत्यवोचाम प्राण-संवादादौ ।

What was said before, viz., “that the heart is the very essence of men; the mind is the very essence of the heart” (*Ait. Āraṇyaka*, II. 1-3); “and that from the mind waters and Varuna were created; from the heart the mind and from the mind, the moon”; that same heart and mind being one only, appear as many. With this single internal sense—*antahkaraṇa*—as (transforming itself into) the sense of sight, he, the puruṣa, sees shapes and colours; as the sense of hearing hears; as the sense of smell smells; as the speech-sense utters speech; as the taste-sense tastes: with the mind which is but its own transformation cogitates and with itself as heart (*antahkaraṇa*) determines (*adhyavasyati*).<sup>1</sup> Hence this one sense serves the purpose of bringing within the range of the cognizer all forms and all varieties of knowledge (i.e., it discharges the functions of all sensory organs). Thus say the Kausītakis (*Kau. Up.*,

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<sup>1</sup> *Antahkaraṇa* (heart or mind) is the one internal sense of which the other sense-organs are only facets as it were. In its cogitating function it goes by the name of mind. *Antahkaraṇa* as activation is *prāṇa* and as intellection, mind. It possesses both *kriyāśakti* and *jñānaśakti*.

III. 6-6) : “ The Ātman reflected in *antahkaraṇa* identifies himself with the sense of speech and with speech appropriates all names; with *prajñā* he identifies himself with the sense of sight and with the eye appropriates all forms ” and so on. In the *Vājasaneyaka* (*Brh. Up.*, I. 5-3) (it is said that) “ with the mind only he sees, with the mind hears; certainly with the heart knows (different) shapes ” and so on. Hence it is well known that the organ termed heart or mind is the one instrument of knowledge which can bring within its compass the functions of all sense-organs. The *Prāṇa* is identical with it (not different from the heart); as witness the *Brāhmaṇa*. “ That which is *prāṇa* is indeed *prajñā*, that which is *prajñā* is *prāṇa*.” In the *prāṇa*-dialogue, etc., it has been said that *prāṇa* is but the aggregate of the senses (*cf. Chand. Up.*, III. 18; VII. 15).<sup>1</sup>

तस्माद्यत्पद्भ्यां प्रापद्यत तद्ब्रह्म तदुपलब्धुरुपलब्धिकरणत्वेन गुण-  
भूतत्वान्नैव तद्वस्तु ब्रह्मोपास्यात्मा भवितुमर्हति । पारिशेष्याद्यस्योप-  
लब्धुरुपलब्ध्यर्था एतस्य हृदयस्य मनोरूपस्य करणस्य वृत्तयो वक्ष्यमाणाः  
स उपलब्धोपास्य आत्मा नोऽस्माकं भवितुमर्हतीति निश्चयं कृतवन्तः ।

It is therefore evident that the Brahman who finds entry by the feet serving only as the channel of knowledge to the person and hence playing only a

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<sup>1</sup> The *prāṇa* becomes the substrate of all senses because it is identical with the *antahkaraṇa*. *Prāṇa* therefore should be regarded as an *indriya* or sense-organ. All functions, sensory, mental, volitional and organic, proceed from the identical source—Ātman mirroring forth in *antahkaraṇa*.

subordinate part (गुणभूतत्वात्) is not fit to be the Brahman of contemplation (and realization). The alternative (by way of residue) then is that the knower, the Ātman, for whom the innumerable notions of the heart and mind to be herein detailed are intended, is the fit object of contemplation by us. Thus they (the seers) decided.

तदन्तःकरणोपाधिस्थस्योपलब्धुः प्रज्ञानरूपस्य ब्रह्माण उपलब्ध्वर्या  
या अन्तःकरणवृत्तयो बाह्यान्तर्वर्तिविषयविषयास्ता इमा उच्यन्ते—

Those mental modes, which relate to both what is objective and subjective (बाह्यान्तर्वर्तिविषयविषयाः) and which are meant for the cognizer, i.e., Brahman who is consciousness itself and whose cognition results from his being conditioned (अध्यस्य) by *antahkaraṇa*, are here related :—

संज्ञानमाज्ञानं विज्ञानं प्रज्ञानं मेधा  
दृष्टिर्धृतिर्मतिर्मनीषा जूतिः स्मृतिः  
संकल्पः क्रतुरसुः कामो वश इति ।

Apprehension, overlordship, erudition,  
Knowledge, retentiveness and alertness of sense,  
Fortitude, deliberation and freedom,  
Bodily anguish and recollection  
Discrimination, zeal, endeavour to meet  
One's physical wants, desire and love ;

संज्ञानं संज्ञसिश्चेतनभावः । आज्ञानमाज्ञसिरीश्वरभावः । विज्ञानं  
कलादिपरिज्ञानम् । प्रज्ञानं प्रज्ञसिः प्रज्ञता । मेधा ग्रन्थधारणसामर्थ्यम् ।  
दृष्टिरिन्द्रियद्वारा सर्वविषयोपलब्धिः । धृतिर्धारणमवसन्नानां शरीरेन्द्रि-

याणां ययोत्तम्भनं भवति धृत्या शरीरमुद्वहन्तीति हि वदन्ति ।  
मतिर्मननम् । मनीषा तत्र स्वातन्त्र्यम् । जूतिश्चेतसो रुजादिदुःस्वित्व-  
भावः । स्मृतिः स्मरणम् । संकल्पः शुक्लकृष्णादिभावेन संकल्पनं  
रूपादीनाम् । क्रतुरध्यवसायः । असुः प्राणनादिजीवनक्रियानिमित्ता  
वृत्तिः । कामोऽसंनिहितविषयाकाङ्क्षा नृष्णा । वशः स्त्रीव्यतिकराद्यभि-  
लाषः । इत्येवमाद्या अन्तःकरणवृत्तयः प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रस्योपलब्धिरूपलब्ध्यर्थ-  
त्वाच्छुद्धप्रज्ञानरूपस्य ब्रह्मण उपाधिभूतास्तदुपाधिजनितगुणनामधेयानि  
भवन्ति संज्ञानादीनि ।

*Samjñānam* is apprehension which is the mark of  
sentient beings; *ājñānam* is the sense of mastery;  
*vijñānam* is knowledge of arts, etc.; *prajñānam* is com-  
prehension; *medhā* is retentiveness of knowledge  
obtained from studying works; *dr̥ṣṭi* is the power of  
grasping all objects through sense-activity; *dhṛtiḥ* is  
fortitude by which the otherwise drooping bodily and  
sense-organs are supported as when they say 'they  
carry the body with steadfastness'; *matiḥ* is pondering  
over; *manīṣā* is freedom therein (*i.e.*, deliberation and  
free choice); *jūtiḥ* is the state of suffering caused by  
diseases, etc.; *smṛtiḥ* is recollection; *saṅkalpaḥ* is  
differentiation as when sorting white and black among  
colours; *kratuḥ* is zealous pursuit of an object; *asuḥ*  
is the pursuit of a calling for one's living; *kāmaḥ* is  
the thirsting desire for an object that is not within  
one's reach (for the time being); *vaśaḥ* is the desire for  
the company of women—these and other mental modes  
(अन्तःकरण वृत्तयः) because they subserve the cognizer  
who is mere sentience in the act of cognition, are to  
be regarded as the limiting factors of Brahman who is

of the nature of pure consciousness: and the names, apprehension. etc., which are the outcome of upādhis become in a figurative sense (गौण) the names of Brahman.<sup>1</sup>

सर्वाण्येवैतानि प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवन्ति ।

All these, of Prajna, are only names.

सर्वाण्येवैतानि प्रज्ञप्तिमात्रस्य प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवन्ति न स्वतः साक्षात् । तथा चोक्तं प्राणश्चैव प्राणो नाम भवतीत्यादि ।

All these (beginning with येनवापश्यति and ending with कामोदशः) indeed become the names of pure Consciousness, i.e., of that which is known as Prajñānam but not directly (can they manifest themselves because the vṛttis are insentient).<sup>2</sup> To this effect the śruti declares: "By the act of breathing only, He (the Supreme Being) is styled prāṇa, etc." *Brh. Up.*, I. 4-7.

<sup>1</sup> After establishing that prāṇa is a karapa or sense-organ and that as such cannot become the object of devotion, the scripture proceeds to the inference of the existence of Brahman—the cognizer, through the Karapa vṛttis or mental modes, viz., samjñānam, etc. There must be one to witness the operations of the mind and He is the Brahman.

<sup>2</sup> This is reducing variety into unity. It is by their superimposition on the luminous self that the mental modes like seeing, hearing, etc., acquire their illuminating character, i.e., power to bring objects within one's cognizance. The one sentience prajñānam is the invariable concomitant of all notions and this is no other than the Ātman rid of all ascriptions—शोधितः. It is other than the senses, other than the sense-perceptions, being self-luminous, the constant witness of all mental modes:—सर्वकरण तद्वृत्तिव्यतिरिक्तः स्व-प्रकाशात्मकः सर्वसाक्षी सर्ववृत्त्यनुगतः एक आत्मा शोधितः.



एष ब्रह्मैष इन्द्र एष प्रजापतिरेते सर्वे देवा इमानि  
च पञ्च महाभूतानि पृथिवी वायुराकाश आपो  
ज्योतीर्षीत्येतानीमानि च क्षुद्रमिश्राणीव ।

He is Brahman,<sup>1</sup> He is Indra<sup>2</sup>  
He is the Lord of beings and all  
The gods and the great elements five :  
Earth and air, sky, waters and fire  
And creatures mixed of inferior kind.

स एष प्रज्ञानरूप आत्मा ब्रह्मापरं सर्वशरीरस्य प्राणः प्रज्ञात्माऽन्तः-  
करणोपाधिष्वनुप्रविष्टो जलभेदगतसूर्यप्रतिबिम्बवद्विरण्यगर्भः प्राणः  
प्रज्ञात्मा । एष एवेन्द्रो गुणादेवराजो वा । एष प्रजापतिर्यः प्रथमजः  
शरीरी । यतो मुखादिनिर्भेदद्वारेणाग्न्यादयो लोकपाला जाताः । स  
प्रजापतिरेष एव । येऽप्येतेऽग्न्यादयः सर्वे देवा एष एव । इमानि च  
सर्वशरीरोपादानभूतानि पञ्च पृथिव्यादीनि महाभूतान्यन्नान्नादत्त्वलक्षणा-  
न्येतानि । किंचेमानि च क्षुद्रमिश्राणि क्षुद्रैरूपकैर्मिश्राणि । इवशब्दोऽ-  
नर्थकः ।

That person who is of the nature of pure wisdom—the Ātman, the lower Brahman (अपरंब्रह्म) is the life principle (प्राण or क्रियाशक्ति) dwelling in all bodies, is prajñātma (ज्ञानशक्ति). He, as Hiranyagarbha, has entered the reflecting medium of the inner sense-organ (*antah-karāṇa*) and appears like so many reflections of the

<sup>1</sup> एषब्रह्म—This Ātman is Brahman, i.e., not the Absolute but the lower Brahman.

<sup>2</sup> Indra is the name of the Supreme Being (Cf. 1-3), but here used to denote conditioned Brahman or Indra, the ruler of Svarga.

sun in different sheets of water and is described again as *prāṇa* and *prajñātma*. Himself is *Indra* (in the sense of *Īśvara*; cf. I. 3-10) because of his qualities, or the king of gods (*Indra*, the lord of *Svarga*). He is *Prajāpati*, who is the first-born embodied being.<sup>1</sup> It is the very *Prajāpati* from whom were born *Agni* and the rest of the world-preservers (fashioned in the *Virāt Puruṣa*—the lump described in 1-1). He is also *Agni* and all the other gods. He is again the five elements which are the material cause of all bodies, viz., earth, and the rest of the gross elements. He is all that is food and is fit for food. Finally, He constitutes all the lower order of beings—the conglomerate of tiny organisms.<sup>2</sup> The particle 'iva' is expletive.

बीजानीतराणि चेताराणि चाण्डजानि च जारु-  
जानि च खेदजानि चोद्भिज्जानि चाश्वा गावः  
पुरुषा हस्तिनो यत्किंचेदं प्राणि जङ्गमं च पतत्रि  
च यच्च स्थावरं सर्वं तत्प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं  
प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म ।

<sup>1</sup> प्रजापतिः—The *Virāt* or the aggregate of all gross bodies as distinguished from *Hiranyagarbha*, the aggregate of all subtle bodies.

<sup>2</sup> क्षुद्रमिश्राणि—The mass of inferior creatures.

क्षुद्रैः—अल्पकैः, मशक पिपीलिकादि देहैर्मिश्राणि, i.e., composed of such tiny living organisms as gnats, worms, etc.

The idea is that the whole creation from *Hiranyagarbha* down to the smallest living creature is but an emanation from the Supreme Reality.

The progenitors, each of its kind—  
 Those born of egg, those born of womb,  
 Those born of sweat and those that sprout,  
 Horses and cows, men and elephants  
 And all the rest of living beings—  
 Yes, those that walk and those that fly,  
 And those again of movement void,  
 All this is under the lordly sway  
 Of Prajna ; is rooted in Prajna ;  
 And swayed by Prajna is the world,  
 And Prajna is the stay of all ;  
 (Verily) Prajnanam is Brahman.

सर्पादीनि बीजानि कारणानीतराणि चेतराणि च द्वैराश्येन निर्दिश्य-  
 मानानि कानि तानि उच्यन्ते । अण्डजानि पक्ष्यादीनि । जारुजानि  
 जरायुजानि मनुष्यादीनि । स्वेदजानि यूकादीनि । उद्भिज्जानि च वृक्षा-  
 दीनि । अश्वा गावः पुरुषा हस्तिनोऽन्यच्च यत्किंचेदं प्राणिजातम् । किं  
 तत् । जङ्गमं यच्चलति पद्भ्यां गच्छति । यच्च पतन्नि । आकाशेन  
 पतनशीलम् । यच्च स्थावरमचलं सर्वं तदशेषतः प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञप्तिः प्रज्ञा  
 तच्च ब्रह्मैव नीयतेऽनेनेति नेत्रं प्रज्ञा नेत्रं यस्य तदिदं प्रज्ञानेत्रम् । प्रज्ञाने  
 ब्रह्मण्युत्पत्तिस्थितिलयकालेषु प्रतिष्ठितं प्रज्ञाश्रयमित्यर्थः । प्रज्ञानेत्रो  
 लोकः पूर्ववत् । प्रज्ञाचक्षुर्वा सर्व एव लोकः । प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा सर्वस्य जगतः ।  
 तस्मात्प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म । तदेतत्प्रत्यस्तमितसर्वोपाधिविशेषं सन्निरञ्जनं निर्मलं  
 निष्क्रियं शान्तमेकमद्वयं नेति नेतीति सर्वविशेषापोहसंवेद्यं सर्वशब्द-  
 प्रत्ययागोचरं तदत्यन्तविशुद्धप्रज्ञोपाधिसंबन्धेन सर्वज्ञमीश्वरं सर्व-  
 साधारणाव्याकृतजगद्बीजप्रवर्तकं नियन्तृत्वादन्तर्यामिसंज्ञं भवति ।  
 तदेव व्याकृतजगद्बीजभूतबुद्ध्यात्माभिमानलक्षणहिरण्यगर्भसंज्ञं भवति ।  
 तदेवान्तरण्डोद्भूतप्रथमशरीरोपाधिमद्विराट्प्रज्ञापतिसंज्ञं भवति । तदु-  
 ष्ण्मताग्न्याद्युपाधिमद्वेवतासंज्ञं भवति । तथा विशेषशरीरोपाधिष्वपि ।

ब्रह्मादिस्तम्बपर्यन्तेषु तत्तन्नामरूपलामो ब्रह्मणः । तदेवैकं सर्वोपाधिभेदमिच्छं  
सर्वैः प्राणिभिस्तार्किकैश्च सर्वप्रकारेण ज्ञायते विकल्प्यते चानेकधा ।

एतमेके वदन्त्यग्निं मनुमन्ये प्रजापतिम् ।

इन्द्रमेके परे प्राणमपरे ब्रह्म साधतम् ॥

इत्याद्या स्मृतिः ॥

Serpents and the rest are the propagators (of their species) and the several beings are divided into distinct classes as described here.<sup>1</sup> Which are these? They are:—Those born of egg like birds, etc.: those born of womb like men, etc. (*jāru, jarāyu, womb*); those born of sweat like lice, etc.; and those born of seed like trees. Horses, cattle, men, elephants; and all the assemblage of the living beings:—which is that? That which moves, *i.e.*, performs movement by walking with its feet: that which flies with its wings in the sky: that which is static, *i.e.*, devoid of motion—all this without exception is under the sway of Prajñā (Prajñānetram). Prajñāpti (consciousness) is Prajñā and that is Brahman Himself; that which is controlled by this is *netram*. Hence Prajñānetram means that (the whole universe) which has Prajñā as its controller.—The gist of the passage is that the Universe of beings has its stay in Prajñā (Brahman) at the time of its origination, its sustentation, and its dissolution or in other words, the universe is wholly dependent on Brahman. The

<sup>1</sup> The whole creation is classed as the static स्थावर and dynamic जंगम.

<sup>2</sup> प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोकः—मर्वस्य स्फुरणहेतुः—Brahman is the cause of the world-manifestation. It is the light of the world.

world is under the sway of Prajñā as explained above: or the whole world has Prajñā as its eye, *i.e.*, its very manifestation or appearance is dependent on Prajñā. Prajñā is the ground, the underlying basis of the whole universe. Therefore Prajñānam is Brahman.<sup>1</sup> That Brahman who is free from all ascriptions and is untainted, pure, actionless, peace, one only, secondless, characterized by such epithets as 'not that', 'not that', and understandable only by negating all qualifications and incapable of being cognized by notions conveyed by words—that same Brahman when delimited by Māya which is pure super-imposition (Visuddhopādhi)

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<sup>1</sup> प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म—Pure consciousness is Brahman. This aphoristic formula is regarded as one of the *mahārākyas* or great statements pointing to the identity of Ātman and Parabrahman—the individual soul and the Supreme. On a par with this R̥gvedic text we have अहं ब्रह्मास्मि (*Bṛh. Up.*, IV.1-10 of Yajurveda) 'I am Brahman'; तत्त्वमसि (*Chand. Up.*, VI.11-1 of Samaveda) 'That thou art'; अयमात्मा ब्रह्म (*Mand. Up.*, 2 of Atharvaveda) 'This Ātman is Brahman'. The *Aitareya Upaniṣad* begins with the text आत्मावा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीत्—Ātman alone there was in the beginning and concludes with the text प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म—the Prajñānam or the individual is Brahman. It is therefore evident that the sole teaching of the Upaniṣad is to inculcate the knowledge that Ātman and Parabrahman are identical. In accounting for the world creation the Upaniṣad declares that the infinite variety of physical objects and mental notions are but names of Prajñāna (सर्वाण्येवैतानि प्रज्ञानस्य नामधेयानि भवन्ति) and are themselves devoid of all substantial reality. The diremption of the Absolute is only apparent and phenomenal.

acquires the designation of the all-wise Īśvara and causing the universal undifferentiated world-seed to fructify, acquires mastery over all and thus is designated as *antaryāmin* (the indwelling ruler). The same Brahman gets the name of Hiranyagarbha who is the differentiated root-cause of the universe, when identifying himself with intellect (buddhi); coming out of the mundane egg the same Brahman who is the Virāt as the first embodied Being acquires the designation of Prajāpati (becomes Virāt when conditioned by the mundane egg and this Virāt is called Prajāpati) and is (known as) the first embodied being. That Brahman again delimited by Agni and the rest proceeding from it (the mundane egg) acquires the designation of devata. Similarly Brahman acquires several designations according to the several bodily limiting conditions. From Hiranyagarbha down to the smallest worm, Brahman acquires respective names and forms. Hence it is, that not only the generality of common people but even learned men (men well versed in reasoning) regard this single entity differentiated thus by all the upādhis, in all manner of ways and imagine it too as of several kinds.

“Some call It Agni, others Manu, Prajāpati;

Some Indra; others, Prāṇa; others Brahman;  
Śāśvatam (eternal).”

Such are the smṛtis (in support of the diversity of names by which the Absolute is known).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The creation process is summed up. The notion of plurality arises because of the variety assumed by the one Supreme Being. It is the difference in the superimposition—

स एतेन प्रज्ञेनाऽऽत्मनाऽऽसालोकादुत्क्रम्यामु-  
 ष्मिन्स्वर्गे लोके सर्वान्कामानाप्त्वाऽमृतः सम-  
 भवत्समभवत् ।

His inner self exalted thus  
 To state divine, he left this world  
 And in that world of supreme bliss  
 Obtained all that his heart desired  
 And gained Eternal Life and gained Eternal Life.

स वामदेवोऽन्यो वैवं यथोक्तं ब्रह्म वेद प्रज्ञेनाऽऽत्मना येनैव  
 प्रज्ञेनाऽऽत्मना पूर्वं विद्वांसोऽमृता अभूवंस्तथाऽयमपि विद्वानेतेनैव  
 प्रज्ञेनाऽऽत्मनाऽऽसालोकादुत्क्रम्येत्यादि व्याख्यातम् । अस्सालोका-  
 दुत्क्रम्यामुष्मिन्स्वर्गे लोके सर्वान्कामानाप्त्वाऽमृतः समभवदित्योमिति ॥

He, i.e., Vāmadeva or any other seer<sup>1</sup> like him  
 having understood the Brahman as described above,

pure or impure, that accounts for the different levels of evolution, knowledge, attainment and ethical purity in men and gods. The Absolute appears to sunder itself into distincts but with the dawn of knowledge the appearances vanish altogether and the pure Being alone remains.

The ethical implication of the Absolutistic doctrine is unmistakable. It is only when we understand the true nature of the Ātman—its all-embracing character, that we turn away from the mechanism of matter and find solace in the spirit and we rise above our narrow selves by our realising that the indwelling Ātman is the same as that which pervades the universe. Then we become alive to our kinship with the whole of creation and transcend our finiteness.

<sup>1</sup> वामदेवो अन्योवा—The object here is not to point out that Vāmadeva in particular obtained immortality by self-realisation but to emphasize the fact that any seeker who realises

to be his inner consciousness just as wise men of old reached immortality by holding to the truth that Prajñānam is Brahman, quitted the world<sup>1</sup> with the same realisation of identity....the rest has already been explained (II. 8 and 9). Om!<sup>2</sup>

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that his own soul rid of all impurities is no other than the Supreme Self is certain to attain Eternal Life.

<sup>1</sup> There is no going hence in mokṣa. A liberated soul need not traverse any region to reach its goal, nor need it take a flight upward as does a bird quitting its nest. All that is necessary is the abandonment of the illusory notion that the body itself is the Ātman—देहात्मभाव—and the realisation that the individual soul and the Supreme are one. Hence the phrase प्रज्ञेनात्मना.

<sup>2</sup> *Om iti*—Śaṅkara concludes his commentary with the auspicious utterance 'Om'; *iti* marks the end of the work.



## CHAPTER VI

### षष्ठोऽध्यायः

हरिः ॐ । वाङ्मे मनसि प्रतिष्ठिता मनो मे  
वाचि प्रतिष्ठितमाविरावीर्म एधि वेदस्य म  
आणीस्थः श्रुतं मे मा प्रहासीरनेनाधीतेनाहो-  
रात्रान्संदधाम्यृतं वदिष्यामि सत्यं वदिष्यामि  
तन्मामवतु तद्वक्तारमवत्ववतु मामवतु वक्तारमवतु  
वक्तारम् । ॐ शान्तिः शान्तिः शान्तिः ॥

Harih Om !

My speech is rooted in my mind  
My mind is rooted in my speech ;  
Brahman, reveal thyself to me,  
Ye mind and speech enable me  
To grasp the truth that the scriptures teach.  
Let what I have heard slip not from me ;  
I join day with night in study,  
I think the truth, I speak the truth ;  
May That protect me, may That protect  
The teacher, protect me,  
Protect the teacher, protect the Teacher.  
Om ! Peace, Peace, Peace.

These verses invoking divine blessings are chanted at the commencement of the Vedic study and also at its conclusion. The disciple sends up an earnest prayer to God—the Supreme Reality तत् both for himself and

for him who is his preceptor. The achievement from a successful pursuit of **scriptural** study is, in the case of the pupil (शिष्य), the riddance of his avidyâ with all its ills, and in the case of the teacher (आचार्य), the happiness of having found a worthy disciple to whom he could impart the traditional wisdom.—*Vidyāranya*.

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